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Description
What's in a name? A person not a number is a multimedia eBook that will explore how the media treats coverage of sexual assault victims and challenges the traditional no-naming policy instilled in almost every professional newsroom. Historical context to no-naming policies, opinions from critics of the no-naming policy and legal information will be provided. This book serves to encourage journalists and editors to consider identifying victims after long, thoughtful discussions, to educate media consumers on the topic, to eradicate the societal stigma of rape, and to reflect the views of survivors so that they may feel more willing to share their stories. Identifying sexual assault victims conforms to the journalistic imperative to tell the truth as fully as possible and to inform the public as completely as possible. When the information is part of the public record and there are no legal limitations on its use, identifying sexual assault victims will have a positive impact in educating the public and eradicating the stigma associated with being the victim of sexual assault. This book proposes that through educated, thoughtful and truthful stories about sexual assault can spark careful conversations and help turn around the stigma our society has placed on victims. The full eBook, complete with photos, videos and other audio components, is available at https://alejandraarmstrong.atavist.com/whats-in-a-name-a-person-not-a-number.
ContributorsArmstrong, Alejandra Moya (Author) / Gilger, Kristin (Thesis director) / Petchel, Jacqueline (Committee member) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
While Italian and American news may look similar from a surface observation, the history and the development of news practices in each respective country is very different. The intent of this research is to dissect the breaking news cycle and point out differences and offer an explanation as to why these differences exist. The research for this will be collected using a variety of methods including first-hand observation, interviews and photographs. It will require travel to the four Italian media locations that are being compared as well as historic research to be conducted in order to provide context for the study. What is collected at the various Italian media organizations will be compared with the American news outlets The Arizona Republic and Arizona NBC affiliate, 12 News. The study goals are focused around three main research questions that aim to uncover differences in breaking news practices regarding ethics, the reporting process and promotion using social media. Cultural, historic and physical barriers separate the two countries. Because of this, directly comparing breaking news between the locations will be difficult, thus it is crucial to be able to analyze what data are being gathered in order to uncover patterns and draw conclusions.
ContributorsNicosia, Domenico Giuseppe (Author) / Silcock, B. William (Thesis director) / Dell'Anna, Antonella (Committee member) / Johnson, Aric (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
This paper aims to assess potential similarities and differences in the way that public relations professionals approach ethics in Spain and The United States. The approach taken for this study was first a thematic analysis of industry-accepted codes of ethics. These were the PRSA Code of Ethics from the United States and the ADECEC and Dircom codes of ethics from Spain. Although the codes provide a basis for a basic analysis, it is hard to say how public relations professionals implement ethical practices in their work solely based on codes of ethics. To further study the ethics in practice, interviews with public relations professionals from a 2012 trip to Madrid were transcribed and analyzed for key themes. To assess ethics in practice in the United States, public relations blog posts related to ethics were analyzed for key themes. The history of public relations in Spain is much shorter than in the United States The histories of the and cultural differences may be the cause of some of the differences in ethics.
ContributorsLurie, Hannah Jessica (Author) / Gilpin, Dawn (Thesis director) / Matera, Fran (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Romania is in the midst of an identity emergency due to its relatively recent departure from a communist dictatorship. This paper will take a look at identities within Romania while paying close attention to the way that emerging political, economic, religious and gender identities have been and are being used to oppress the Romanian queer population. This paper seeks to justify an application of Western values towards the call for enfranchisement of Romanian queers. Western values, in this sense, will be based on Enlightenment notions of equality in all people and based on philosophers whose writings and paradigms are centered in the Western world. Furthermore, it will discuss violence and masculinity in hopes that understanding and critically examining these topics may be used in application towards the emerging Romanian identities and statistics which highlight and implicate queer oppression. Again, this paper will not seek to definitely link as causal any one emerging identity towards the oppression of the queer minority in Romania nor will it seek to undermine any single Romanian institution, but rather question the correlative elements of Romanian society that may be implicated in potential oppression, violences, and a neglect of the Romanian queer minority.
