This thesis proposes an extension of David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, providing a method to calculate the `degrees of causal influence.' By providing a quantitative approach to causal influence, I find that that the influence approach can assess statements that involve causal redundancies, allowing the assessor to attribute primary causal responsibility to the contending cause with a higher net influence value. The causal influence calculation also addresses criticisms towards Lewis's influence account, namely those involving `inert zones' of influence, the use of the term `might,' trumping versus symmetric overdetermination, and Lewis's clause requiring stepwise influence. This thesis also compares the results of causal influence in multiple toy cases including Two Rocks, both the asymmetric and symmetric variants, demonstrating that causal influence overcomes many of the core issues in Lewis's initial counterfactual account of causation. Using the asymmetric Two Rocks variant, this thesis also provides a detailed example of how to use the calculation and a discussion of the calculation's limitations. The main drawbacks of the quantitative method for causal influence seems to be the effort that it requires and issues in finding measurable qualities to compare the similarity/difference between possible worlds. Using the Two Rocks case, however, the causal influence calculation reaches the same conclusions as what Lewis suggests. A primary remaining issue is applying the calculation to instances of causation by omission, however this seems to only be a problem in using the equations rather than a problem within the idea of causal influence itself. Also, there may still be issues in justifying comparative overall similarity. However, this is an issue that both the counterfactual and influence accounts face.

I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns of addiction, Native American revenue streams, and the metaphysics of sport and integrity of the game.

This thesis addresses the widespread questions asked of Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies - decentralized ledgers of peer to peer transactions – have taken the world by storm, with Bitcoin leading the way by means of being the original, most valuable, and most popular. Despite this widespread use, skepticism remains as to what Bitcoin is and whether it counts as money. I first defend the framework that I use for understanding Social Objects, Searle’s X counts as Y in C formula, as money is undoubtedly a social object. I then argue that Smit et al.’s account of money, while useful, mistakenly identifies an essential characteristic of money, the relative ratio scale, as a feature. I therefore present an alternative account of money. I then explain why the most commonly held account of Bitcoin, the chain Definition fails, and why Bitcoin being a fictional substance is not a problem for Bitcoin being money. I then demonstrate Bitcoin’s compatibility with my alternative account, and from this conclude that Bitcoin is Money.

In this thesis, I delve into the complex ethical issue of deception and coercion as external factors that can undermine consent. Countless theorists have debated the moral permissibility of different forms of deception and coercion, and in this thesis, I propose my own solution to this challenging problem in the ethics of consent. Narrow in scope, my investigation focuses on the morally transformative power of consent and how deception and coercion hinder consent from performing this morally transformative "magic." I argue that certain features of sex are essential to the act of consent, and that deception about these features fundamentally undermines the validity of consent. Furthermore, I support David Boonin's distinction between threats and offers in the coercion literature as the most compelling distinction thus far. Through rigorous analysis and critical engagement with existing literature, my thesis contributes to the ongoing philosophical discourse on consent, deception, and coercion, shedding light on the intricacies of these issues and advancing our understanding of this complex ethical landscape.

The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7, according to the World Health Orignaztion, the mortality rate for COVID reached its lowest since March 9, 2020. I will take September 7 as the turning point for the ethics of the pandemic in this work. If we accept utilitarianism, deontology, or moral relativism, then, prior to the turning point, China’s Zero-COVID Policy was morally justified. Although China’s Zero-COVID Policy has remained controversial, I will propose that (1) the policy was justified on utilitarianism because it maximized utility, (2) the policy was justified on deontology because the policy is the Nash Equilibrium, and (3) the policy was justified on moral relativism because the policy was in accordance with the norms of the Chinese people.

This is a theatrical script for a personal narrative driven solo performance piece that focuses on advocating for the value and importance of pursuing civil discourse and intellectual humility in order to change people’s minds and find agreement among disagreement. It tracks a personal story of developing various, conflicting, worldviews and exploring how this conflict can be dealt with, as well as how it can inform dealing with others.

Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then there exist entities called personites. And if personites exist, then many of the ordinary prudential, social, and moral habits we engage in, like present self-sacrifice for future benefit, promising to do something painful in the future, or being held responsible for something the we did in the past, subjects personites to suffering without sufficient compensation, consent, or desert. And this would be immoral according to our common-sense morality. In this paper, I argue that if four-dimensionalism is true, and personites exist, then we are still morally permitted to engage in the above practices. If four-dimensionalism turns out to be true, it has no perverse implications on how we ought to live.