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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have

This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond prices. Both measures shed light on the credit spread puzzle: changes in credit spread are positively correlated with changes in holding periods and markups, and a large portion of credit spread changes is explained by them. The economic effects of holding periods and markups are particularly sharp during crisis periods.
ContributorsQian, Zhiyi (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets,

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description区块链技术应用(DApp)最早出现在数字货币交易上,也有部分DApp涉及游戏、音乐、教育、出行等场景,但是由于前几年DApp还属于新生事物,多数社会大众对其了解程度不高,加之多数DApp开发和优化的水平有限,用户体验较差,因此并没有良好的市场表现。

尽管如此, 2017年11月一款叫CryptoKitties的区块链游戏正式上线,并且在短时间之内引爆了整个区块链,游戏交易量在1个月内暴涨至1.7万。随后风险资本不断进入区块链行业,并且催生出一大批区块链DApp出来,涉及的应用场景进一步拓展到游戏、赌博、社交、金融、市场、保险、健康等领域。如何设计一套有效的治理机制,从而实现用户留存高、项目前景好,成为多数区块链DApp最为关注的问题。

本文选择CryptoKitties、Mycryptohero、Steemit和NeoWorld这四款区块链DApp作为案例研究对象,通过归纳总结发现这四款DApp都将游戏性、通证经济、社群生态和网络效应作为共同的治理方式。基于这四方面,本文对四款DApp的异同进行了跨案例比较,发现NeoWorld要比其他三款DApp在治理手段上更加丰富和合理。最后,利用136份NeoWorld玩家调查问卷数据,对游戏性、通证经济、社群生态和网络效应对其治理绩效的影响进行了实证检验,结果发现除了社群生态之外,其他三个因素都能提升NeoWorld的治理绩效。

本研究的最大创新是选择在区块链场景应用中具有代表性的4个DApp项目作为案例研究对象,通过归纳总结发现各自在治理手段上的共同之处(影响因素),并根据问卷调查数据对不同影响因素对特定Dapp治理绩效的影响程度进行实证检验,丰富了平台治理相关研究成果,也为社会各界深化认识DApp治理方式和成效,推动DApp行业生态健康有序发展提供参考和借鉴。

关键词:通证经济;社群生态;网络效应;跨案例研究;回归分析
ContributorsHe, Xin (Author) / Shao, Benjamin (Thesis advisor) / Hu, Jie (Thesis advisor) / Zheng, Zhiqiang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description随着经济和社会的进步,企业不仅要以盈利为目标,也为利益相关者和生态环境负责并承担相应的社会责任。社会公众也日渐对企业社会责任问题加以重视,伴随着社会责任这一理念的深入,监管部门制定并出台了一系列与企业社会责任信息披露有关的政策和法规,用以规范和引导企业社会责任信息的披露工作。本文以有效市场理论、信息不对称理论和利益相关者理论为基础,将2010-2018年香港证券交易所上市公司为作为研究对象,运用实证研究的方法,将企业社会责任融入股票崩盘风险的研究视角。本文结合理论演绎和实证检验的方法,突破已有文献以收益框架为研究视角的限制,从金融资本市场的角度出发研究企业社会责任的崩盘效应,系统的探索了企业社会责任影响股票崩盘风险的效应及其影响因素。研究结果显示,对比未披露企业社会责任的公司而言,披露企业社会责任相关信息的公司,未来股价崩盘风险越小。基于香港股市主要以机构投资者为主,进一步考察了社会责任信息披露和机构投资者对股价未来崩盘风险的交互作用,研究发现在机构持股比例越低的公司中,企业社会责任信息披露对未来崩盘效应的抑制作用越明显。此外,本文以独立董事占董事会人员比例作为企业治理因素,探索了社会责任信息披露和董事会独立性对股价崩盘风险的交互作用,研究发现企业董事独立性越强,社会责任信息披露对股票崩盘风险的抑制作用更为显著。最后,相对于非国有企业而言,国有企业性质削弱了企业社会责任信息披露对未来崩盘效应的抑制作用。
ContributorsHe, Jie (Author) / Zhu, David, H. (Thesis advisor) / Zhang, Jie (Thesis advisor) / Hu, Jie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
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Description随着科创板、注册制出台,企业间的竞争逐步从资源型竞争转向科技和技术的竞争,大量有知识、有文化、有理想、有技术的人才涌入社会,给科技发展、技术创新在政策、市场和人才层面提供了支撑、机遇和源动力,科技型创新企业大量涌现,形成趋势性上升行业。科技型创业企业多冠以“规模小、技术密集、高成长、高风险”的标签,在融资过程中困难重重,这些特点与风险投资(VC)“高风险、高回报”的特质不谋而合,VC机构还能给被投企业提供人才、信息、商业模式、政策法律咨询等增值服务,助力企业发展。引入VC走上市路径成为诸多科技型创业企业最优选择。 近些年VC行业在我国得到迅猛发展,IVC和CVC已成了助推我国科技型创业企业发展的主力军。由于IVC和CVC的组织架构、投资期限、资金来源、投资目标、投资经验、管理层薪资结构等方面存在着很大的不同。不同的投资模式势必会对被投企业的经营活动产生不同影响,本文基于总资产单位产出和投入为经济学逻辑,针对相关变量提出假设。 本文对我国中小板和创业板2013年以前上市的七个高新技术行业(5G通信、大数据、人工智能、软件服务、生物制药、新材料、医疗器械)共123家,以上市为起点的6年企业数据为基础。以IVC和CVC为自变量,以上市司龄、企业规模、行业控制、分红占净利润比为控制变量,以V/A、E/A、K/A和E/R为因变量,对IVC和CVC投入的科技型创业企业分别进行描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析,验证IVC和CVC对被投企业的市场维度(V/A)、财务维度(E/A、E/R)、创新维度(K/A)的影响。试图从企业的角度出发,理清企业与VC的关系,为二级市场投资者提供一个投资决策视角。
ContributorsZhang, Mingpeng (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Jiang, Zhan (Thesis advisor) / Hu, Jie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021