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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.
ContributorsWu, Qingqing (Author) / Bates, Thomas W. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
How to play the advantages of network loan platform to reduce the financing costs of net loan platform both in theory and practice has important significance. In this paper, we use the method of qualitative and quantitative combination. First of all, through the interview of the net loan platform practitioners,

How to play the advantages of network loan platform to reduce the financing costs of net loan platform both in theory and practice has important significance. In this paper, we use the method of qualitative and quantitative combination. First of all, through the interview of the net loan platform practitioners, the financing cost of the net loan platform comes from the internal and external parts. Part of the network loan platform should be righteous, but counterproductive human and material costs, credit costs, information efficiency, transaction costs and matching costs; part of the emerging industry as a challenge, compliance costs, technical costs and safety costs and other cost. And put forward the top design credit system, promote the credit system; build a unified development of regulatory policies to reduce compliance risks; increase investment in technology, share the improvement of technological progress bonuses. Through the establishment of the regression model, the paper analyzes the influence of various indexes of network loan platform on the cost of network reception. It is found that the background of net loan platform with shareholder and executive team as the proxy variable has significant influence on the cost of network loan platform. The effect is not significant. Risk control indicators on the net loan platform cost has a significant negative effect. The impact of operating capacity on the cost of net loan platform differentiation, the acquisition of the cost of positive relations, the other is negative relations. Policy compliance indicators of financial security on the net loan platform cost significantly, the other did not significantly affect the role of liquidity indicators of differentiation, the average borrowing period will significantly affect the net loan platform costs, liquidity is a negative impact. And finally put forward the policy and recommendations and research limitations and future direction.
ContributorsRen, Junxia (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Qian, Jun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description冷链物流主要是指食品在生产到消费者食用前始终处于适宜的温度环境,以保障食品品质、降低流通过程中的损耗。冷链物流相比于传统物流而言是一项更复杂的系统性工程,受到政策和市场需求的影响呈现迅猛发展态势。但是,冷链物流企业长期以来因规模小、固定资产少、服务范围窄、服务规范性弱而发展困难重重,核心问题是资金的问题。政府引导和鼓励打造冷链物流产业园,推动产业园投资和建设主体打造平台,实现对园区内冷链企业的聚集效应并通过金融服务解决企业发展的资金问题。通过产融结合助力冷链物流企业发展,成为目前冷链物流行业发展的主要方式和未来趋势。

本研究聚焦冷链物流产业园金融服务助力冷链物流企业发展问题,主要研究内容包括:第一,基于产融结合理论,梳理冷链物流企业与产业园之间关系,从供需两侧探索冷链物流企业和产业园的金融服务的范围、类型和特点。第二,基于平台理论,构建冷链物流企业采纳产业园金融服务的研究模型,探索金融服务影响冷链物流企业的经营因素,分析冷链物流企业采纳产业园金融服务的因素和途径。第三,基于信息不对称理论,关切信息技术支持和知识分享在冷链物流企业采纳产业园提供金融服务过程中的调节作用。同时,梳理产业园提供金融服务可能面临哪些风险,制订冷链物流企业入驻园区的标准,防范风险。

本文运用实证研究方法,通过对国内18家冷链物流相关的产业园、物流园、冷链物流、商贸流通、金融等企业实地考察和专家访谈基础上,拟定问卷并对268家企业进行调查收集数据,使用结构方程模型进行假设检验。研究发现:金融服务的有形性、可靠性、移情性、经济性对冷链物流企业采纳产业园金融服务影响显著,而响应性的影响不显著。同时

信息技术支持和知识共享的调节作用不显著。最后,针对产业园吸引冷链物流企业提供金融服务、冷链物流企业采纳产业园金融服务的风险,提出防范策略措施。
ContributorsYang, Su (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Xinlei (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
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Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
With years of continuous Chinese economic growth and accelerating aging population, better serving the changing demands in wealth management has become the new market development directions. As evidenced in international experiences, the embedded nature of privacy and isolation of managed assets in the trust business have demonstrated built-in consistency with

With years of continuous Chinese economic growth and accelerating aging population, better serving the changing demands in wealth management has become the new market development directions. As evidenced in international experiences, the embedded nature of privacy and isolation of managed assets in the trust business have demonstrated built-in consistency with the needs of high-end wealth management and inheritance; hence, trust has become a very fitting vehicle for wealth management. By 2014, total assets under trust management have reached RMB14trillion.

However, there is as yet a massive gap between the current service levels received by high net worth individuals and their requirements; a gap that is adverse in establishing a stable customer service relationship; which eventually hinders the vigorous development of the overall industry.

With modeling the gaps in service levels as the basic foundation, this paper first and foremost starts with the discussion on the issues in listening to service needs. This paper conducted customer surveys in such categories as customer expected and perceived service quality, service level design and standards, service provided in accordance with the design, and service commitment actually fulfilled. By correlation and regression analyses, this paper analyzed the characteristics of high net worth population, concluding that high net worth individuals with different gender, profession, age exhibit varying needs, preferences and other determining factors in wealth management.

This Paper has designed wealth management service standards and value-added asset allocation systems; the Paper has structured a systematic and disciplined framework in wealth management, which serves as a guideline in the implementation of leading wealth management and in the establishment of superior trust management services. It serves as an impetus for the trust industry to thrive as the leader in China’s wealth management domain, enhance industry brand image, accumulate stable customer segments and develop sustainable market core competencies.
ContributorsZhao, Nuan (Author) / Wang, Jiang (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets,

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate

Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. Surprisingly, this labor market friction enhances firm value and production efficiency when firms are subject to other frictions causing overinvestment, consistent with the theory of second best. Finally, I identify increased operating leverage and aggravation of debt overhang as mechanisms by which DWR impedes investment.
ContributorsCho, DuckKi (Author) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Committee member) / Wang, Jiaxu (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017