Matching Items (5)
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- All Subjects: Security
- All Subjects: Web Applications
- Creators: Bazzi, Rida
Description
Cravingz is a web-based application that allows users to learn the maximum number of food items that they can purchase at a restaurant within a defined personal budget. We created two versions of this web-based application and asked 40 users to perform an A/B test to determine which version provides the best user experience in terms of efficiency and performance. Users who participated in this study completed a set of tasks to test these applications. Our findings demonstrate that users prefer a web application that does not require them to input data repeatedly to view combinations for multiple restaurants. Although the version which required reentry of data was more visually-pleasing, users preferred the version in which inputting data was a one-time task.
ContributorsPandarinath, Agastya (Co-author) / Jain, Ayushi (Co-author) / Atkinson, Robert (Thesis director) / Chavez-Echeagaray, Maria Elena (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
Description
Ethereum smart contracts are susceptible not only to those vulnerabilities common to all software development domains, but also to those arising from the peculiar execution model of the Ethereum Virtual Machine. One of these vulnerabilities, a susceptibility to re-entrancy attacks, has been at the center of several high-profile contract exploits. Currently, there exist many tools to detect these vulnerabilties, as well as languages which preempt the creation of contracts exhibiting these issues, but no mechanism to address them in an automated fashion. One possible approach to filling this gap is direct patching of source files. The process of applying these patches to contracts written in Solidity, the primary Ethereum contract language, is discussed. Toward this end, a survey of deployed contracts is conducted, focusing on prevalence of language features and compiler versions. A heuristic approach to mitigating a particular class of re-entrancy vulnerability is developed, implemented as the SolPatch tool, and examined with respect to its limitations. As a proof of concept and illustrative example, a simplified version of the contract featured in a high-profile exploit is patched in this manner.
ContributorsLehman, Maxfield Chance Christian (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
On Android, existing security procedures require apps to request permissions for access to sensitive resources.
Only when the user approves the requested permissions will the app be installed.
However, permissions are an incomplete security mechanism.
In addition to a user's limited understanding of permissions, the mechanism does not account for the possibility that different permissions used together have the ability to be more dangerous than any single permission alone.
Even if users did understand the nature of an app's requested permissions, this mechanism is still not enough to guarantee that a user's information is protected.
Applications can potentially send or receive sensitive information from other applications without the required permissions by using intents.
In other words, applications can potentially collaborate in ways unforeseen by the user, even if the user understands the permissions of each app independently.
In this thesis, we present several graph-based approaches to address these issues.
We determine the permissions of an app and generate scores based on our assigned value of certain resources.
We analyze these scores overall, as well as in the context of the app's category as determined by Google Play.
We show that these scores can be used to identify overzealous apps, as well as apps that do not properly fit within their category.
We analyze potential interactions between different applications using intents, and identify several promiscuous apps with low permission scores, showing that permissions alone are not sufficient to evaluate the security risks of an app.
Our analyses can form the basis of a system to assist users in identifying apps that can potentially compromise user privacy.
Only when the user approves the requested permissions will the app be installed.
However, permissions are an incomplete security mechanism.
In addition to a user's limited understanding of permissions, the mechanism does not account for the possibility that different permissions used together have the ability to be more dangerous than any single permission alone.
Even if users did understand the nature of an app's requested permissions, this mechanism is still not enough to guarantee that a user's information is protected.
Applications can potentially send or receive sensitive information from other applications without the required permissions by using intents.
In other words, applications can potentially collaborate in ways unforeseen by the user, even if the user understands the permissions of each app independently.
In this thesis, we present several graph-based approaches to address these issues.
We determine the permissions of an app and generate scores based on our assigned value of certain resources.
We analyze these scores overall, as well as in the context of the app's category as determined by Google Play.
We show that these scores can be used to identify overzealous apps, as well as apps that do not properly fit within their category.
We analyze potential interactions between different applications using intents, and identify several promiscuous apps with low permission scores, showing that permissions alone are not sufficient to evaluate the security risks of an app.
Our analyses can form the basis of a system to assist users in identifying apps that can potentially compromise user privacy.
ContributorsGibson, Aaron (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Walker, Erin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Data from a total of 282 online web applications was collected, and accounts for 230 of those web applications were created in order to gather data about authentication practices, multistep authentication practices, security question practices, fallback authentication practices, and other security practices for online accounts. The account creation and data collection was done between June 2016 and April 2017. The password strengths for online accounts were analyzed and password strength data was compared to existing data. Security questions used by online accounts were evaluated for security and usability, and fallback authentication practices were assessed based on their adherence to best practices. Alternative authentication schemes were examined, and other security considerations such as use of HTTPS and CAPTCHAs were explored. Based on existing data, password policies require stronger passwords in for web applications in 2017 compared to the requirements in 2010. Nevertheless, password policies for many accounts are still not adequate. About a quarter of online web applications examined use security questions, and many of the questions have usability and security concerns. Security mechanisms such as HTTPS and continuous authentication are in general not used in conjunction with security questions for most web applications, which reduces the overall security of the web application. A majority of web applications use email addresses as the login credential and the password recovery credential and do not follow best practices. About a quarter of accounts use multistep authentication and a quarter of accounts employ continuous authentication, yet most accounts fail to combine security measures for defense in depth. The overall conclusion is that some online web applications are using secure practices; however, a majority of online web applications fail to properly implement and utilize secure practices.
ContributorsGutierrez, Garrett (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
Apple’s HomeKit framework centralizes control of smart home devices and allows users to create home automations based on predefined rules. For example, a user can add a rule to turn off all the lights in their house whenever they leave. Currently, these rules must be added through a graphical user interface provided by Apple or a third-party app on iOS. This thesis describes how a text-based language provides users with a more expressive means of creating complex home automations and successfully implements such a language. Rules created using this text-based format are parsed and interpreted into rules that can be added directly into HomeKit. This thesis also explores how security features should be implemented with this text-based approach. Since automations are run by the system without user interaction, it is important to consider how the system itself can provide functionality to address the unintended consequences that may result from running an automation. This is especially important for the text-based approach since its increase in expressiveness makes it easier for a user to make a mistake in programming that leads to a security concern. The proposed method for preventing unintended side effects is using a simulation to run every automation prior to actually running the automation on real-world devices. This approach allows users to code some conditions that must be satisfied in order for the automation to run on devices in the home. This thesis describes the creation of such a program that successfully simulates every device in the home. There were limitations, however, with Apple's HomeKit framework, which made it impractical to match the state of simulated devices to real devices in the home. Without being able to match the current state of the home to the current state of the simulation, this method cannot satisfy the goal of ensuring that certain adverse effects will not occur as a result of automations. Other smart home control platforms that provide more extensibility could be used to create this simulation-based security approach. Perhaps as Apple continues to open up their HomeKit platform to developers, this approach may be feasible within Apple's ecosystem at some point in the future.
ContributorsSharp, Trevor Ryan (Co-author) / Sharp, Trevor (Co-author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Department of Management and Entrepreneurship (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05