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- Creators: School of Politics and Global Studies
- Creators: Benkert, Volker
- Member of: Barrett, The Honors College Thesis/Creative Project Collection
- Resource Type: Text
Description
Disinformation has long been a tactic used by the Russian government to achieve its goals. Today, Vladimir Putin aims to achieve several things: weaken the United States’ strength on the world stage, relieve Western sanctions on himself and his inner circle, and reassert dominant influence over Russia’s near abroad (the Baltics, Ukraine, etc.). This research analyzed disinformation in English, Spanish, and Russian; noting the dominant narratives and geopolitical goals Russia hoped to achieve by destabilizing democracy in each country/region.
ContributorsHorowitz, Jamie Fara (Author) / Sivak, Henry (Thesis director) / Brown, Keith (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
This thesis is based on the responses of Soviet Displaced Persons collected by the Harvard Study on the Soviet Social System (HPSSS), an oral history conducted in Munich and New York from 1950 to 1951 in which former Soviet citizens were interviewed. They were primarily interviewed about daily life within the Soviet Union. A total of 331 displaced persons were interviewed over the course of the study, with most individuals receiving multiple interview sessions. These sessions were divided broadly as A and B sections. The A-section, which the majority of interviewees received and was viewed by the compilers as a broad sociological inquiry, was divided into subsections focusing on Soviet work, government, family, education, communication, philosophy of life, and ideology. The B-sections were used for deeper anthropological inquiries and are potentially more controversial due to the use of Rorschach tests and situational responses. Fewer respondents were continued on to the B interviews which contained a variety of subsections, though most respondents were only asked questions from one or two sections of the greater whole. A portion of the B section interviews do provide valuable insight to my thesis for their focus on the Displaced Person status of the interviewees. The project consisted of 764 separate interviews of the 331 respondents. The interviewers for the HPSSS were primarily graduate students, ranging from history, sociology, psychology and economics departments, with varying degrees of fluency in Russian and Ukrainian. Some of the interviewers went on to become leading experts in Soviet Studies in the years to follow. Others stopped publishing, following the major publication of the HPSSS in the late 1950s, which may indicate a move to the private sector or employment within the federal government rather than academics. While not possible to include within my analysis, the major publications of the study also included the insights garnered from nearly ten thousand written questionnaires of DPs that were tabulated and discarded prior to publication.
ContributorsWilder, Ian (Author) / Manchester, Laurie (Thesis director) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Benkert, Volker (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
The purpose of this paper is to examine why the Russian government has been taking political, economic, and military actions in Belarus and Ukraine, and the extent to which the Russian people support these actions. Many observers in the West seem to believe that the Russian government is forcing its political will onto Russian citizens. However, public opinion research indicates that Russian citizens express a genuine support for the regime's political behavior in neighboring countries. Russian citizens seem to support the decisions to build closer relations with countries they consider culturally significant or culturally similar to themselves. Perhaps the clearest examples of these sentiments occur in relationships with Belarus and Ukraine. This is especially apparent when compared to Russian relations with the Baltic nations. Although these nations are home to a large numbers of Russians, the citizens of Russia do not consider the Baltics as significant as Belarus or Ukraine because of pronounced cultural differences. In this context, it seems as though Russian public opinion drives government action toward international relations with the Near Abroad nations perhaps just as much as the government influences public opinion.
ContributorsFranko, Blake Isaac (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis director) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Benkert, Volker (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
After World War II both Japanese and Germans had to come to grips with the reality of defeat. It was during this time when both countries had to develop a new identity that was able to deal with the question of war responsibility. This paper attempts to compare these two identities using history textbooks from the occupation time period while keeping in mind the delicate balance between the wishes of the occupation authorities, the approaching Cold War, and the very nature of defeat itself.
