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British Neuroscientist Adrian Owen documents in his book Into the Grey Zone difficult cases of patients between a state of brain death and consciousness. His team collected evidence that sug- gested patients—presumed to be brain dead—were partially or, in some cases, fully conscious. The two culturally dominant metaphysical accounts of

British Neuroscientist Adrian Owen documents in his book Into the Grey Zone difficult cases of patients between a state of brain death and consciousness. His team collected evidence that sug- gested patients—presumed to be brain dead—were partially or, in some cases, fully conscious. The two culturally dominant metaphysical accounts of consciousness, Cartesian dualism and eliminative physicalism, are unable to explain the presence of consciousness in Owen’s cases. To better understand the consciousness present in Owen’s cases I argue we should look to Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.
ContributorsQuint, Elana (Author) / Karen, Taliaferro (Thesis director) / Jeff, Watson (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Civic & Economic Thought and Leadership (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
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In this essay, I argue that a regulated kidney market, which would allow qualified Americans to sell one of their kidneys, should be developed in the United States of America. My argument has four parts. First, I provide brief background information for kidneys, kidney disease, and the dire state of

In this essay, I argue that a regulated kidney market, which would allow qualified Americans to sell one of their kidneys, should be developed in the United States of America. My argument has four parts. First, I provide brief background information for kidneys, kidney disease, and the dire state of kidney transplantation in America. Second, I present a consequentialist argument, deontological argument, and a market argument to establish the moral permissibility of a kidney market and compensation for kidney donations. Third, I evaluate the main legal and social hurdles impeding a kidney market and discuss how these barriers can feasibly be overcome. Fourth, I discuss the logistics of a kidney market and outline the components necessary for an ethical market design. Finally, I address and respond to the myriad of objections for legalizing kidneys and demonstrate how each objection fails to justify the current prohibition on kidney sales. Ultimately, I prove that a paid kidney market should be established in the United States of America. While applicable to many other countries in the world, this particular argument is only for the United States of America.
ContributorsHadziahmetovic, Dino (Author) / Priest, Maura (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
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In the past several years, the long-standing debate over freedom and responsibility has been applied to artificial intelligence (AI). Some such as Raul Hakli and Pekka Makela argue that no matter how complex robotics becomes, it is impossible for any robot to become a morally responsible agent. Hakli and Makela

In the past several years, the long-standing debate over freedom and responsibility has been applied to artificial intelligence (AI). Some such as Raul Hakli and Pekka Makela argue that no matter how complex robotics becomes, it is impossible for any robot to become a morally responsible agent. Hakli and Makela assert that even if robots become complex enough that they possess all the capacities required for moral responsibility, their history of being programmed undermines the robot’s autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. In this paper, I argue that a robot’s history of being programmed does not undermine that robot’s autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. I begin the paper with an introduction to Raul and Hakli’s argument, as well as an introduction to several case studies that will be utilized to explain my argument throughout the paper. I then display why Hakli and Makela’s argument is a compelling case against robots being able to be morally responsible agents. Next, I extract Hakli and Makela’s argument and explain it thoroughly. I then present my counterargument and explain why it is a counterexample to that of Hakli and Makela’s.
ContributorsAnderson, Troy David (Author) / Khoury, Andrew (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / College of Integrative Sciences and Arts (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
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This paper looks to examine the person of Boethius in order to illuminate his position as an instrumental influence, a “bridge”, between Greek and Roman sources and posterity, in particular, the Scholastics of the late medieval period. To do this it follows a three part arrangement: Part 1 offers biographical

This paper looks to examine the person of Boethius in order to illuminate his position as an instrumental influence, a “bridge”, between Greek and Roman sources and posterity, in particular, the Scholastics of the late medieval period. To do this it follows a three part arrangement: Part 1 offers biographical information regarding Boethius so as to familiarize the reader into his person and achievements. Part II examines historical evidence and connections that examine Boethius’s influences and influencers so as to show why he was so important to those who followed him. The third, and last part, is my attempt at a commentary of Boethius’s Consolation in an effort to revive this traditional method so prevalent in Boethius’s time. The paper is then concluded emphasizing the merits of Boethius and what this work aimed to achieve.
ContributorsZazueta, Derek A. (Author) / O'Neill, Joseph (Thesis director) / Rigoni, Adam (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
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Description
Many philosophers have attempted to define what it is to be rational. Yet, each attempt faces insurmountable objections, throwing it away in place of another. This lack of success has motivated some authors to seek a deflationary theory of rationality, particularly Sinan Dogramaci and his epistemic communism, hoping that reducing

Many philosophers have attempted to define what it is to be rational. Yet, each attempt faces insurmountable objections, throwing it away in place of another. This lack of success has motivated some authors to seek a deflationary theory of rationality, particularly Sinan Dogramaci and his epistemic communism, hoping that reducing the breadth and obligation of the theory lessens the obstacles. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I highlight previous attempts to define rationality. In the second part, epistemic communism is explained. In the third part, I argue that the answer of the virtue epistemologist Ernest Sosa to the knowledge-related “value problem” can parallel to show that rationality has intrinsic value. And if rationality has intrinsic value, then rationality is not fully accounted for in epistemic communism.
ContributorsPierce, Nathanael David (Author) / Reynolds, Steven (Thesis director) / Nestor, Pinillos (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
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Description
The Mu’tazila were a group of early Islamic rationalists whose primary philosophical project was to reconcile God’s perfectly just nature, as well as the existence of a judgment day, with human free will. Drawing on Greek logical precepts, the Mu’tazila rejected the idea that human actions were caused solely by

The Mu’tazila were a group of early Islamic rationalists whose primary philosophical project was to reconcile God’s perfectly just nature, as well as the existence of a judgment day, with human free will. Drawing on Greek logical precepts, the Mu’tazila rejected the idea that human actions were caused solely by God, thereby affirming that humans have at least some degree of originative power. In this thesis, I will present a logical analysis of the Mu’tazila’s rejection of determinism, as well as their position on human-originated action, primarily using Qadi Abd al-Jabbar’s Book of the Five Principles as my source text. I will then present some of the primary views in contemporary free will discourse and compare these views to those of the Mu’tazila. The aim of my thesis is to present a logically rigorous picture of free will under Mu’tazilism, as well as to highlight the relevance of Mu’tazilism within contemporary discussions of free will.
ContributorsGeorge, Allison (Author) / Botham, Thad (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05