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- Creators: Arizona State University
Description在我国经济体制改革和全球国际金融形势变化的大背景下，我国对金融高端人才的质量需求越来越高，但受行业发展影响，我国金融高素质人才的缺口很大，金融市场政策、环境变化过程中往往给金融机构带来较高风险，这也使得专业性、复合型和经验型成为衡量人才质量的附加标准。证监会作为证券公司的主管部门，有证监会任职经历的高管通常具有深厚的专业知识、丰富的审查经验以及政治关联资源等，所以证券公司引进外部人才通常也会选择监管背景的人才做高级管理人员，从而获得更多的竞争优势。现有文献关于高管背景的影响主要集中于有过政府部门工作经历的角度，还未有专门从监管背景的角度研究高管对企业绩效的影响。因此本文以证券公司作为样本，对监管背景高层人员来源结构与所在机构绩效的关系进行分析研究。本文通过分析得出以下结论：（1）证券公司高管的监督背景对公司绩效的影响呈现出倒U型关系；（2）证券公司高管中董事长（CEO）或总经理拥有监管背景对公司业绩的影响更显著；（3）市场化程度对证券公司高管的监管背景与公司绩效之间的倒U型关系起着调节作用，即证券公司所在地区的市场化程度越高，高管监管背景对公司绩效的影响越弱。
ContributorsWu, Xingyuan (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Qigui (Thesis advisor) / Yu, Xiaoyun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description中国改革开放以来经济高速发展，一部分人群快速积累了大量财富，迫切需要专业机构对其财富进行有效管理，激发了中国私人银行市场的蓬勃发展。本文利用M银行全部私人银行网点的客户资产配置数据，以省级行政单位为划分，从核心公共资源供给角度出发，探究地区公共资源财政支出对私人银行客户数量增长和资产配置的影响。本文通过实证研究发现：（1）在人均公共安全财政支出较高、人均公共教育财政支出较低的地区，即公共安全资源相对匮乏、公共教育资源相对丰富的地区，私人银行客户规模增速较快；（2）在人均公共安全财政支出较高，即公共安全资源相对匮乏的地区，高净值人群会积极配置流动性良好的银行存款类产品和保险类产品，同时会减少配置高风险、高收益的理财类产品和基金类产品；（3）在人均公共医疗卫生财政支出较高，即公共医疗资源相对匮乏的地区，高净值人群会积极配置银行存款类产品，同时减少保险类产品和理财类产品的配置比例；（4）在人均公共教育财政支出较高，即公共教育资源相对匮乏的地区，高净值人群会积极配置银行保险类产品和理财类产品，同时减少存款类产品的配置比例。
ContributorsMa, Ying (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Wu, Fei (Thesis advisor) / Wang, Tan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
The dissertation consists of three essays in financial economics. In the first essay, using historical prices for futures contracts tied to U.S. election outcomes, I develop a measure of firm-level partisan exposure. This measure captures the sensitivity of a firm's stock return to the changes in the odds of winning by a Democratic presidential candidate. I find that political beta is significantly lower in regulated industries and that it takes more extreme values for smaller and more highly levered firms. Finally, I document that firms with high political beta earn 4.0% higher annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns under Republican presidencies than firms with low political beta. The second essay studies mean monthly returns and compound long-run returns to over 64,000 global common stocks during the January 1990 to June 2020 period. The important practical distinctions between arithmetic, geometric, and dollar-weighted monthly returns are highlighted. In addition, it is documented that the majority, 56.6% of U.S. stocks and 61.3% of non-U.S. stocks, underperform one-month U.S. Treasury bills in terms of compound returns over the full sample. Focusing on aggregate shareholder outcomes, the top-performing 1.5% of firms account for all of the $US 56.2 trillion in net global stock market wealth creation. Outside the US, less than one percent of firms account for the $US 20.1 trillion in net wealth creation. The third essay documents evidence of managerial influence on shareholder voting outcomes. There are significantly more proposals that narrowly pass than narrowly fail. This behavior is more pronounced for firms with low institutional ownership and for proposals receiving a negative ISS recommendation. Mechanisms by which managers influence the outcome, such as meeting adjournment and selective campaigning, are newly identified. Finally, the market reacts more positively to the narrow failure of management proposals than to their passage. Combined with a theoretical model, these results imply that managerial influence on the voting process is value-destroying.
ContributorsChoi, Goeun (Author) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Schiller, Christoph (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find that firms that issue loans without financial covenants tend to have (i) lower accounting quality, (ii) lower assets, and (iii) are experiencing faster growth in profitability relative to firms that issue loans with financial covenants. I build a theoretical model of project financing in which there is noisy public information about the project’s profitability, and the lender can privately monitor to improve the information quality. I show that if the signal precision without monitoring is sufficiently low (high), the equilibrium contract does not include (includes) a covenant. Covenant inclusion plays a key role in providing incentives to the lender to monitor. I show that the lender monitors less often relative to the first best. Insufficient monitoring leads to “excessive risk-taking,” namely, bad quality firms continuing with the project too often. Relatedly, I also show that covenants are used less often in equilibrium relative to the first best. The second chapter examines equilibrium consequences of litigation by holdout creditors in sovereign debt renegotiation. I show that given a sufficiently high probability of winning the litigation case against the borrowing country and/or a high enough defaulted sovereign debt, the presence of the holdout creditors increases the expected debt recovery rate, which makes the default option less attractive, and decreases the country’s default probability and the interest rate on the country’s debt. The country responds by borrowing more but defaults less often along the equilibrium path as it wants to avoid default and facing holdout creditors. Having a non-zero probability of successful litigation is welfare improving for the country as it sustains higher debt and defaults less frequently.
ContributorsKim, Yong (Author) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I use regression discontinuity design around the threshold to assign firms to each category. The results show that “value” firms have a significantly higher dividend payout - about four percentage points - than growth firms. This approach establishes a causal link between firm “growth/value” labels and dividend policy.
The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
ContributorsLee, Tae Eui (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Thesis advisor) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
The current study combines field study, survey study, and public financial reports, and conducts an in-depths comprehensive study of the cost of the global tire industry. By comparing the price and the total cost structure of standardized tire products, we investigate Chinese tire industry’s global competitiveness, especially in light of China’s fast increasing labor cost. By constructing a comprehensive cost index (CCI), this dissertation estimates the evolution and forecasts the trend of global tire industry’s cost structure. Based on our empirical analysis, we provide various recommendations for Chinese tire manufacturers, other manufacturing industries, and foreign trade policy makers.
ContributorsZhang, Ning (Author) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015