ContributorsNeumann, Johannes (Author) / Moore, Aaron (Thesis director) / Benkert, Volker (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
In the sixty-seven years following the end of World War II, West Germany and Japan underwent a remarkable series of economic and social changes that irrevocably altered their respective ways of life. Formerly xenophobic, militaristic and highly socially stratified societies, both emerged from the 20th Century as liberal, prosperous and free. Both made great strides well beyond the expectations of their occupiers, and rebounded from the overwhelming destruction of their national economies within a few short decades. While these changes have yielded dramatic results, the wartime period still looms large in their respective collective memories. Therefore, an ongoing and diverse dialectical process would engage the considerable popular, official, and intellectual energy of their post-war generations. In West Germany, the term Vergangenheitsbewältigung (VGB) emerged to describe a process of coming to terms with the past, while the Japanese chose kako no kokufuku to describe their similar historical sojourns. Although intellectuals of widely varying backgrounds in both nations made great strides toward making Japanese and German citizens cognizant of the roles that their militaries played in gruesome atrocities, popular cinematic productions served to reiterate older, discredited assertions of the fundamental honor and innocence of the average soldier, thereby nurturing a historically revisionist line of reasoning that continues to compete for public attention. All forms of media would play an important role in sustaining this “apologetic narrative,” and cinema, among the most popular and visible of these mediums, was not excluded from this. Indeed, films would play a unique recurring role, like rhetorical time capsules, in offering a sanitized historical image of Japanese and German soldiers that continues to endure in modern times. Nevertheless, even as West Germany and Japan regained their sovereignty and re-examined their pasts with ever greater resolution and insight, their respective film industries continued to “reset” the clock, and accentuated the visibility and relevancy of apologetic forces still in existence within both societies. However, it is important to note that, when speaking of “Germans” and “Japanese,” that they are not meant to be thought of as being uniformly of one mind or another. Rather, the use of these words is meant as convenient shorthand to refer to the dominant forces in Japanese and German civil society at any given time over the course of their respective post- war histories. Furthermore, references to “Germany” during the Cold War period are to be understood to mean the Federal Republic of Germany, rather than their socialist counterpart, the German Democratic Republic, a nation that undertook its own coming to terms with the past in an entirely distinct fashion.
ContributorsPiscopo, Michael (Author) / Benkert, Volker (Thesis director) / Moore, Aaron (Committee member) / Machander, Sina (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor)
Created2012-12
Description
After the First World War, citizens, soldiers, and political figures alike thought they had witnessed the archetype of human sadism and war brutality. Yet, less than twenty years later, World War II immediately countered this notion. World War II was a transnational conflict that epitomized total war, which directly engaged civilians in the conflict like never before. Typically when we discuss Germany’s involvement in the war, we have visions of Hitler and his high-up officials personally crafting the Holocaust that killed 6 million Jews via firing squads, ghettoes, and gas chambers. The post-war landscape furthered this notion through the Nuremberg trials, which sentenced the most evil of the war’s perpetrators on the international stage, and the denazification process by the allied countries, which worked to reteach a “brainwashed” generation of Germans. However, rarely was the role of ordinary soldiers and the people at home a part of the dialogue of German complicity. Through the phases of post-war memorialization, people began to question the roles of themselves, and eventually their ancestors, in various ways. Of course, there are immense differences between the architect of the Final Solution and a Wehrmacht soldier who was drafted into the war; my goal is not to place these people on a ladder of guilt, but to widen the dialogue on the complex role ordinary Germans held during the war.
I will begin by establishing complicity among Wehrmacht soldiers, and then among ordinary people, contrasting beneficiaries and participants in popularized crime with bystanders. I will also argue that as women suffered uniquely during World War II, they also exercised unique complicity. Next, I will take these findings and discuss the memorialization of complicity in order to understand how individuals, the public, and the state framed their respective roles in the war; in order to accomplish this I will first discuss individual remembrance by examining individual interviews and familial interviews in order to gain an understanding of how people perceive their role in the war and also how individual stories can change as generations pass. These interviews include people who were both beneficiaries and bystanders. Then, I will discuss collective remembrance by examining the controversy over public monuments. Ultimately, I will argue that ordinary Germans all held significant levels of complicity that need to be assessed in order to understand the Nazi war effort and political system; additionally, how complicity is remembered greatly and profoundly affects memorialization and our future.
