Many current cryptographic algorithms will eventually become easily broken by Shor's Algorithm once quantum computers become more powerful. A number of new algorithms have been proposed which are not compromised by quantum computers, one of which is the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol (SIDH). SIDH works by having both parties perform random walks between supersingular elliptic curves on isogeny graphs of prime degree and eventually end at the same location, a shared secret.<br/><br/>This thesis seeks to explore some of the theory and concepts underlying the security of SIDH, especially as it relates to finding supersingular elliptic curves, generating isogeny graphs, and implementing SIDH. As elliptic curves and SIDH may be an unfamiliar topic to many readers, the paper begins by providing a brief introduction to elliptic curves, isogenies, and the SIDH Protocol. Next, the paper investigates more efficient methods of generating supersingular elliptic curves, which are important for visualizing the isogeny graphs in the algorithm and the setup of the protocol. Afterwards, the paper focuses on isogeny maps of various degrees, attempting to visualize isogeny maps similar to those used in SIDH. Finally, the paper looks at an implementation of SIDH in PARI/GP and work is done to see the effects of using isogenies of degree greater than 2 and 3 on the security, runtime, and practicality of the algorithm.