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Ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals in Mostar espoused a discourse of ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in order to establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal colonization of residential and commercial property through manipulating the pre-Bosnian War discourse on property relations. This is not to argue

Ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals in Mostar espoused a discourse of ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in order to establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal colonization of residential and commercial property through manipulating the pre-Bosnian War discourse on property relations. This is not to argue that some or most of these politicians and criminals did not believe in their virulent nationalist rhetoric, but instead that the effects of the discourse created well-used pathways to personal, not community, wealth. Elites used the Yugoslav economic crisis and perceived past grievance to enflame growing tensions between ethnicities and social classes. I use Mostar as an object of analysis to examine the creation of Bosnian Croat and Bosniak ethnocratic regimes in this divided city. However, I focus more on the Bosnian Croat regime in the city because it envisioned Mostar as its capital, making the city the site of its political competition among factions. Even though ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals still hold a level of power in Mostar, the IC did succeed in instituting a high level of property restitution, which does not necessarily imply return, because the IC was able to impose rule of law when it acted in an organized manner. Also, the ethnocratic regimes were weakened due to regional economic and political factors that undercut the regimes' hold over the population.
ContributorsPignotti, Arthur (Author) / Batalden, Stephen K. (Thesis advisor) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Holian, Anna (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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This dissertation addresses the tendency among some disability scholars to overlook the importance of congenital deformity and disability in the pre-modern West. It argues that congenital deformity and disability deviated so greatly from able-bodied norms that they have played a pivotal role in the history of Western Civilization. In particular,

This dissertation addresses the tendency among some disability scholars to overlook the importance of congenital deformity and disability in the pre-modern West. It argues that congenital deformity and disability deviated so greatly from able-bodied norms that they have played a pivotal role in the history of Western Civilization. In particular, it explores the evolution of two seemingly separate, but ultimately related, ideas from classical antiquity through the First World War: (1) the idea that there was some type of significance, whether supernatural or natural, to the existence of congenital deformity and (2) the idea that the existence of disabled people has resulted in a disability problem for western societies because many disabilities can hinder labor productivity to such an extent that large numbers of the disabled cannot survive without taking precious resources from their more productive, able-bodied counterparts. It also looks at how certain categories of disabled people, including, monsters, hunchbacks, cripples, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and dwarfs, which signified aesthetic and functional deviations from able-bodied norms, often reinforced able-bodied prejudices against the disabled.
ContributorsParry, Matthew (Author) / Fuchs, Rachel (Thesis advisor) / Tirosh-Samuelson, Hava (Committee member) / Wright, Johnson K. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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This thesis is based on the responses of Soviet Displaced Persons collected by the Harvard Study on the Soviet Social System (HPSSS), an oral history conducted in Munich and New York from 1950 to 1951 in which former Soviet citizens were interviewed. They were primarily interviewed about daily life within

This thesis is based on the responses of Soviet Displaced Persons collected by the Harvard Study on the Soviet Social System (HPSSS), an oral history conducted in Munich and New York from 1950 to 1951 in which former Soviet citizens were interviewed. They were primarily interviewed about daily life within the Soviet Union. A total of 331 displaced persons were interviewed over the course of the study, with most individuals receiving multiple interview sessions. These sessions were divided broadly as A and B sections. The A-section, which the majority of interviewees received and was viewed by the compilers as a broad sociological inquiry, was divided into subsections focusing on Soviet work, government, family, education, communication, philosophy of life, and ideology. The B-sections were used for deeper anthropological inquiries and are potentially more controversial due to the use of Rorschach tests and situational responses. Fewer respondents were continued on to the B interviews which contained a variety of subsections, though most respondents were only asked questions from one or two sections of the greater whole. A portion of the B section interviews do provide valuable insight to my thesis for their focus on the Displaced Person status of the interviewees. The project consisted of 764 separate interviews of the 331 respondents. The interviewers for the HPSSS were primarily graduate students, ranging from history, sociology, psychology and economics departments, with varying degrees of fluency in Russian and Ukrainian. Some of the interviewers went on to become leading experts in Soviet Studies in the years to follow. Others stopped publishing, following the major publication of the HPSSS in the late 1950s, which may indicate a move to the private sector or employment within the federal government rather than academics. While not possible to include within my analysis, the major publications of the study also included the insights garnered from nearly ten thousand written questionnaires of DPs that were tabulated and discarded prior to publication.
ContributorsWilder, Ian (Author) / Manchester, Laurie (Thesis director) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Benkert, Volker (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
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The Soviet Union suffered immensely as a result of World War II. When the dust settled and Soviet citizens began to rebuild their lives, the memory of the social, economic, and human costs of the war still remained. The Soviet state sought to frame the conflict in a way that