I will begin by establishing complicity among Wehrmacht soldiers, and then among ordinary people, contrasting beneficiaries and participants in popularized crime with bystanders. I will also argue that as women suffered uniquely during World War II, they also exercised unique complicity. Next, I will take these findings and discuss the memorialization of complicity in order to understand how individuals, the public, and the state framed their respective roles in the war; in order to accomplish this I will first discuss individual remembrance by examining individual interviews and familial interviews in order to gain an understanding of how people perceive their role in the war and also how individual stories can change as generations pass. These interviews include people who were both beneficiaries and bystanders. Then, I will discuss collective remembrance by examining the controversy over public monuments. Ultimately, I will argue that ordinary Germans all held significant levels of complicity that need to be assessed in order to understand the Nazi war effort and political system; additionally, how complicity is remembered greatly and profoundly affects memorialization and our future.
ContributorsTobin, Janna K (Author) / Benkert, Volker (Thesis director) / Cichopek-Gajraj, Anna (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
The Constructivists were a prominent group of Avant Garde artists that began to work in the years preceding the Bolshevik revolution and continued to work prominently until Stalin came to power. As other Avant Garde movements became prevalent throughout Europe, Constructivism became the Modernist movement that encapsulated Russia’s Socialist future. Constructivist artist-workers embraced the idea that objects of art must be useful in the daily life of a Soviet worker as well as representative of the future for which communists were working. As such, they aligned with the new national ideals aesthetically by illustrating national and political goals in a functional way. Constructivists wanted to create objects that would signify and enable future Soviet life through their usefulness and their ideological intensity. This thesis argues that Constructivist objects served a third purpose as productive agents of community.
Each chapter of this thesis closely studies a different object of a different medium to trace relationships between Constructivist objects and Soviet community. El Lissitzky’s PROUN Manifesto illuminates the creation of an artistic community. Alexander Rodchenko’s print Propaganda communicates between a state and its people. Varvara Stepanova’s Sportswear designs facilitate a society of workers. Alexandra Exter’s Marionettes combine common everyday objects and children’s theater. Vladimir Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International, envisions the ideal Soviet society as place in which socialists could convene. And Liubov Popova’s Painterly Architectonics relates the functional and aesthetic goals of Constructivism from Russia to the international art world. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social, and Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction each provide the framework for discussing the intersections of art objects and community. Anderson explores nationhood through the lens of language and print media, Latour studies how social interaction on an individual basis might rely upon the physical objects around them, whereas Bourdieu addresses hierarchies in distinguishing objects of art in class-based societies by outlining the conflicts between cultural capital and tastemaking in the analysis of objects.
Through the exploration of each Constructivist object, this thesis explores individual, national, and international communities while considering their changing political, social contexts.
Each chapter of this thesis closely studies a different object of a different medium to trace relationships between Constructivist objects and Soviet community. El Lissitzky’s PROUN Manifesto illuminates the creation of an artistic community. Alexander Rodchenko’s print Propaganda communicates between a state and its people. Varvara Stepanova’s Sportswear designs facilitate a society of workers. Alexandra Exter’s Marionettes combine common everyday objects and children’s theater. Vladimir Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International, envisions the ideal Soviet society as place in which socialists could convene. And Liubov Popova’s Painterly Architectonics relates the functional and aesthetic goals of Constructivism from Russia to the international art world. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social, and Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction each provide the framework for discussing the intersections of art objects and community. Anderson explores nationhood through the lens of language and print media, Latour studies how social interaction on an individual basis might rely upon the physical objects around them, whereas Bourdieu addresses hierarchies in distinguishing objects of art in class-based societies by outlining the conflicts between cultural capital and tastemaking in the analysis of objects.
Through the exploration of each Constructivist object, this thesis explores individual, national, and international communities while considering their changing political, social contexts.
ContributorsBrown, Theodora Circe (Author) / Hoogenboom, Hilde (Thesis director) / Hedberg Olenina, Ana (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Art (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, faced the unfathomable difficulty of navigating the Eurozone crisis of 2010-2017. The Eurozone crisis was the economic devastation from Greece’s financial depression, which led to the refugee humanitarian crisis (Elliot, 2018). During this time, the Syrian war took place, which contributed to the refugee crisis as people sought asylum from the war. Although the German Chancellor has undergone severe scrutiny for her decisions, she stood by her choices to enact an open-door policy that would allow asylum seekers to gain access to Germany and offer aid during a time of a humanitarian crisis. Not only was she honoring the Spirit of Europe through her open-door policy, she was also acting as a strategic economist by using the influx of refugees to supply skilled labor to the German workforce, growing the nation’s GDP and using Eurobonds as a means of policy coordination (De Grauwe, 2010).
