Matching Items (16)
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- All Subjects: Cognitive Psychology
- All Subjects: Theory of Mind
- Creators: Glenberg, Arthur
- Status: Published
Description
Recognition memory was investigated for naturalistic dynamic scenes. Although visual recognition for static objects and scenes has been investigated previously and found to be extremely robust in terms of fidelity and retention, visual recognition for dynamic scenes has received much less attention. In four experiments, participants view a number of clips from novel films and are then tasked to complete a recognition test containing frames from the previously viewed films and difficult foil frames. Recognition performance is good when foils are taken from other parts of the same film (Experiment 1), but degrades greatly when foils are taken from unseen gaps from within the viewed footage (Experiments 3 and 4). Removing all non-target frames had a serious effect on recognition performance (Experiment 2). Across all experiments, presenting the films as a random series of clips seemed to have no effect on recognition performance. Patterns of accuracy and response latency in Experiments 3 and 4 appear to be a result of a serial-search process. It is concluded that visual representations of dynamic scenes may be stored as units of events, and participant's old
ew judgments of individual frames were better characterized by a cued-recall paradigm than traditional recognition judgments.
ew judgments of individual frames were better characterized by a cued-recall paradigm than traditional recognition judgments.
ContributorsFerguson, Ryan (Author) / Homa, Donald (Thesis advisor) / Goldinger, Stephen (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Brewer, Gene (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Categories are often defined by rules regarding their features. These rules may be intensely complex yet, despite the complexity of these rules, we are often able to learn them with sufficient practice. A possible explanation for how we arrive at consistent category judgments despite these difficulties would be that we may define these complex categories such as chairs, tables, or stairs by understanding the simpler rules defined by potential interactions with these objects. This concept, called grounding, allows for the learning and transfer of complex categorization rules if said rules are capable of being expressed in a more simple fashion by virtue of meaningful physical interactions. The present experiment tested this hypothesis by having participants engage in either a Rule Based (RB) or Information Integration (II) categorization task with instructions to engage with the stimuli in either a non-interactive or interactive fashion. If participants were capable of grounding the categories, which were defined in the II task with a complex visual rule, to a simpler interactive rule, then participants with interactive instructions should outperform participants with non-interactive instructions. Results indicated that physical interaction with stimuli had a marginally beneficial effect on category learning, but this effect seemed most prevalent in participants were engaged in an II task.
ContributorsCrawford, Thomas (Author) / Homa, Donald (Thesis advisor) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / McBeath, Michael (Committee member) / Brewer, Gene (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
A converging operations approach using response time distribution modeling was adopted to better characterize the cognitive control dynamics underlying ongoing task cost and cue detection in event based prospective memory (PM). In Experiment 1, individual differences analyses revealed that working memory capacity uniquely predicted nonfocal cue detection, while proactive control and inhibition predicted variation in ongoing task cost of the ex-Gaussian parameter associated with continuous monitoring strategies (mu). In Experiments 2A and 2B, quasi-experimental techniques aimed at identifying the role of proactive control abilities in PM monitoring and cue detection suggested that low ability participants may have PM deficits during demanding tasks due to inefficient monitoring strategies, but that emphasizing importance of the intention can increase reliance on more efficacious monitoring strategies that boosts performance (Experiment 2A). Furthermore, high proactive control ability participants are able to efficiently regulate their monitoring strategies under scenarios that do not require costly monitoring for successful cue detection (Experiment 2B). In Experiments 3A and 3B, it was found that proactive control benefited cue detection in interference-rich environments, but the neural correlates of cue detection or intention execution did not differ when engaged in proactive versus reactive control. The results from the current set of studies highlight the importance of response time distribution modeling in understanding PM cost. Additionally, these results have important implications for extant theories of PM and have considerable applied ramifications concerning the cognitive control processes that should be targeted to improve PM abilities.
