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Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in

Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in U.S. markets, the covariance between stock-level idiosyncratic volatility and the idiosyncratic risk premium explains future stock returns. Stocks in the highest quintile of the covariance between the volatility and risk premium earn an average 3-factor alpha of 70 bps per month higher than those in the lowest quintile.
ContributorsXie, Daruo (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have

This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond prices. Both measures shed light on the credit spread puzzle: changes in credit spread are positively correlated with changes in holding periods and markups, and a large portion of credit spread changes is explained by them. The economic effects of holding periods and markups are particularly sharp during crisis periods.
ContributorsQian, Zhiyi (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
Based on multiple case studies of the transactions in China by private equity funds, this paper attempts to explore the value-creation capabilities of private equity funds at the transaction/deal level.

Previous studies on financial performance of PE funds utilized data collected from publically traded companies in European/US markets. By

Based on multiple case studies of the transactions in China by private equity funds, this paper attempts to explore the value-creation capabilities of private equity funds at the transaction/deal level.

Previous studies on financial performance of PE funds utilized data collected from publically traded companies in European/US markets. By measuring financial performance of both “pre- and post-transactions,” these studies researched two questions: 1) Do buyout funds create value? 2) If they do, what are the sources of value creation? In general, studies conclude that private equity/buyout funds do create value at both the deal level and investor level. They also identified four possible sources of such value creation: 1) undervaluation, 2) leverage effect, 3) better governance, and 4) operational improvement.

However, relatively little is known about the process of value creation. In this study, I attempt to fill that gap, revealing the “secret recipe” of value creation.

By carefully looking into the process of value creation, this study suggests five propositions covering capabilities at 1) deal selection/screening, 2) deal structuring, 3) operational improvement, 4) investment exit, and 5) Top Management Team (TMT). These capabilities at private equity/buyout funds are critical factors for value creation. In a thorough review of the value-creation process, this paper hopes to:

1) Share real-life experiences and lessons learned on private equity transactions in China as a developing economy.

2) Reveal the process of deal/transaction to observe measures taken place within deal/transaction for value creation.

3) Show how well-executed strategies and capabilities in deal selection/screening, deal structuring, operational improvement, and investment exit can still create value for private equity firms without financial leverage.

4) Share the experience of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) reform participated in by private equity firms in China. This could provide valuable information for policy makers in China.
ContributorsYe, Youming (Author) / Lee, Peggy (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets,

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial obligations to asset prices. Financial obligations include both debt payments and other financial commitments.

In the first essay, I investigate how household financial obligations affect the equity premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) consumption-based asset pricing model to resolve

This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial obligations to asset prices. Financial obligations include both debt payments and other financial commitments.

In the first essay, I investigate how household financial obligations affect the equity premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) consumption-based asset pricing model to resolve the equity risk premium puzzle. I focus on two channels: the preference channel and the borrowing constraints channel. Under reasonable parameterizations, my model generates equity risk premiums similar in magnitudes to those observed in U.S. data. Furthermore, I show that relaxing the borrowing constraint shrinks the equity risk premium.

In the Second essay, I test the predictability of excess market returns using the household financial obligations ratio. I show that deviations in the household financial obligations ratio from its long-run mean is a better forecaster of future market returns than alternative prediction variables. The results remain significant using either quarterly or annual data and are robust to out-of-sample tests.

In the third essay, I investigate whether the risk associated with household financial obligations is an economy-wide risk with the potential to explain fluctuations in the cross-section of stock returns. The multifactor model I propose, is a modification of the capital asset pricing model that includes the financial obligations ratio as a ``conditioning down" variable. The key finding is that there is an aggregate hedging demand for securities that pay off in periods characterized by higher levels of financial obligations ratios. The consistent pricing of financial obligations risk with a negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations ratio acts as a state variable.
ContributorsJahangiry, Pedram (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Committee member) / Reffett, Kevin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
This dissertation consists of two essays. The essay “Is Capital Reallocation Really Procyclical?” studies the cyclicality of corporate asset reallocation and its implication for aggregate productivity efficiency. Empirically, aggregate reallocation is procyclical. This is puzzling given the documented evidence that the benefits of reallocation are countercyclical. I show that this