Through studying Angela Merkel’s humanitarian and economic policies during 2010-2017, it is concluded that Angela Merkel did not simply enact the open-door policy because of her moral convictions as a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), but did so as a policy actor within a rational choice framework (Crozier 451; Downs 146). As a policy actor, Merkel established her preference to enact humanitarian policies that fell in line with her legal obligation, as an EU member, to honor the spirit of Europe and then was able to defensively adjust to the Eurozone’s economic crisis by strategically creating economic opportunities from the refugee influx. While neighboring countries and even her own people provided constant criticism and reproof, Merkel never wavered in her policies and convictions.
Through studying Angela Merkel’s humanitarian and economic policies during 2010-2017, it is concluded that Angela Merkel did not simply enact the open-door policy because of her moral convictions as a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), but did so as a policy actor within a rational choice framework (Crozier 451; Downs 146). As a policy actor, Merkel established her preference to enact humanitarian policies that fell in line with her legal obligation, as an EU member, to honor the spirit of Europe and then was able to defensively adjust to the Eurozone’s economic crisis by strategically creating economic opportunities from the refugee influx. While neighboring countries and even her own people provided constant criticism and reproof, Merkel never wavered in her policies and convictions.
ContributorsTerrell, Shaylah Elyse (Author) / Kittilson, Miki (Thesis director) / Lennon, Tara (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Russian President Vladimir Putin is a revisionist leader seeking to restore Russia’s status as a great power and rival U.S. global dominance by constructing a multipolar world order at the expense of the United States. Putin’s aggressive tendencies are not limited to Europe and the former Soviet sphere as Putin has expanded his revisionist ambitions into other regional theaters, including the Middle East. Putin has pursued an active foreign policy in the Middle East, exploiting the volatile region plagued with a historical predisposition to great power competition as a crucial part of his revisionist grand strategy. Putin is a realist, and employs a ruthless strategy of pragmatic flexibility, capitalizing on historical relations between the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern regimes when possible, but is also skilled at adapting to new circumstances and developments, and exploiting them for Russia’s strategic benefit. Putin has engaged in heightened relations and involvement with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In Turkey, Putin has taken advantage of that country’s central location and used Turkey as a hub for the expansion of the Russian energy industry, placing pressure on NATO and the European Union. Putin has opportunistically used Iran’s controversial nuclear program to Russia’s benefit by acting as Iran’s primary international sponsor and patron for its nuclear program, elevating Russia’s regional prestige as a rival to the United States, and countering American foreign policy objectives. Putin intervened decisively on behalf of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, thwarting U.S. calls for regime change in Damascus and forcefully asserting Russia as a formidable regional power with veto-authority in matters of global power dynamics at Washington’s expense. Putin’s achievements with Turkey, Iran, and Syria serve to complement his larger grand strategic objectives to rival the United States as a great power and to create a multipolar world order. Putin’s ruthless, opportunistic foreign policy poses significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy and endangers the liberal world order. Washington must come to terms with the threat posed by a revisionist Russia and adopt a more assertive policy toward Putin.
ContributorsMarch, Nicolas Robert (Author) / Drummond, Charles (Thesis director) / Carrese, Paul (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Democracy and the democratization of authoritarian regimes are lauded as necessary for women to achieve equal rights. However, German reunification defied expectations and resulted in declining gender equality. East German women lost many progressive economic and political conditions after reunifying with democratic and comparatively West Germany. This contributes nuance to the previous theory that cultural values and economic integration influence how gender equality can be achieved. This study employs quantitative methods to evaluate if the protections imposed upon East German women from the Communist regime primed East German to have more progressive attitudes about gender equality post-reunification. With regards to economic participation, the results showed that East German women held significantly more progressive views than West German women. This indicates that economic integration impacts attitudes about women in the workforce and may predict how gender equality will be conceptualized in an ideal Korean reunification and other future reunifications.
ContributorsEchevarria, Jiaya (Author) / Lasala-Blanco, Narayani (Thesis director) / Hinojosa, Magda (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05