ContributorsBall, Brett Hunter (Author) / Brewer, Gene A. (Thesis advisor) / Goldinger, Stephen (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Amazeen, Eric (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
An emerging literature on the relation between memory and importance has shown that people are able to selectively remember information that is more, relative to less important. Researchers in this field have operationalized importance by assigning value to the different information that participants are asked to study and remember. In the present investigation I developed two experiments, using a slightly altered value-directed-remembering (VDR) paradigm, to investigate whether and how value modifies the dynamics of memory organization and search. Moreover, I asked participants to perform a surprise final free recall task in order to examine the effects of value in the recall dynamics of final free recall. In Experiment 1, I compared the recall dynamics of delayed and final free recall between a control and a value condition, in the latter of which numbers appeared next to words, in random order, denoting the value of remembering each word during recall. In Experiment 2, I manipulated the order of presentation of the values by adding an ascending and a descending condition where values were presented in either an ascending or a descending order, respectively. Overall, my results indicated that value affected several measures of delayed and final free recall, without, in most cases, taking away the serial position effects on those same measures.
ContributorsStefanidi, Aikaterini (Author) / Brewer, Gene A. (Thesis advisor) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Goldinger, Stephen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Writing is an intricate cognitive and social process that involves the production of texts for the purpose of conveying meaning to others. The importance of lower level cognitive skills and language knowledge during this text production process has been well documented in the literature. However, the role of higher level skills (e.g., metacognition, strategy use, etc.) has been less strongly emphasized. This thesis proposal examines higher level cognitive skills in the context of persuasive essay writing. Specifically, two published manuscripts are presented, which both examine the role of higher level skills in the context of writing. The first manuscript investigates the role of metacognition in the writing process by examining the accuracy and characteristics of students' self-assessments of their essays. The second manuscript takes an individual differences approach and examines whether the higher level cognitive skills commonly associated with reading comprehension are also related to performance on writing tasks. Taken together, these manuscripts point towards a strong role of higher level skills in the writing process and provide a strong foundation on which to develop future research and educational interventions.
ContributorsAllen, Laura K (Author) / McNamara, Danielle S. (Thesis advisor) / Connor, Carol (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Learning and transfer were investigated for a categorical structure in which relevant stimulus information could be mapped without loss from one modality to another. The category space was composed of three non-overlapping, linearly-separable categories. Each stimulus was composed of a sequence of on-off events that varied in duration and number of sub-events (complexity). Categories were learned visually, haptically, or auditorily, and transferred to the same or an alternate modality. The transfer set contained old, new, and prototype stimuli, and subjects made both classification and recognition judgments. The results showed an early learning advantage in the visual modality, with transfer performance varying among the conditions in both classification and recognition. In general, classification accuracy was highest for the category prototype, with false recognition of the category prototype higher in the cross-modality conditions. The results are discussed in terms of current theories in modality transfer, and shed preliminary light on categorical transfer of temporal stimuli.
ContributorsFerguson, Ryan (Author) / Homa, Donald (Thesis advisor) / Goldinger, Stephen (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of partial exemplar experience on category formation and use. Participants had either complete or limited access to the three dimensions that defined categories by dimensions within different modalities. The concept of "crucial dimension" was introduced and the role it plays in category definition was explained. It was hypothesized that the effects of partial experience are not explained by a shifting of attention between dimensions (Taylor & Ross, 2009) but rather by an increased reliance on prototypical values used to fill in missing information during incomplete experiences. Results indicated that participants (1) do not fill in missing information with prototypical values, (2) integrate information less efficiently between different modalities than within a single modality, and (3) have difficulty learning only when partial experience prevents access to diagnostic information.