This dissertation consists of two essays. The essay “Is Capital Reallocation Really Procyclical?” studies the cyclicality of corporate asset reallocation and its implication for aggregate productivity efficiency. Empirically, aggregate reallocation is procyclical. This is puzzling given the documented evidence that the benefits of reallocation are countercyclical. I show that this procyclicality is driven entirely by the reallocation of bundled capital (e.g., business divisions), which is highly correlated with market valuations and is unrelated to measures of productivity dispersion. In contrast, reallocation of unbundled capital (e.g., specific machinery or equipment) is countercyclical and highly correlated with dispersion in productivity growth. To gauge the aggregate productivity impact of bundled transactions, I propose a heterogeneous agentmodel of investment featuring two distinct used-capital markets as well as a sentiment component. In equilibrium, unbundled capital is reallocated for productivity gains, whereas bundled capital is also reallocated for real, or perceived, synergies in the equity market. While equity overvaluation negatively affects aggregate productivity by encouraging excessive trading of capital, its adverse impact is largely offset by its positive externality on asset liquidity in the unbundled capital market. The second essay “The Profitability of Liquidity Provision” studies the profitability of liquidity provision in the US equity market. By tracking the cumulative inventory position of all passive liquidity providers and matching each aggregate position with its offsetting trade, I construct a measure of profits to liquidity provision (realized profitability) and assess how profitability varies with the average time to offset. Using a sample of all common stocks from 2017 to 2020, I show that there is substantial variation in the horizon at which trades are turned around even for the same stock. As a mark-to-market profit, the conventional realized spread—measured with a prespecified horizon—can deviate significantly from the realized profits to liquidity provision both in the cross-section and in the time series. I further show that, consistent with the risk-return tradeoff faced by liquidity providers as a whole, realized profitability is low for trades that are quickly turned around and high for trades that take longer to reverse.
ContributorsYang, Lingyan (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Boguth, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
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This dissertation consists of two essays. The first, titled “Sweep Order and the Cost of Market Fragmentation” takes a “revealed-preference” approach towards gauging the effects of market fragmentation by documenting the implicit costs borne by traders looking to avoid executing in a fragmented environment. I show that traders use Intermarket

This dissertation consists of two essays. The first, titled “Sweep Order and the Cost of Market Fragmentation” takes a “revealed-preference” approach towards gauging the effects of market fragmentation by documenting the implicit costs borne by traders looking to avoid executing in a fragmented environment. I show that traders use Intermarket Sweep Orders (ISO) to trade “as-if” markets were single-venued and pay a premium to do so. Using a sample of over 2,600 securities over the period January 2019 to April 2021, this premium amounts to 1.3 bps on average (or 40%of the effective spread), amounting to a total of $3 billion over the sample period. I find a positive, robust, and significant relationship between the premium and different measures of market fragmentation, further supporting the interpretation of the premium as a cost of market fragmentation. The second essay, titled “The Profitability of Liquidity Provision” investigates the relationship between the profits realized from providing liquidity and the amount of time it takes liquidity providers to reverse their positions. By tracking the cumulative inventory position of all passive liquidity providers in the US equity market and matching each aggregate position with its offsetting trade, I construct a measure of profits to liquidity provision (realized profitability) and assess how profitability varies with the average time to offset. Using a sample of all common stocks from 2017 to 2020, I show that there is substantial variation in the horizon at which trades are turned around even for the same stock. As a mark-to-market profit, the conventional realized spread—measured with a prespecified horizon—can deviate significantly from the realized profits to liquidity provision both in the cross-section and in the time-series. I further show that, consistent with the risk-return tradeoff faced by liquidity providers as a whole, realized profitability is low for trades that are quickly turned around and high for trades that take longer to reverse.
ContributorsLohr, Ariel (Author) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Committee member) / Aragon, George (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022