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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
Financing lease has bloomed as a new financing tool in China for the last several years. In this thesis I investigate the factors that influence China’s automobile financial leasing decisions by both lessors and lessees through market surveys. Based on Probit regression analysis of the data collected from 250 companies

Financing lease has bloomed as a new financing tool in China for the last several years. In this thesis I investigate the factors that influence China’s automobile financial leasing decisions by both lessors and lessees through market surveys. Based on Probit regression analysis of the data collected from 250 companies and 300 individuals, I find that a firm is more likely to use automobile financial leasing when its corporate tax rate is lower, growth potential is more stabilized, and profit is higher. It is also more likely to happen when a firm's long-term debt ratio and its degree of internationalization are higher. At the individual level, I find that the likelihood of individuals’ leasing decision is influenced by their risk preference, income level, and car price. Individuals’ gender, age and education level show no effect.

Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis, I further find that financing costs, service value-added, and products diversity are the three most important competitive factors for the auto financial leasing service providers. This is the case for both the corporate and individual customers in the sample. By contrast, the factors of sales channel and government relationship are found to be much less important. Finally, through an in-depth case study of the leasing company Shanghai Auto Financial Leasing, I find that the key factors determining the customers’ credit default risk are interest rate and automobile type. I also investigate factors that influence business risk during the automobile procurement stage, at the selling stage, and toward the disposition stage. The managerial implications of the above results are discussed throughout the thesis.
ContributorsLin, Zhen, Ph.D (Author) / Zhang, Anming (Thesis advisor) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
The current study combines field study, survey study, and public financial reports, and conducts an in-depths comprehensive study of the cost of the global tire industry. By comparing the price and the total cost structure of standardized tire products, we investigate Chinese tire industry’s global competitiveness, especially in light of

The current study combines field study, survey study, and public financial reports, and conducts an in-depths comprehensive study of the cost of the global tire industry. By comparing the price and the total cost structure of standardized tire products, we investigate Chinese tire industry’s global competitiveness, especially in light of China’s fast increasing labor cost. By constructing a comprehensive cost index (CCI), this dissertation estimates the evolution and forecasts the trend of global tire industry’s cost structure. Based on our empirical analysis, we provide various recommendations for Chinese tire manufacturers, other manufacturing industries, and foreign trade policy makers.
ContributorsZhang, Ning (Author) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
There has been much debate in the world of academia over the valuation of conglomerates. This thesis proposes the use of the EVA theory in explaining fluctuations in conglomerates’ valuation, and we believe that ROIC, WACC, and ROIC-WACC are three indicators that to a certain extent explain these valuation fluctuations.

There has been much debate in the world of academia over the valuation of conglomerates. This thesis proposes the use of the EVA theory in explaining fluctuations in conglomerates’ valuation, and we believe that ROIC, WACC, and ROIC-WACC are three indicators that to a certain extent explain these valuation fluctuations. Through analysis of a sample containing 23 conglomerates, this thesis finds that ROIC, WACC, and ROIC-WACC exhibit positive correlation with valuation fluctuations. In the case study on Fosun, this thesis finds that ROIC-WACC is highly correlated with Fosun’s valuation fluctuations and next with ROIC. Thus this thesis conjectures that for investment companies for which investment capital is derived largely from insurance float, such as Fosun, ROIC-WACC is a better valuation tool.
ContributorsLiang, Xinjun (Author) / Chen, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets,

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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This thesis starts with an analysis of the current situation of the pharmaceutical industry in China, and discusses the strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the pharmaceutical industry in China. It elaborates on the rationale for the development of the mergers and acquisitions of

This thesis starts with an analysis of the current situation of the pharmaceutical industry in China, and discusses the strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the pharmaceutical industry in China. It elaborates on the rationale for the development of the mergers and acquisitions of the pharmaceutical SMEs. Then a literature review is provided on the causes of corporate mergers and acquisitions such as the economies of scale, synergistic effect, transaction costs, market power, and strategic diversification.Next,the thesis analyzes the underlying rationale for the M&A transactions in the pharmaceutical industry in China, and explores the likely path of successful value creation for pharmaceutical SMEs in China. Specifically, with five in-depth case studies of M&A transactions of pharmaceutical firms, this thesis reveals the critical success factors leading to value creation and growth in the practice of mergers and acquisitions of the pharmaceutical SMEs in China.
ContributorsZhou, Yan (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of unbiased CEOs.
ContributorsWalton, Richard (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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The dissertation consists of three essays in financial economics. In the first essay, using historical prices for futures contracts tied to U.S. election outcomes, I develop a measure of firm-level partisan exposure. This measure captures the sensitivity of a firm's stock return to the changes in the odds of winning

The dissertation consists of three essays in financial economics. In the first essay, using historical prices for futures contracts tied to U.S. election outcomes, I develop a measure of firm-level partisan exposure. This measure captures the sensitivity of a firm's stock return to the changes in the odds of winning by a Democratic presidential candidate. I find that political beta is significantly lower in regulated industries and that it takes more extreme values for smaller and more highly levered firms. Finally, I document that firms with high political beta earn 4.0% higher annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns under Republican presidencies than firms with low political beta. The second essay studies mean monthly returns and compound long-run returns to over 64,000 global common stocks during the January 1990 to June 2020 period. The important practical distinctions between arithmetic, geometric, and dollar-weighted monthly returns are highlighted. In addition, it is documented that the majority, 56.6% of U.S. stocks and 61.3% of non-U.S. stocks, underperform one-month U.S. Treasury bills in terms of compound returns over the full sample. Focusing on aggregate shareholder outcomes, the top-performing 1.5% of firms account for all of the $US 56.2 trillion in net global stock market wealth creation. Outside the US, less than one percent of firms account for the $US 20.1 trillion in net wealth creation. The third essay documents evidence of managerial influence on shareholder voting outcomes. There are significantly more proposals that narrowly pass than narrowly fail. This behavior is more pronounced for firms with low institutional ownership and for proposals receiving a negative ISS recommendation. Mechanisms by which managers influence the outcome, such as meeting adjournment and selective campaigning, are newly identified. Finally, the market reacts more positively to the narrow failure of management proposals than to their passage. Combined with a theoretical model, these results imply that managerial influence on the voting process is value-destroying.
ContributorsChoi, Goeun (Author) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Schiller, Christoph (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021