Matching Items (10)
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- All Subjects: Finance
- Genre: Academic theses
- Creators: Boguth, Oliver
- Creators: Yan, Hong
Description
I study the performance of hedge fund managers, using quarterly stock holdings from 1995 to 2010. I use the holdings-based measure built on Ferson and Mo (2012) to decompose a manager's overall performance into stock selection and three components of timing ability: market return, volatility, and liquidity. At the aggregate level, I find that hedge fund managers have stock picking skills but no timing skills, and overall I do not find strong evidence to support their superiority. I show that the lack of abilities is driven by the large fluctuations of timing performance with market conditions. I find that conditioning information, equity capital constraints, and priority in stocks to liquidate can partly explain the weak evidence. At the individual fund level, bootstrap analysis results suggest that even top managers' abilities cannot be separated from luck. Also, I find that hedge fund managers exhibit short-horizon persistence in selectivity skill.
ContributorsKang, MinJeong (Author) / Aragon, George O. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael G (Committee member) / Boguth, Oliver (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
In the first chapter, I develop a representative agent model in which the purchase of consumption goods must be planned in advance. Volatility in the agent's portfolio increases the risk that a purchase cannot be implemented. This implementation risk causes the agent to make conservative consumption plans. In the model, this leads to persistent and negatively skewed consumption growth and a slow reaction of consumption to wealth shocks. The model proposes a novel explanation for the negative relation between volatility and expected utility. In equilibrium, prices of risky assets must compensate for the utility loss. Hence, the model suggests a new mechanism for generating the equity risk premium. Importantly, because implementation risk does not rely on the co-movement of asset prices with marginal utility, the resulting equity premium does not require concavity of the intratemporal utility function.
In the second chapter, I challenge the view that equity market timing always benefits
shareholders. By distinguishing the effect of a firm's equity decisions from the effect of mispricing itself, I show that market timing can decrease shareholder value. Additionally, the timing of equity sales has a more negative effect on existing shareholders than the timing of share repurchases. My theory can be used to infer firms' maximization objectives from their observed market timing strategies. I argue that the popularity of stock buybacks, the low frequency of seasoned equity offerings, and the observed post-event stock returns are consistent with managers maximizing current shareholder value.
In the second chapter, I challenge the view that equity market timing always benefits
shareholders. By distinguishing the effect of a firm's equity decisions from the effect of mispricing itself, I show that market timing can decrease shareholder value. Additionally, the timing of equity sales has a more negative effect on existing shareholders than the timing of share repurchases. My theory can be used to infer firms' maximization objectives from their observed market timing strategies. I argue that the popularity of stock buybacks, the low frequency of seasoned equity offerings, and the observed post-event stock returns are consistent with managers maximizing current shareholder value.
ContributorsWan, Pengcheng (Author) / Boguth, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Thesis advisor) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
This dissertation focuses on risk prevention and regulatory issues of financial asset trading platforms, exploring the composition of a financial asset trading platform and its risks, formulating the general framework of platform risk prevention and regulation, and discussing the methodologies for monitoring and managing the risk of financial assets trading platform. The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which discusses the current status in this research field, the motivation and significance of the research topic. The second chapter discusses the transaction cost theory, information asymmetry theory, financial risk management theory, financial supervision theory and other related basic theories related to financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision. The third chapter presents the definition, the main types, the generating mechanism and the transmission mechanism of the financial asset trading platform. The fourth chapter elaborates theoretically on the general framework of financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision based on the aspects of basic principles, key tasks, applicable methods and constituent elements. The fifth chapter discusses the performance of financial asset trading business, asset return trading business, financing business and information coupling business on financial asset trading platforms, and analyzes the risk prevention of financial asset trading platforms from a business perspective. The sixth chapter discusses the development of financial asset trading platforms in developed countries, and summarizes the experience and practice of their risk prevention and supervision based on four categories of business lines. On this basis, the dissertation draws the inspiration and implications for the future development of the trading platforms in our country. The seventh chapter puts forward policy recommendations regarding risk prevention and supervision of financial asset trading platforms in five aspects: legal positioning, credit information system, protection of consumer rights, self-discipline management and business supervision.
