This thesis addresses the widespread questions asked of Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies - decentralized ledgers of peer to peer transactions – have taken the world by storm, with Bitcoin leading the way by means of being the original, most valuable, and most popular. Despite this widespread use, skepticism remains as to what Bitcoin is and whether it counts as money. I first defend the framework that I use for understanding Social Objects, Searle’s X counts as Y in C formula, as money is undoubtedly a social object. I then argue that Smit et al.’s account of money, while useful, mistakenly identifies an essential characteristic of money, the relative ratio scale, as a feature. I therefore present an alternative account of money. I then explain why the most commonly held account of Bitcoin, the chain Definition fails, and why Bitcoin being a fictional substance is not a problem for Bitcoin being money. I then demonstrate Bitcoin’s compatibility with my alternative account, and from this conclude that Bitcoin is Money.

In this thesis, I delve into the complex ethical issue of deception and coercion as external factors that can undermine consent. Countless theorists have debated the moral permissibility of different forms of deception and coercion, and in this thesis, I propose my own solution to this challenging problem in the ethics of consent. Narrow in scope, my investigation focuses on the morally transformative power of consent and how deception and coercion hinder consent from performing this morally transformative "magic." I argue that certain features of sex are essential to the act of consent, and that deception about these features fundamentally undermines the validity of consent. Furthermore, I support David Boonin's distinction between threats and offers in the coercion literature as the most compelling distinction thus far. Through rigorous analysis and critical engagement with existing literature, my thesis contributes to the ongoing philosophical discourse on consent, deception, and coercion, shedding light on the intricacies of these issues and advancing our understanding of this complex ethical landscape.

In 1757 Edmund Burke published A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful. I will be extending his analysis of the sublime and beautiful, and using it to dissect quantum mechanics. Using Burke’s template on the sublime and beautiful, I can evaluate experiments in quantum mechanics, and explore a new side of Burke’s aesthetic theory. For the reader, I have outlined Burke’s aesthetic theory on the sublime and beautiful. I then used this analysis to explore quantum mechanics and assess the components of quantum mechanics that are beautiful and sublime.

This thesis proposes an extension of David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, providing a method to calculate the `degrees of causal influence.' By providing a quantitative approach to causal influence, I find that that the influence approach can assess statements that involve causal redundancies, allowing the assessor to attribute primary causal responsibility to the contending cause with a higher net influence value. The causal influence calculation also addresses criticisms towards Lewis's influence account, namely those involving `inert zones' of influence, the use of the term `might,' trumping versus symmetric overdetermination, and Lewis's clause requiring stepwise influence. This thesis also compares the results of causal influence in multiple toy cases including Two Rocks, both the asymmetric and symmetric variants, demonstrating that causal influence overcomes many of the core issues in Lewis's initial counterfactual account of causation. Using the asymmetric Two Rocks variant, this thesis also provides a detailed example of how to use the calculation and a discussion of the calculation's limitations. The main drawbacks of the quantitative method for causal influence seems to be the effort that it requires and issues in finding measurable qualities to compare the similarity/difference between possible worlds. Using the Two Rocks case, however, the causal influence calculation reaches the same conclusions as what Lewis suggests. A primary remaining issue is applying the calculation to instances of causation by omission, however this seems to only be a problem in using the equations rather than a problem within the idea of causal influence itself. Also, there may still be issues in justifying comparative overall similarity. However, this is an issue that both the counterfactual and influence accounts face.