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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor

Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor confidence and on trading profitability. Specifically, I examine abnormal trading volumes generated by small and large investors in response to security analyst recommendations and the resulting abnormal market returns generated. I find an overall increase in investor confidence in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period consistent with a reduction in existing conflicts of interest. The change in confidence observed is particularly striking for small traders. I also find that small trader profitability has increased in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period whereas that for large traders has decreased. These results are consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission's primary mission to protect small investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.
ContributorsDong, Xiaobo (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
I examine the degree to which stockholders' aggregate gain/loss frame of reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm's quarterly earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements

I examine the degree to which stockholders' aggregate gain/loss frame of reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm's quarterly earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements is larger (smaller) when stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized capital gain (loss) position. This relation is stronger among seller-initiated trades and weaker in December, consistent with the cognitive bias referred to as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). Sensitivity analysis reveals that the relation is stronger among less sophisticated investors and for firms with weaker information environments, consistent with the behavioral explanation. I also present evidence on the consequences of this disposition effect. First, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gain position moderates the degree to which information-related determinants of trade (e.g. unexpected earnings, firm size, and forecast dispersion) affect abnormal announcement-window trading volume. Second, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gains position is associated with announcement-window abnormal returns, consistent with the disposition effect reducing the market's ability to efficiently incorporate earnings news into price.
ContributorsWeisbrod, Eric (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Mikhail, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
How to play the advantages of network loan platform to reduce the financing costs of net loan platform both in theory and practice has important significance. In this paper, we use the method of qualitative and quantitative combination. First of all, through the interview of the net loan platform practitioners,

How to play the advantages of network loan platform to reduce the financing costs of net loan platform both in theory and practice has important significance. In this paper, we use the method of qualitative and quantitative combination. First of all, through the interview of the net loan platform practitioners, the financing cost of the net loan platform comes from the internal and external parts. Part of the network loan platform should be righteous, but counterproductive human and material costs, credit costs, information efficiency, transaction costs and matching costs; part of the emerging industry as a challenge, compliance costs, technical costs and safety costs and other cost. And put forward the top design credit system, promote the credit system; build a unified development of regulatory policies to reduce compliance risks; increase investment in technology, share the improvement of technological progress bonuses. Through the establishment of the regression model, the paper analyzes the influence of various indexes of network loan platform on the cost of network reception. It is found that the background of net loan platform with shareholder and executive team as the proxy variable has significant influence on the cost of network loan platform. The effect is not significant. Risk control indicators on the net loan platform cost has a significant negative effect. The impact of operating capacity on the cost of net loan platform differentiation, the acquisition of the cost of positive relations, the other is negative relations. Policy compliance indicators of financial security on the net loan platform cost significantly, the other did not significantly affect the role of liquidity indicators of differentiation, the average borrowing period will significantly affect the net loan platform costs, liquidity is a negative impact. And finally put forward the policy and recommendations and research limitations and future direction.
ContributorsRen, Junxia (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Qian, Jun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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This dissertation focuses on risk prevention and regulatory issues of financial asset trading platforms, exploring the composition of a financial asset trading platform and its risks, formulating the general framework of platform risk prevention and regulation, and discussing the methodologies for monitoring and managing the risk of financial assets trading

This dissertation focuses on risk prevention and regulatory issues of financial asset trading platforms, exploring the composition of a financial asset trading platform and its risks, formulating the general framework of platform risk prevention and regulation, and discussing the methodologies for monitoring and managing the risk of financial assets trading platform. The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which discusses the current status in this research field, the motivation and significance of the research topic. The second chapter discusses the transaction cost theory, information asymmetry theory, financial risk management theory, financial supervision theory and other related basic theories related to financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision. The third chapter presents the definition, the main types, the generating mechanism and the transmission mechanism of the financial asset trading platform. The fourth chapter elaborates theoretically on the general framework of financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision based on the aspects of basic principles, key tasks, applicable methods and constituent elements. The fifth chapter discusses the performance of financial asset trading business, asset return trading business, financing business and information coupling business on financial asset trading platforms, and analyzes the risk prevention of financial asset trading platforms from a business perspective. The sixth chapter discusses the development of financial asset trading platforms in developed countries, and summarizes the experience and practice of their risk prevention and supervision based on four categories of business lines. On this basis, the dissertation draws the inspiration and implications for the future development of the trading platforms in our country. The seventh chapter puts forward policy recommendations regarding risk prevention and supervision of financial asset trading platforms in five aspects: legal positioning, credit information system, protection of consumer rights, self-discipline management and business supervision.
ContributorsXu, Chaojun (Author) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description财富管理是一个高度信息不对称的行业,因此投资人需要尽可能减少自身的不确定来做投资决策,通过文献整理,本文发现通过建立信任来消除不确定性是很多投资人都会选择的帮助投资决策的方法。纵观历史,美国2007-2008年的金融危机也恰恰导致金融市场投资人对于理财机构信任的严重缺失,相同的情况也可能发生在中国财富管理市场,因此本文将此选作研究重点,希望深入研究财富管理公司投资人对理财师的信任来得到一系列结论。本文最终发现就平台和理财师相比,投资人更看重平台的信誉度。 投资人大多认为平台的信誉度要高于理财师的信誉度,但是这并不意味着理财师不重要。本文进一步的分析发现,多数投资人会和理财师建立起一种私人联系,且该私人关系有助于加强客户和平台的联系。投资人认为行业经验、为人诚恳,说话可信以及责任心是加强这种私人关系的重要因素。最后,投资人对于钜派平台的信任主要由对于理财师的信任来维持,同时对于理财师的信任主要来自与情感信任。本文的发现对财富管理平台具有战略意义。
ContributorsWu, Qimin (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Hongquan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
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With years of continuous Chinese economic growth and accelerating aging population, better serving the changing demands in wealth management has become the new market development directions. As evidenced in international experiences, the embedded nature of privacy and isolation of managed assets in the trust business have demonstrated built-in consistency with

With years of continuous Chinese economic growth and accelerating aging population, better serving the changing demands in wealth management has become the new market development directions. As evidenced in international experiences, the embedded nature of privacy and isolation of managed assets in the trust business have demonstrated built-in consistency with the needs of high-end wealth management and inheritance; hence, trust has become a very fitting vehicle for wealth management. By 2014, total assets under trust management have reached RMB14trillion.

However, there is as yet a massive gap between the current service levels received by high net worth individuals and their requirements; a gap that is adverse in establishing a stable customer service relationship; which eventually hinders the vigorous development of the overall industry.

With modeling the gaps in service levels as the basic foundation, this paper first and foremost starts with the discussion on the issues in listening to service needs. This paper conducted customer surveys in such categories as customer expected and perceived service quality, service level design and standards, service provided in accordance with the design, and service commitment actually fulfilled. By correlation and regression analyses, this paper analyzed the characteristics of high net worth population, concluding that high net worth individuals with different gender, profession, age exhibit varying needs, preferences and other determining factors in wealth management.

This Paper has designed wealth management service standards and value-added asset allocation systems; the Paper has structured a systematic and disciplined framework in wealth management, which serves as a guideline in the implementation of leading wealth management and in the establishment of superior trust management services. It serves as an impetus for the trust industry to thrive as the leader in China’s wealth management domain, enhance industry brand image, accumulate stable customer segments and develop sustainable market core competencies.
ContributorsZhao, Nuan (Author) / Wang, Jiang (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets,

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017