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Modern computer processors contain an embedded firmware known as microcode that controls decode and execution of x86 instructions. Although proprietary and relatively obscure, this microcode can be modified using updates released by hardware manufacturers to correct processor logic flaws (errata). At the same time, a malicious microcode update could compromise a processor by implementing new malicious instructions or altering the functionality of existing instructions, including processor-accelerated virtualization or cryptographic primitives. Not only is this attack vector capable of subverting all software-enforced security policies and access controls, but it also leaves behind no postmortem forensic evidence since the write-only patch memory is cleared upon system reset. Although supervisor privileges (ring zero) are required to update processor microcode, this attack cannot be easily mitigated due to the implementation of microcode update functionality within processor silicon. In this paper, we reveal the microarchitecture and mechanism of microcode updates, present a security analysis of this attack vector, and provide some mitigation suggestions.
ContributorsChen, Daming Dominic (Author) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Thesis director) / Lee, Joohyung (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Ethereum smart contracts are susceptible not only to those vulnerabilities common to all software development domains, but also to those arising from the peculiar execution model of the Ethereum Virtual Machine. One of these vulnerabilities, a susceptibility to re-entrancy attacks, has been at the center of several high-profile contract exploits. Currently, there exist many tools to detect these vulnerabilties, as well as languages which preempt the creation of contracts exhibiting these issues, but no mechanism to address them in an automated fashion. One possible approach to filling this gap is direct patching of source files. The process of applying these patches to contracts written in Solidity, the primary Ethereum contract language, is discussed. Toward this end, a survey of deployed contracts is conducted, focusing on prevalence of language features and compiler versions. A heuristic approach to mitigating a particular class of re-entrancy vulnerability is developed, implemented as the SolPatch tool, and examined with respect to its limitations. As a proof of concept and illustrative example, a simplified version of the contract featured in a high-profile exploit is patched in this manner.
ContributorsLehman, Maxfield Chance Christian (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Smartphone privacy is a growing concern around the world; smartphone applications routinely take personal information from our phones and monetize it for their own profit. Worse, they're doing it legally. The Terms of Service allow companies to use this information to market, promote, and sell personal data. Most users seem to be either unaware of it, or unconcerned by it. This has negative implications for the future of privacy, particularly as the idea of smart home technology becomes a reality. If this is what privacy looks like now, with only one major type of smart device on the market, what will the future hold, when the smart home systems come into play. In order to examine this question, I investigated how much awareness/knowledge smartphone users of a specific demographic (millennials aged 18-25) knew about their smartphone's data and where it goes. I wanted three questions answered: - For what purposes do millennials use their smartphones? - What do they know about smartphone privacy and security? - How will this affect the future of privacy? To accomplish this, I gathered information using a distributed survey to millennials attending Arizona State University. Using statistical analysis, I exposed trends for this demographic, discovering that there isn't a lack of knowledge among millennials; most are aware that smartphone apps can collect and share data and many of the participants are not comfortable with the current state of smartphone privacy. However, more than half of the study participants indicated that they never read an app's Terms of Service. Due to the nature of the privacy vs. convenience argument, users will willingly agree to let apps take their personal in- formation, since they don't want to give up the convenience.
ContributorsJones, Scott Spenser (Author) / Atkinson, Robert (Thesis director) / Chavez-Echeagaray, Maria Elena (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12