ContributorsXu, Chaojun (Author) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays. The essay “Is Capital Reallocation Really Procyclical?” studies the cyclicality of corporate asset reallocation and its implication for aggregate productivity efficiency. Empirically, aggregate reallocation is procyclical. This is puzzling given the documented evidence that the benefits of reallocation are countercyclical. I show that this procyclicality is driven entirely by the reallocation of bundled capital (e.g., business divisions), which is highly correlated with market valuations and is unrelated to measures of productivity dispersion. In contrast, reallocation of unbundled capital (e.g., specific machinery or equipment) is countercyclical and highly correlated with dispersion in productivity growth. To gauge the aggregate productivity impact of bundled transactions, I propose a heterogeneous agentmodel of investment featuring two distinct used-capital markets as well as a sentiment component. In equilibrium, unbundled capital is reallocated for productivity gains, whereas bundled capital is also reallocated for real, or perceived, synergies in the equity market. While equity overvaluation negatively affects aggregate productivity by encouraging excessive trading of capital, its adverse impact is largely offset by its positive externality on asset liquidity in the unbundled capital market. The second essay “The Profitability of Liquidity Provision” studies the profitability of liquidity provision in the US equity market. By tracking the cumulative inventory position of all passive liquidity providers and matching each aggregate position with its offsetting trade, I construct a measure of profits to liquidity provision (realized profitability) and assess how profitability varies with the average time to offset. Using a sample of all common stocks from 2017 to 2020, I show that there is substantial variation in the horizon at which trades are turned around even for the same stock. As a
mark-to-market profit, the conventional realized spread—measured with a prespecified horizon—can deviate significantly from the realized profits to liquidity provision both in the cross-section and in the time series. I further show that, consistent with the risk-return tradeoff faced by liquidity providers as a whole, realized profitability is low for trades that are quickly turned around and high for trades that take longer to reverse.
ContributorsYang, Lingyan (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Boguth, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the total assets managed by U.S. mutual funds have frequently hit new highs and the industry has become increasingly concentrated. In the meantime, two strategies have emerged in the American mutual fund industry: active and passive management. What factors affect the market shares of firms that adopted these two different strategies?
Building on strategic management theories, I suggest that mutual fund families that adopted active and passive management strategies tend to compete in different dimensions. Active management fund families tend to implement the product differentiation strategy, competing on “product quality” through excess-returns, innovative and differentiated fund products; passively managed fund families focus more on "price competition" by conducting an overall cost leadership strategy.
This research examines the driven factors of fund families’ market share. The results show that: the market share of actively managed fund families is more sensitive to positive impact of fund performance, while passive management firms are more sensitive to negative effect of management fees and total loads; 12b-1 expense improves the competitiveness of active fund families and thus enhance their market shares but it has negative impact on passive fund families. In addition, high turnover decreases the market share of all fund families, especially for passively managed families. The outcome reveals the latest US mutual industry orientation: products differentiation, turnover, management fee have greater impact on market share while the competition of fund performance is diminishing. The Matthew effect in US mutual fund industry is outstanding. Industrial competition dimension expands from performance and products to cost cutting.
Empirical analysis on Chinese mutual fund families is also conducted. Different from the US, there is only small number of mutual fund families targeting passive management products. The results show that the distribution channel has the largest impact on Chinese mutual fund family market share and investors are more willing to chase performance than to consider cost-efficient fund families. This study then analyses reasons behind the difference of Chinese and American mutual fund industries.
Building on strategic management theories, I suggest that mutual fund families that adopted active and passive management strategies tend to compete in different dimensions. Active management fund families tend to implement the product differentiation strategy, competing on “product quality” through excess-returns, innovative and differentiated fund products; passively managed fund families focus more on "price competition" by conducting an overall cost leadership strategy.
This research examines the driven factors of fund families’ market share. The results show that: the market share of actively managed fund families is more sensitive to positive impact of fund performance, while passive management firms are more sensitive to negative effect of management fees and total loads; 12b-1 expense improves the competitiveness of active fund families and thus enhance their market shares but it has negative impact on passive fund families. In addition, high turnover decreases the market share of all fund families, especially for passively managed families. The outcome reveals the latest US mutual industry orientation: products differentiation, turnover, management fee have greater impact on market share while the competition of fund performance is diminishing. The Matthew effect in US mutual fund industry is outstanding. Industrial competition dimension expands from performance and products to cost cutting.
Empirical analysis on Chinese mutual fund families is also conducted. Different from the US, there is only small number of mutual fund families targeting passive management products. The results show that the distribution channel has the largest impact on Chinese mutual fund family market share and investors are more willing to chase performance than to consider cost-efficient fund families. This study then analyses reasons behind the difference of Chinese and American mutual fund industries.
