Matching Items (11)
Filtering by
- All Subjects: ethics
- Creators: Harrington Bioengineering Program
Description
Romania is in the midst of an identity emergency due to its relatively recent departure from a communist dictatorship. This paper will take a look at identities within Romania while paying close attention to the way that emerging political, economic, religious and gender identities have been and are being used to oppress the Romanian queer population. This paper seeks to justify an application of Western values towards the call for enfranchisement of Romanian queers. Western values, in this sense, will be based on Enlightenment notions of equality in all people and based on philosophers whose writings and paradigms are centered in the Western world. Furthermore, it will discuss violence and masculinity in hopes that understanding and critically examining these topics may be used in application towards the emerging Romanian identities and statistics which highlight and implicate queer oppression. Again, this paper will not seek to definitely link as causal any one emerging identity towards the oppression of the queer minority in Romania nor will it seek to undermine any single Romanian institution, but rather question the correlative elements of Romanian society that may be implicated in potential oppression, violences, and a neglect of the Romanian queer minority.
ContributorsWoodmansee, Jon Wessley (Author) / Montesano, Mark (Thesis director) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
At Arizona State University (ASU), there is a perceived lack of interdisciplinary symposiums for student presenters and a lack of understanding about the university's "#1 in Innovation" title awarded by U.S. News & World report. In addition, ASU focuses on advertising innovation in a few select fields, such as astronomy and space exploration. To address these issues, a team of Lincoln Undergraduate Scholars planned an Ethics & Innovation Symposium with the theme of "Defining Our Future" for April 11, 2018. I chose to conduct a post-event analysis of logistics, successes, and failures. This additional evaluation was meant to serve as a measure of the symposium's sustainability for future years. This thesis addresses the methods of event planning (incl. marketing, gathering student presenters, catering, room reservation), results, and analysis of outcomes specifically for the Ethics & Innovation Symposium. Overall, the thesis document will benefit anyone interested in planning some event at the university level. Additional reference documents are included in this report to provide help with creating a general checklist, developing marketing deliverables, and contacting university departments/organizations.
ContributorsJagadish, Ishitha (Author) / Coursen, Jerry (Thesis director) / Kenney, Sean (Committee member) / O'Neil, Erica (Committee member) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained away by the moderate deontologist.
ContributorsCook, Tyler Blake (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
Memory augmentation will play a vital role in the development of our future. The predicted introduction of downloadable brains will be the first of many neurocognitive technologies that will alter our lives at both the societal and individual levels. These technologies can affect everything from educational institutions to the judicial system, meanwhile raising issues such as autonomy, human psychology, and selfhood. Because of its tremendous potential, memory augmentation and its implications should thoroughly be examined.
ContributorsKim, Jinkyu (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis director) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Helms Tillery, Stephen (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Division of Educational Leadership and Innovation (Contributor) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
The development of computational systems known as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) offers the possibility of allowing individuals disabled by neurological disorders such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and ischemic stroke the ability to perform relatively complex tasks such as communicating with others and walking. BCIs are closed-loop systems that record physiological signals from the brain and translate those signals into commands that control an external device such as a wheelchair or a robotic exoskeleton. Despite the potential for BCIs to vastly improve the lives of almost one billion people, one question arises: Just because we can use brain-computer interfaces, should we? The human brain is an embodiment of the mind, which is largely seen to determine a person's identity, so a number of ethical and philosophical concerns emerge over current and future uses of BCIs. These concerns include privacy, informed consent, autonomy, identity, enhancement, and justice. In this thesis, I focus on three of these issues: privacy, informed consent, and autonomy. The ultimate purpose of brain-computer interfaces is to provide patients with a greater degree of autonomy; thus, many of the ethical issues associated with BCIs are intertwined with autonomy. Currently, brain-computer interfaces exist mainly in the domain of medicine and medical research, but recently companies have started commercializing BCIs and providing them at affordable prices. These consumer-grade BCIs are primarily for non-medical purposes, and so they are beyond the scope of medicine. As BCIs become more widespread in the near future, it is crucial for interdisciplinary teams of ethicists, philosophers, engineers, and physicians to collaborate to address these ethical concerns now before BCIs become more commonplace.