ContributorsCrawford, Thomas (Author) / Homa, Donald (Thesis advisor) / Mcbeath, Micheal (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
A cornerstone of children’s socio-cognitive development is understanding that others can have knowledge, thoughts, and perceptions that differ from one’s own. Preschool-aged children often have difficulty with this kind of social understanding, i.e., they lack an explicit theory of mind. The goal of this dissertation was to examine the role mental state language as a developmental mechanism of children’s early understanding of their own mental states (i.e., their introspective ability). Specifically, it was hypothesized that (1) parents’ ability to recognize and appropriately label their children’s mental states and (2) children’s linguistic ability to distinguish between their mental states shapes the development of children’s introspective ability. An initial prediction of the first hypothesis is that parents should recognized differences in the development of children’s self- and other-understanding in order to better help their children’s introspective development. In support of this prediction, parents (N = 400, Mage = 58 months, Range = 28-93 months) reported that children’s understanding of their own knowledge was greater than children’s understanding of others’ knowledge. A prediction of the second hypothesis is that children’s linguistic ability to distinguish between and appropriately label their own mental states should determine their ability to make fined grained judgments of mental states like certainty. In support of this prediction, children’s (N = 197, Mage = 56 months, Range = 36-82 months) ability to distinguish between their own knowledge and ignorance states was associated children’s ability to engage in uncertainty monitoring. Together, these findings provide support for the association between children’s linguistic environment and ability and their introspective development.
ContributorsGonzales, Christopher Ryan (Author) / Fabricius, William V. (Thesis advisor) / Spinrad, Tracy (Committee member) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Horne, Zachary (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
Introspective awareness refers to direct access to one’s own internal and subjective thoughts and feelings (Wimmer & Hartl, 1991). Two theories, simulation theory and theory-theory, have been used to understand our access to our mental states. Simulation theory (Harris, 1991) involves imagining yourself in another person’s situation, reading off of your mental state, and attributing that state to the other person. Theory-theory (Gopnik, 1993) involves an interrelated body of knowledge, based on core mental-state constructs, including beliefs and desires, that may be applied to everyone—self and others (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Introspection is taken for granted by simulation theory, and explicitly denied by theory-theory. This study is designed to test for evidence of introspection in young children using simple perception and knowledge task. The current evidence is against introspective awareness in children because the data suggest that children cannot report their own false beliefs and they cannot report their on-going thoughts (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1993; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). The hypothesis in this study states that children will perform better on Self tasks compared to Other tasks, which will be evidence for introspection. The Other-Perception tasks require children to calculate the other’s line of sight and determine if there is something obscuring his or her vision. The Other-Knowledge tasks require children to reason that the other’s previous looking inside a box means that he or she will know what is inside the box when it is closed. The corresponding Self tasks could be answered either by using the same reasoning for the self or by introspection to determine what it is they see and do not see, and know and do not know. Children performing better on Self tasks compared to Other tasks will be an indication of introspection. Tests included Yes/No and Forced Choice questions, which was initially to ensure that the results will not be caused by a feature of a single method of questioning. I realized belatedly, however, that Forced Choice was not a valid measure of introspection as children could introspect in both the Self and Other conditions. I also expect to replicate previous findings that reasoning about Perception is easier for children than reasoning about Knowledge.
ContributorsAamed, Mati (Author) / Fabricius, William (Thesis director) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Kupfer, Anne (Committee member) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / T. Denny Sanford School of Social and Family Dynamics (Contributor)
Created2013-12
Description
How do children understand how others see the world? I examined correlations between 4-8 year old children's understanding of beliefs and their understanding of other ways that people represent the world. Beliefs that I measured are understanding of pretense, understanding that things can have multiple identities, understanding that people can know things by inference, and understanding that people can look at the same thing and have different representations of it. I predicted that there would be correlations among these tasks. In particular, I predicted children would be able to understand these tasks when they understood true and false beliefs, based on current theories on belief understanding. I predicted that the classic false belief task alone would not be a good predictor of task performance, but that the combination of true and false belief tasks would. Participants were 100 children recruited at the Phoenix Children's Museum between ages 4 and 8. Previous research has found that children pass all of these tasks between the ages of 6 and 8, but no other studies have looked at the inter-correlations among them. Contrary to my prediction, children did not pass these tasks all at once, but scores went up gradually with age and belief understanding.
ContributorsLaitin, Emily Lynne (Author) / Fabricius, William (Thesis director) / Glenberg, Arthur (Committee member) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / School of Sustainability (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12