ContributorsLiu, Jianping (Author) / Zhu, Hongquan (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description期限错配策略利用滚动短期融资支持长期投资，滚动短期融资本身极易导致资金链紧张，产生流动性风险。利用手工收集的2006-2018年A股上市公司独特数据，本文系统考察了企业投融资期限错配对发行信用债信用利差的影响。本文发现，期限错配越严重的企业，越有可能在发行信用债时被要求更高的信用利差，对于民营上市公司发行信用债尤其如此；利用再融资环境和“钱荒”事件进行的作用机制检验表明，企业投融资期限错配对发行信用债利差的影响主要是因为期限错配蕴含着较高的流动性风险； 利用工具变量、双重差分法和替代性度量等一系列稳健性检验仍能得出一致结论。再者，利用2006-2018 年我国开放式基金年度持股数据，从基金投资组合与持仓调整两个角度，实证检验了期限错配行为对于基金投资行为的影响。研究发现，期限错配产生的财务风险会降低基金对期限错配上市公司发行信用债的投资规模；且在实施期限错配当年，基金对持有的该上市公司的信用债更可能进行减持，由此表明期限错配会影响基金投资策略的形成。进一步的分析显示，基金所在基金管理公司为中外合资时，上述基金投资行为更加明显；同时，当基金持有民营上市公司以及处于紧缩性货币政策环境时，期限错配对于基金投资行为的影响更大。
最后，本文考察了期限错配下基金投资信用债的经济后果，分别从基金业绩、基金收益波动率和基金流量这三个维度进行了检验。实证结果显示，在控制其他可能影响基金收益及收益波动率的因素后，对期限错配上市公司信用债持有比重越小及减持比例越大的基金，当年业绩越好，且收益的波动率越低。再次，对于基金投资者，本文利用净申购率作为基金流量的代理变量，检验发现，基金投资者更热忠于追逐采取减少持有期限错配上市公司信用债这一投资策略的基金，表现为这类基金有更多的资金净流入，而且，相对于个人投资者，上述基金投资者的投资偏好在我国的机构投资者中表现得更加明显。
ContributorsXu, Liqun (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Zhang, Huibing (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
I propose new measures of investor attention for Mutual Funds. Using the Security and Exchange Commissions’ Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system’s server log files, this study is the first to explore investor attention to specific mutual funds. I find that changes, or spikes, in mutual fund investor attention are associated with funds’ introduction of a new share class, decreases in expense ratio, past performance and volatility. On average, spikes to investor attention predict net inflows into mutual funds which outpace the overall growth of the mutual fund sector. Attention via this EDGAR channel is more important when investors are researching more opaque funds. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between mutual fund investor attention and fund returns. Yet, there is evidence that investors appear to be responding to the acquisition of stale information with flows. I additionally utilize Google Trends data for individual fund tickers and investigate its effects in Mutual Fund Market. I find that Investor Attention to individual mutual funds is concentrated within Equity funds, Index funds, and Institutional funds. Individual fund attention is strongly negatively associated with expense ratios, 12B-1 Fees, and 'broker sold' funds, suggesting that funds with higher fees get less attention than low cost index funds. I find limited support for the controversial convexity in the flow to performance sensitivity in the Mutual Fund market, but only in funds with high levels of individual attention.
ContributorsWymbs, Michael (Author) / Aragon, George (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Boguth, Oliver (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description本文对不良资产法拍定价的实践操作进行分析，选取一线、二线部分城市的住宅为主要研究对象，以主流互联网拍卖平台上真实成交的司法拍卖案例为样本，样本覆盖上海、杭州、苏州、南京等国内一二线城市主流司法拍卖资产，时间跨度为2017年至2020年。本文选取影响不良法拍资产定价的主要因素有：资产面积、位置、税费承担方式、参拍人数、加价轮数、租约情况等，以上述主要因素为自变量因素，以不良法拍资产价格偏离指数及参拍人数作为因变量。回归模型分别采用线性回归和二阶段最小二乘法，把资产面积、位置、税费承担方式、参拍人数、加价轮数、租约情况作为核心变量，研究各个因素对于不良资产拍卖成交价格的影响程度。本次所采用的回归分析中，由于研究的因果关系涉及因变量和两个以上自变量，因此在研究过程中选取六个核心变量，在系统梳理大量样本数据的基础上，利用数理统计方法建立因变量与自变量之间的回归模型，通过线性回归方法研究六个核心变量与因变量之间的关系，并通过二阶段最小二乘法来剔除核心区域、税费承担方式、租约情况对参拍人数的影响，最终得出核心变量对因变量的影响。经研究发现，位置、资产面积、税费承担方式、租约情况对△p呈负向影响，参拍人数、加价轮数对△p呈正向影响。
ContributorsShi, Jinhua (Author) / Shao, Benjamin (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
The first chapter uses data on birthplaces of 2,065 Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and a county-level measure of cultural individualism based on the westward expansion in American history to establish a positive relation between CEO cultural individ- ualism and corporate innovation. Difference-in-differences estimations around CEO turnovers support the causality. Individualistic CEOs increase innovation by creating an innovative corporate culture, providing more flexibility to employees, and tolerance for failure.The second chapter develops a model to study the corporate board structure and communication. Outside directors are related to potential competitors. As a result, they can bring valuable advice and cause information leakage. The firm needs to decide whether to have outside directors on the board. In the presence of the outside director, the other directors need to determine whether to communicate.
ContributorsZhang, Fan (Author) / Boguth, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Schiller, Christoph (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie Jiaxu (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022