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- All Subjects: Russia
- Creators: Hoogenboom, Hilde
- Creators: Carrese, Paul
Description
What makes a Russian dancer Russian? In 1909 Sergei Diaghilev essentially created a tradition of "Russian ballet" through his Ballets Russes, which brought the stars of the imperial Petersburg theater to Paris and other Western capitals. By commissioning new and innovative works, such as Igor Stravinsky's Rite of Spring and Firebird, Diaghilev revolutionized the standard repertoire of dance ensembles around the world. Ballet dancers such as Vaslav Nijinsky, Anna Pavlova, Mathilde Kschessinska, Dame Alicia Markova, all worked closely with Diaghilev. Post-Diaghilev, Rudolf Nureyev (an ethnic Tatar) and Mikhail Baryshnikov were both born in the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, and later escaped to live and dance in the West. All of these artists, despite their varied origins, considered themselves to be Russian dancers. Why? What, in their view, made them Russian? Careful and original analysis of their memoirs and other writings suggests that Russian identity is highly complex and composed of many different elements. Some dancers inherited their Russian identity from their parents. Others acquired their Russian identity through language, religious conversion to Orthodox Christianity, a common tradition of ballet training, participation in distinctly Russian dance companies, or culture. In general, these dancers do not regard "Russianness" as innate; instead, Russian identity is created and achieved through cultural practices. By participating in the educational tradition of the Imperial ballet, these dancers become Russian.
ContributorsClay, Joy Neylufer (Author) / Hoogenboom, Hilde (Thesis director) / Roses-Thema, Cynthia (Committee member) / Moldabekova, Saule (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
The Constructivists were a prominent group of Avant Garde artists that began to work in the years preceding the Bolshevik revolution and continued to work prominently until Stalin came to power. As other Avant Garde movements became prevalent throughout Europe, Constructivism became the Modernist movement that encapsulated Russia’s Socialist future. Constructivist artist-workers embraced the idea that objects of art must be useful in the daily life of a Soviet worker as well as representative of the future for which communists were working. As such, they aligned with the new national ideals aesthetically by illustrating national and political goals in a functional way. Constructivists wanted to create objects that would signify and enable future Soviet life through their usefulness and their ideological intensity. This thesis argues that Constructivist objects served a third purpose as productive agents of community.
Each chapter of this thesis closely studies a different object of a different medium to trace relationships between Constructivist objects and Soviet community. El Lissitzky’s PROUN Manifesto illuminates the creation of an artistic community. Alexander Rodchenko’s print Propaganda communicates between a state and its people. Varvara Stepanova’s Sportswear designs facilitate a society of workers. Alexandra Exter’s Marionettes combine common everyday objects and children’s theater. Vladimir Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International, envisions the ideal Soviet society as place in which socialists could convene. And Liubov Popova’s Painterly Architectonics relates the functional and aesthetic goals of Constructivism from Russia to the international art world. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social, and Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction each provide the framework for discussing the intersections of art objects and community. Anderson explores nationhood through the lens of language and print media, Latour studies how social interaction on an individual basis might rely upon the physical objects around them, whereas Bourdieu addresses hierarchies in distinguishing objects of art in class-based societies by outlining the conflicts between cultural capital and tastemaking in the analysis of objects.
Through the exploration of each Constructivist object, this thesis explores individual, national, and international communities while considering their changing political, social contexts.
Each chapter of this thesis closely studies a different object of a different medium to trace relationships between Constructivist objects and Soviet community. El Lissitzky’s PROUN Manifesto illuminates the creation of an artistic community. Alexander Rodchenko’s print Propaganda communicates between a state and its people. Varvara Stepanova’s Sportswear designs facilitate a society of workers. Alexandra Exter’s Marionettes combine common everyday objects and children’s theater. Vladimir Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International, envisions the ideal Soviet society as place in which socialists could convene. And Liubov Popova’s Painterly Architectonics relates the functional and aesthetic goals of Constructivism from Russia to the international art world. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social, and Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction each provide the framework for discussing the intersections of art objects and community. Anderson explores nationhood through the lens of language and print media, Latour studies how social interaction on an individual basis might rely upon the physical objects around them, whereas Bourdieu addresses hierarchies in distinguishing objects of art in class-based societies by outlining the conflicts between cultural capital and tastemaking in the analysis of objects.
Through the exploration of each Constructivist object, this thesis explores individual, national, and international communities while considering their changing political, social contexts.
ContributorsBrown, Theodora Circe (Author) / Hoogenboom, Hilde (Thesis director) / Hedberg Olenina, Ana (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Art (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Russian President Vladimir Putin is a revisionist leader seeking to restore Russia’s status as a great power and rival U.S. global dominance by constructing a multipolar world order at the expense of the United States. Putin’s aggressive tendencies are not limited to Europe and the former Soviet sphere as Putin has expanded his revisionist ambitions into other regional theaters, including the Middle East. Putin has pursued an active foreign policy in the Middle East, exploiting the volatile region plagued with a historical predisposition to great power competition as a crucial part of his revisionist grand strategy. Putin is a realist, and employs a ruthless strategy of pragmatic flexibility, capitalizing on historical relations between the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern regimes when possible, but is also skilled at adapting to new circumstances and developments, and exploiting them for Russia’s strategic benefit. Putin has engaged in heightened relations and involvement with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In Turkey, Putin has taken advantage of that country’s central location and used Turkey as a hub for the expansion of the Russian energy industry, placing pressure on NATO and the European Union. Putin has opportunistically used Iran’s controversial nuclear program to Russia’s benefit by acting as Iran’s primary international sponsor and patron for its nuclear program, elevating Russia’s regional prestige as a rival to the United States, and countering American foreign policy objectives. Putin intervened decisively on behalf of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, thwarting U.S. calls for regime change in Damascus and forcefully asserting Russia as a formidable regional power with veto-authority in matters of global power dynamics at Washington’s expense. Putin’s achievements with Turkey, Iran, and Syria serve to complement his larger grand strategic objectives to rival the United States as a great power and to create a multipolar world order. Putin’s ruthless, opportunistic foreign policy poses significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy and endangers the liberal world order. Washington must come to terms with the threat posed by a revisionist Russia and adopt a more assertive policy toward Putin.
ContributorsMarch, Nicolas Robert (Author) / Drummond, Charles (Thesis director) / Carrese, Paul (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Following the Russian Federation’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has once again found itself in a time of crisis. President Vladimir Putin has chosen to rewind the clock and restore the Cold War-era divide between Russia and the United States. The European Union, while still divided internally on numerous issues, has seemingly chosen to rise to the occasion in the wake of Russia’s invasion and assert itself as an equal party to both Cold War-era rivals. All the while China, the pacing, ever vigilant threat, continues to keep its cards close to its chest, and it remains to be seen whether a new Sino-Soviet split will emerge just as before or if the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” still rings true. However, 2022 is not 1962, at least not yet. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the culmination of sixty years of constant effort between adversary and ally alike, exists to save the United States and Russia from themselves. Despite the breadth and authority of the regime there are threats abound to its existence, particularly in this time of deep uncertainty. It is incumbent upon the nuclear powers of the world, and Russia especially, to ensure that it does not become a casualty of this age. The world must therefore look back to the early days of the Cold War when crises were abundant, and the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly brought humanity to the edge of the nuclear abyss. What we learn from doing so is that, while difficult, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime can be supported through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions such as novel weaponry moratoriums, a return to adversarial arms control, and achieving the universality of export control regimes, respectively.
ContributorsErjavic, Spencer (Author) / Hoogenboom, Hilde (Thesis director) / O'Donnell, Edward (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor)
Created2022-05