ContributorsWoodmansee, Jon Wessley (Author) / Montesano, Mark (Thesis director) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
On September 11, 2012, terrorists attacked the American Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi, Libya. Four men died in the attack, including a U.S. ambassador, and 10 others were injured. As has become customary with terrorist attacks, there was constant coverage of the attack by newsrooms all over the world. And as terrorism has become a more prevalent occurrence, newspapers have been confronted with unique ethical issues. This study examines how four international newspapers – The New York Times in the United States, The International Herald Tribune in France, The Gulf Times in Qatar and The Guardian in Britain— responded to the attack in Benghazi and whether they violated journalism ethical codes in three specific areas. A content analysis of 140 print articles published in a little more than three weeks after the attack revealed that The New York Times and The International Herald Tribune were more likely to frame the attack around politics, whereas The Guardian and The Gulf Times focused on international ramifications of the attack. It also found that all four newspapers changed their stories on what was to blame for the attack as time went on. In this study, a total of 41 violations of ethical codes were displayed. The Guardian presented the highest number with 15. These findings suggest that the newspaper’s geographic separation from the incident and Britain’s lack of personal involvement may have influenced its coverage. Additionally, the findings revealed that journalism ethics codes need to be updated to reflect some of the moral dilemmas that are unique to terrorist attacks.
ContributorsMcCarthy, Meghan Catherine (Author) / Silcock, Bill (Thesis director) / Carlson, John (Committee member) / Magruder, Jane (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive consideration of the full implications of engaging in real earnings management through 1.) an in-depth literature review of selected studies concerning real earnings management, 2.) supplemental interviews to consider real earnings management from various perspectives including supply chain management, accounting and management, as well as 3.) a final framework of the considerations that must be made to fully understand the implications of real earnings management. Though the ethics of real earnings management will be discussed, no determination will be made to support or discredit its use. The methods of real earnings management are plentiful and would benefit most from being judged on a case-by-case basis before coming to any firm conclusions.
ContributorsWestgard, Kristy Kayan (Author) / Maltz, Arnold (Thesis director) / Leckey, Andrew (Committee member) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained away by the moderate deontologist.
ContributorsCook, Tyler Blake (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Moral philosophy should create concepts and formulate arguments to articulate and assess the statements and behaviors of the morally devoted and the traditions (such as religious and ethical systems) founded by the morally devoted. Many moral devotees and their traditions advocate love as the ideal to live by. Therefore, moral philosophy needs an account of love as an ideal. I define an ideal as an instrument for organizing a life and show that this definition is more adequate than previous definitions. Ideals can be founded on virtues, and I show that love is a virtue.
I define love as a composite attitude whose elements are benevolence, consideration, perception of moment (importance or significance), and receptivity. I define receptivity as the ability to be with someone without imposing careless or compulsive expectations. I argue that receptivity curbs the excesses and supplements the defects of the other elements. Love as an ideal is often understood as universal love.
However, there are three problems with universal love: it could be too demanding, it could prevent intimacy and special relationships, and it could require a person to love their abuser. I argue that love can be extended to all human beings without posing unacceptable risks, once love is correctly defined and the ideal correctly understood.
Because of the revelations of ecology and the ongoing transformation of sensibilities about the value of the nonhuman, love should be extended to the nonhuman. I argue that love can be given to the nonhuman in the same way it is to the human, with appropriate variations. But how much of the nonhuman would an ideal direct one to love? I argue for two limits to universal love: it does not make sense to extend it to nonliving things, and it can be extended to all living things. I show that loving all living things does not depend on whether they can reciprocate, and I argue that it would not prevent one from living a recognizably human life.
I define love as a composite attitude whose elements are benevolence, consideration, perception of moment (importance or significance), and receptivity. I define receptivity as the ability to be with someone without imposing careless or compulsive expectations. I argue that receptivity curbs the excesses and supplements the defects of the other elements. Love as an ideal is often understood as universal love.
However, there are three problems with universal love: it could be too demanding, it could prevent intimacy and special relationships, and it could require a person to love their abuser. I argue that love can be extended to all human beings without posing unacceptable risks, once love is correctly defined and the ideal correctly understood.
Because of the revelations of ecology and the ongoing transformation of sensibilities about the value of the nonhuman, love should be extended to the nonhuman. I argue that love can be given to the nonhuman in the same way it is to the human, with appropriate variations. But how much of the nonhuman would an ideal direct one to love? I argue for two limits to universal love: it does not make sense to extend it to nonliving things, and it can be extended to all living things. I show that loving all living things does not depend on whether they can reciprocate, and I argue that it would not prevent one from living a recognizably human life.
ContributorsJohnson, Carter Lane (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020