ContributorsChu, Kevin Michael (Author) / Ankeny, Casey (Thesis director) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Frow, Emma (Committee member) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School for the Future of Innovation in Society (Contributor) / Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Moral philosophy should create concepts and formulate arguments to articulate and assess the statements and behaviors of the morally devoted and the traditions (such as religious and ethical systems) founded by the morally devoted. Many moral devotees and their traditions advocate love as the ideal to live by. Therefore, moral philosophy needs an account of love as an ideal. I define an ideal as an instrument for organizing a life and show that this definition is more adequate than previous definitions. Ideals can be founded on virtues, and I show that love is a virtue.
I define love as a composite attitude whose elements are benevolence, consideration, perception of moment (importance or significance), and receptivity. I define receptivity as the ability to be with someone without imposing careless or compulsive expectations. I argue that receptivity curbs the excesses and supplements the defects of the other elements. Love as an ideal is often understood as universal love.
However, there are three problems with universal love: it could be too demanding, it could prevent intimacy and special relationships, and it could require a person to love their abuser. I argue that love can be extended to all human beings without posing unacceptable risks, once love is correctly defined and the ideal correctly understood.
Because of the revelations of ecology and the ongoing transformation of sensibilities about the value of the nonhuman, love should be extended to the nonhuman. I argue that love can be given to the nonhuman in the same way it is to the human, with appropriate variations. But how much of the nonhuman would an ideal direct one to love? I argue for two limits to universal love: it does not make sense to extend it to nonliving things, and it can be extended to all living things. I show that loving all living things does not depend on whether they can reciprocate, and I argue that it would not prevent one from living a recognizably human life.
I define love as a composite attitude whose elements are benevolence, consideration, perception of moment (importance or significance), and receptivity. I define receptivity as the ability to be with someone without imposing careless or compulsive expectations. I argue that receptivity curbs the excesses and supplements the defects of the other elements. Love as an ideal is often understood as universal love.
However, there are three problems with universal love: it could be too demanding, it could prevent intimacy and special relationships, and it could require a person to love their abuser. I argue that love can be extended to all human beings without posing unacceptable risks, once love is correctly defined and the ideal correctly understood.
Because of the revelations of ecology and the ongoing transformation of sensibilities about the value of the nonhuman, love should be extended to the nonhuman. I argue that love can be given to the nonhuman in the same way it is to the human, with appropriate variations. But how much of the nonhuman would an ideal direct one to love? I argue for two limits to universal love: it does not make sense to extend it to nonliving things, and it can be extended to all living things. I show that loving all living things does not depend on whether they can reciprocate, and I argue that it would not prevent one from living a recognizably human life.
ContributorsJohnson, Carter Lane (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
When an individual is conceived there is a metaphorical roll of the dice. A game of chance is played with their genetics to which they cannot consent. Unlucky players could have inherited mild conditions such as chronic allergies to terrible diseases such as Cystic Fibrosis or Tay-Sachs. Controlling the genetics of an individual through the use of gene editing technology could be the key to ending this cycle of genetic diseases. Once detrimental diseases are now being cured through direct applications of genetic engineering. Even as we see the uses of genetic engineering technologies change the world, the more “sci-fi” applications have yet to be fully realized or explored. Editing hereditary genes before birth may have the ability to eliminate diseases from entire genetic lines, reduce the possibility for certain cancers and diseases, and perhaps even modify phenotypes in humans to create enhanced humans. Although this scientific field shows promise, it does have its reservations. Like any other scientific field, its ability to benefit humanity depends on its use.
ContributorsSchuler, Jacob (Co-author) / Silva, Anthony (Co-author) / Brian, Jennifer (Thesis director) / Ross, Christian (Committee member) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms are revolutionizing the field of healthcare by offering new opportunities for improved diagnosis and treatment planning. These technologies have the potential to transform the way medical professionals approach patient care by analyzing vast amounts of data, identifying patterns, and making predictions. This overview highlights the current state of research and development in the field of AI and ML for diagnosis and treatment planning, as well as explore the ethical benefits and challenges associated with their implementation.
ContributorsShankar, Kruthy (Author) / Arquiza, Jose (Thesis director) / Sobrado, Michael (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor)
Created2024-05
ContributorsShankar, Kruthy (Author) / Arquiza, Jose (Thesis director) / Sobrado, Michael (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor)
Created2024-05