The Soviet Union suffered immensely as a result of World War II. When the dust settled and Soviet citizens began to rebuild their lives, the memory of the social, economic, and human costs of the war still remained. The Soviet state sought to frame the conflict in a way that provided meaning to the chaos that so drastically shaped the lives of its citizens. Film was one such way. Film, heavily censored until the Gorbachev period, provided the state with an easily malleable and distributable means of sharing official history and official memory. However, as time went on, film began to blur the lines between official memory and real history, providing opportunities for directors to create stories that challenged the regime's official war mythology. This project examines seven Soviet war films (The Fall of Berlin (1949), The Cranes are Flying (1957), Ballad of a Soldier (1959), Ivan's Childhood (1962), Liberation (1970-1971), The Ascent (1977), and Come and See (1985)) in the context of the regimes under which they were released. I examine the themes present within these films, comparing and contrasting them across multiple generations of Soviet post-war memory.
Created2014-05
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The Soviet Union suffered immensely as a result of World War II. When the dust settled and Soviet citizens began to rebuild their lives, the memory of the social, economic, and human costs of the war still remained. The Soviet state sought to frame the conflict in a way that

The Soviet Union suffered immensely as a result of World War II. When the dust settled and Soviet citizens began to rebuild their lives, the memory of the social, economic, and human costs of the war still remained. The Soviet state sought to frame the conflict in a way that provided meaning to the chaos that so drastically shaped the lives of its citizens. Film was one such way. Film, heavily censored until the Gorbachev period, provided the state with an easily malleable and distributable means of sharing official history and official memory. However, as time went on, film began to blur the lines between official memory and real history, providing opportunities for directors to create stories that challenged the regime's official war mythology. This project examines seven Soviet war films (The Fall of Berlin (1949), The Cranes are Flying (1957), Ballad of a Soldier (1959), Ivan's Childhood (1962), Liberation (1970-1971), The Ascent (1977), and Come and See (1985)) in the context of the regimes under which they were released. I examine the themes present within these films, comparing and contrasting them across multiple generations of Soviet post-war memory.
Created2014-05
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Transhumanist concepts and themes increasingly occupy a prominent place in contemporary visions of the future, particularly with regard to technology. A growing number of scholars, including some self-described transhumanists, see transhumanism as functioning like a religion for secular people, in that it fulfills many of the same desires and impulses

Transhumanist concepts and themes increasingly occupy a prominent place in contemporary visions of the future, particularly with regard to technology. A growing number of scholars, including some self-described transhumanists, see transhumanism as functioning like a religion for secular people, in that it fulfills many of the same desires and impulses without reference to any supernatural forces. For this reason there is a growing discussion of transhumanism in comparison with major religious traditions, but one which has heretofore been underappreciated is Protestant pietism. Pietism grew out of a need among Protestants after the Reformation to realize a better Christian community and better prepare individual believers for the afterlife. It had a significant influence over the European Enlightenment, of which transhumanists claim to be the successors. In its understanding of human improvement, human nature, and ultimate human destiny in death and the end-point of history, pietism has multiple interesting points of comparison with transhumanism. Both ideologies begin by improving individual human beings as the primary means to the end of eliminating suffering, especially death and disease, and building the ideal human community. Transhumanism accomplishes its goals for humanity through the use of advanced technologies which enable human beings to transcend their natural limitations. Pietism focuses, as its name suggests, on moral and spiritual improvement according to practical guidelines that lead a Christian believer to take an active role in his or her own sanctification. This essay concludes that pietism reveals certain key limitations in transhumanism as a comprehensive life philosophy, especially in its ability to organize society according to its system of values.
ContributorsDepew, Mason James (Author) / Tirosh-Samuelson, Hava (Thesis director) / Bennett, Gaymon (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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The Norman invasion and conquest of England in 1066, led by Duke William "the Conqueror," is well-known in British history; less well-known is the fact that the conquest caused a group of Norman Jews to immigrate to England. These immigrants were the first significant population of Jews to ever reside

The Norman invasion and conquest of England in 1066, led by Duke William "the Conqueror," is well-known in British history; less well-known is the fact that the conquest caused a group of Norman Jews to immigrate to England. These immigrants were the first significant population of Jews to ever reside in England, and by about 1100, distinct communities of Jews had established themselves in several cities throughout the country. However, Jewish life in England came to an abrupt end less than two-hundred and thirty years after its beginning when King Edward I expelled the entire Jewish population from England in 1290. The edict of expulsion was approved by the English parliament on June 18, 1290, and there are no surviving records of what happened in that meeting or why Edward decided to banish the Jews. Accordingly, there are a host of questions that need answering if one is to propose a explanation. For example, what could compel Edward I, who struggled financially and was deeply in debt for the duration of his reign, to expel the people who had been the crown's greatest asset for two centuries? Why did the king break the charter which specifically placed the Jews under the monarchy's protection? Why was the aristocracy so intent on getting rid of the Jews who, on several occasions, kept the baronies financially afloat through generous loans? My goal in writing this thesis is threefold: first, to provide a concise but clear account of this extraordinarily specific section of history; second, to present the information in such a way that those who read it might be convinced that the Expulsion was, in fact, primarily motivated by financial factors; and third, to identify several structural and institutional factors which were critical to the Jews' experiences in medieval England.
Created2016-12
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The American entrance into World War I instituted a fundamental change in the nation’s handling of foreign policy. The established precedent of isolationism was rooted in Washingtonian affairs and further emphasized by the policies of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary. President Woodrow Wilson, by choosing to engage in a

