This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of entanglement and the particular problems it poses for some physicists. In addition to looking at the history of entanglement and non-locality, this paper will use the Bell Test as a means for demonstrating how entanglement works, which measures the behavior of electrons whose combined internal angular momentum is zero. This paper will go over Dr. Bell's famous inequality, which shows why the process of entanglement cannot be explained by traditional means of local processes. Entanglement will be viewed initially through the Copenhagen Interpretation, but this paper will also look at two particular models of quantum mechanics, de-Broglie Bohm theory and Everett's Many-Worlds Interpretation, and observe how they explain the behavior of spin and entangled particles compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation.

With the dissolution of the old forms of power has come a new heteronomy: that of the screen. The individual is in stasis, caught between the old forms of control and the new, but unable to imagine a better, liberated future. What is responsible for this interregnum? The answer lies in analyzing these new forms of control, their effects on the subject, and the material, historical processes behind them. This paper looks specifically at social media and how it has come to limit autonomy and commodify human experience and personhood. Drawing from Theodor Adorno’s Theory of Pseudo Culture, it seeks to describe the ways in which social media both erodes and administers subjectivity. Culture, now subject to the economic imperatives of capitalism, no longer contributes to the development of individuality. By referencing Karl Marx’s Capital and C. Wright Mill’s “The Competitive Personality”, this paper describes how social media expands commercial imperatives outside of the bounds of the workplace and into everyday life. The paper concludes by drawing on Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man in order to describe how social media neutralizes oppositional sentiments. Even the seemingly spontaneous expressions of dissent found on social media become a conservative force, stymieing real world organization through the repressive desublimation of revolt. In addition to understanding the dominating effects of the screen, this paper seeks to map the contours of neoliberal subjectivity.

The sociological model of mental illness (Weitz, 2020, pp. 146-148) offers a much needed contrast to the disproportionate dominance of the medical model in research, public policy, and popular discourse (Weitz, 2020, pp. 145-146 & 158-160). Unfortunately, the sociological model receives little attention in comparison (Mulvaney, 2001), although there has been a slight revival in recent years. However, the bulk of research on mental illness within the sociological model is predominantly quantitative, relying heavily on statistics and reducing complex systemic processes to various separated variables (Chandler, 2019; Mullaney, 2016; Spates & Slatton, 2021). Both sociological and psychological research on mental illness tend to be dominated by a highly quantitative focus on ‘social factors’, and generally shy away from examining the role of macro-level social structures and institutions. Consequently, even the sociological model of mental illness tends to fall short of implicating the underlying socio-economic system as a potential contributor to psychological harm and distress. This paper offers critiques of the medical model of mental illness and highlights both the strengths and shortcomings of work in the sociological model. I will also attempt to address these issues by providing a sociological and philosophical analysis of how the capitalist socio-economic system, and systems of oppression in general, shapes social constructions of mental illness and inflicts chronic stress and stigma, leading to much of the psychological distress that many people currently experience.