Matching Items (3)
Filtering by
- All Subjects: competition
- Creators: Aucejo, Esteban
- Creators: Bergstrom, Carl T.
Description
Science is a formalized method for acquiring information about the world. In
recent years, the ability of science to do so has been scrutinized. Attempts to reproduce
findings in diverse fields demonstrate that many results are unreliable and do not
generalize across contexts. In response to these concerns, many proposals for reform have
emerged. Although promising, such reforms have not addressed all aspects of scientific
practice. In the social sciences, two such aspects are the diversity of study participants
and incentive structures. Most efforts to improve scientific practice focus on replicability,
but sidestep issues of generalizability. And while researchers have speculated about the
effects of incentive structures, there is little systematic study of these hypotheses. This
dissertation takes one step towards filling these gaps. Chapter 1 presents a cross-cultural
study of social discounting – the purportedly fundamental human tendency to sacrifice
more for socially-close individuals – conducted among three diverse populations (U.S.,
rural Indonesia, rural Bangladesh). This study finds no independent effect of social
distance on generosity among Indonesian and Bangladeshi participants, providing
evidence against the hypothesis that social discounting is universal. It also illustrates the
importance of studying diverse human populations for developing generalizable theories
of human nature. Chapter 2 presents a laboratory experiment with undergraduates to test
the effect of incentive structures on research accuracy, in an instantiation of the scientific
process where the key decision is how much data to collect before submitting one’s
findings. The results demonstrate that rewarding novel findings causes respondents to
make guesses with less information, thereby reducing their accuracy. Chapter 3 presents
an evolutionary agent-based model that tests the effect of competition for novel findings
on the sample size of studies that researchers conduct. This model demonstrates that
competition for novelty causes the cultural evolution of research with smaller sample
sizes and lower statistical power. However, increasing the startup costs to conducting
single studies can reduce the negative effects of competition, as can rewarding
publication of secondary findings. These combined chapters provide evidence that
aspects of current scientific practice may be detrimental to the reliability and
generalizability of research and point to potential solutions.
recent years, the ability of science to do so has been scrutinized. Attempts to reproduce
findings in diverse fields demonstrate that many results are unreliable and do not
generalize across contexts. In response to these concerns, many proposals for reform have
emerged. Although promising, such reforms have not addressed all aspects of scientific
practice. In the social sciences, two such aspects are the diversity of study participants
and incentive structures. Most efforts to improve scientific practice focus on replicability,
but sidestep issues of generalizability. And while researchers have speculated about the
effects of incentive structures, there is little systematic study of these hypotheses. This
dissertation takes one step towards filling these gaps. Chapter 1 presents a cross-cultural
study of social discounting – the purportedly fundamental human tendency to sacrifice
more for socially-close individuals – conducted among three diverse populations (U.S.,
rural Indonesia, rural Bangladesh). This study finds no independent effect of social
distance on generosity among Indonesian and Bangladeshi participants, providing
evidence against the hypothesis that social discounting is universal. It also illustrates the
importance of studying diverse human populations for developing generalizable theories
of human nature. Chapter 2 presents a laboratory experiment with undergraduates to test
the effect of incentive structures on research accuracy, in an instantiation of the scientific
process where the key decision is how much data to collect before submitting one’s
findings. The results demonstrate that rewarding novel findings causes respondents to
make guesses with less information, thereby reducing their accuracy. Chapter 3 presents
an evolutionary agent-based model that tests the effect of competition for novel findings
on the sample size of studies that researchers conduct. This model demonstrates that
competition for novelty causes the cultural evolution of research with smaller sample
sizes and lower statistical power. However, increasing the startup costs to conducting
single studies can reduce the negative effects of competition, as can rewarding
publication of secondary findings. These combined chapters provide evidence that
aspects of current scientific practice may be detrimental to the reliability and
generalizability of research and point to potential solutions.
ContributorsTiokhin, Leonid (Author) / Hruschka, Daniel J (Thesis advisor) / Morgan, Thomas JH (Thesis advisor) / Boyd, Robert (Committee member) / Frankenhuis, Willem E. (Committee member) / Bergstrom, Carl T. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
In competitive Taekwondo, Electronic Body Protectors (EBPs) are used to register hits made by players during sparring. EBPs are comprised of three main components: chest guard, foot sock, and headgear. This equipment interacts with each other through the use of magnets, electric sensors, transmitters, and a receiver. The receiver is connected to a computer programmed with software to process signals from the transmitter and determine whether or not a competitor scored a point. The current design of EBPs, however, have numerous shortcomings, including sensing false positives, failing to register hits, costing too much, and relying on human judgment. This thesis will thoroughly delineate the operation of the current EBPs used and discuss research performed in order to eliminate these weaknesses.
ContributorsSpell, Valerie Anne (Author) / Kozicki, Michael (Thesis director) / Kitchen, Jennifer (Committee member) / Electrical Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
This dissertation explores the effect of school competition on the human capital accumulation of students. Policies that expand the scope for school choice have become increasingly popular largely due to the belief that this will create incentives for low-performing, incumbent schools to improve academic outcomes. However, there is a general lack of empirical support for these positive academic spillover effects in most contexts. In the first chapter, I demonstrate that if schools respond to competition through channels not typically considered in standard arguments in favor of school choice, it means that these policies may lead to negative, unintended consequences for academic achievement. I find that increasing the number of schools serving a given market can have a negative effect on test scores through creating incentives for schools to increase the provision of non-academic services that do not contribute to academic preparation, and through the creation of excess costs in the public school system. I use an empirical strategy designed to address strategic location decisions by new entrants as well as student selection across schools to show that entry of a new charter middle school during a recent large-scale charter expansion in North Carolina decreased average traditional public middle school test scores across a school district.
The second chapter considers the extent to which policymakers have tools available to them that can improve the ability of competition to generate the increases in test scores at incumbent schools that they have prioritized. I show that the efficacy of school choice can be improved by providing short-term, partial reimbursements to public school districts for increases in charter school enrollment by resident pupils. I also demonstrate that these effects occur not only due to the direct increase in district revenue associated with reimbursements, but also because the presence of this aid reduces the incentives of school administrators to compete for students through non-academic channels. The empirical strategy that I use to generate these results leverages plausibly exogenous cutoffs for aid eligibility induced by a unique policy in the state of New York.
ContributorsTobin, Zachary Benjamin (Author) / Aucejo, Esteban (Thesis advisor) / Silverman, Daniel (Committee member) / Murphy, Alvin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022