The American entrance into World War I instituted a fundamental change in the nation’s handling of foreign policy. The established precedent of isolationism was rooted in Washingtonian affairs and further emphasized by the policies of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary. President Woodrow Wilson, by choosing to engage in a European war, created a milestone in American history by sending troops across the Atlantic to “repay Lafayette’s debt.” However, while World War I shaped American relations with western Europe, it also played an important role in Russian-American relations with Wilson’s decision to intervene in the Russian Civil War. Like his Fourteen Points at the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson asserted the legitimacy to intervene in Russia through pro-democratic rhetoric. This historic decision not only marked one of the first pro-democratic interventions in American military history, but it became the foundation for containment strategy during the Cold War twenty years later.
Furthermore, this paper will look to highlight and bring forth the stories and testimonies of those who fought in the American Expeditionary Force in North Russia (AEF-NR). Examination of the American leaders in the region as well as the geographical situation will address why the AEF-NR’s intervention was far more violent than that of the American Expeditionary Force of Siberia, telling the story of the ‘Forgotten Fight’ and its significant effect on American-Russian foreign relations.
ContributorsBrooks, Jeffery (Author) / Von Hagen, Mark (Thesis director) / Longley, Rodney (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2018-12
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Since the 1980s, academics and activists attempting to explain why American evangelicals have supported politicians with controversial environmental track records—from James Watt to James Inhofe—have framed such believers as apocalyptic fatalists content to pillage Creation until Jesus raptures them to safety and destroys the Earth. Today evangelicals maintain higher levels

Since the 1980s, academics and activists attempting to explain why American evangelicals have supported politicians with controversial environmental track records—from James Watt to James Inhofe—have framed such believers as apocalyptic fatalists content to pillage Creation until Jesus raptures them to safety and destroys the Earth. Today evangelicals maintain higher levels of climate skepticism and lower levels of support for environmental legislation than other religious groups—seemingly confirming the “End Times Apathy Hypothesis.” However, the history of such Rapture-believing, premillennial evangelicals reveals surprisingly sensitive attitudes toward science, nature, and the environmental crisis that stand in stark contrast to popular depictions. Far from promoting anti-science and anti-environmental attitudes, premillennialism has historically encouraged a this-worldly interest in empirical science as believers saw the natural world as a source of revelation and sought to discern the “signs of the times.” It has also offered a flexible theological framework capable of assimilating the most dire findings by environmental scientists and meeting them with hope. Prophecy popularizers such as Billy Graham and Hal Lindsay wrote books which sold in the millions and carried with them the latest findings and predictions by environmental scientists—making them, in effect, some of the most effective science communicators of the twentieth century. Where environmental skepticism has entered evangelicalism, it has been through postmillennial Christian Reconstructionism—a movement deeply opposed to premillennialism—and its promotion of economic cornucopianism, Young Earth Creationism, Christian America historical revisionism, and organizations like the Cornwall Alliance. To make evangelicals into anti-environmentalists, these Reconstructionists first had to unmake them as premillennialists. This interdisciplinary dissertation demonstrates how history and theology can explain evangelicals’ shifting attitudes toward environmentalism. From their early concerns over nuclear testing through their participation in the first Earth Day and up to the eve of the millennium, premillennialism drove evangelicals to take seriously the growing concerns for Creation’s condition and their present attitudes of skepticism and antagonism represent a divergence from this hitherto untold story of apocalyptic environmentalism.
ContributorsFuller, Robert Edward (Author) / Tirosh-Samuelson, Hava (Thesis advisor) / Jones, Christopher (Committee member) / Berry, Evan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
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The first official history of the Great Patriotic War appeared in the Soviet Union in 1960-1965. It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from the reading public. This dissertation examines the creation of the historiographical narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the

The first official history of the Great Patriotic War appeared in the Soviet Union in 1960-1965. It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from the reading public. This dissertation examines the creation of the historiographical narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the decade following de-Stalinization in 1956. The debates historians, Party and state representatives engaged in, including the responses they received from reviewers and readers, shed new light on the relationship between the government, those who wrote state-sponsored narratives, and the reading public.

The narrative examined here shows the importance and value placed on the war effort, and explores how aspects of the Stalinist period were retained during the Thaw. By focusing on previously unexplored archival material, which documents debates and editorial decisions, an examination of how officials sought to control the state’s explanation of events, motivations and consequences of the war can be examined in-depth. To date, the periodization, terminology and areas of concentration that define the course of the Great Patriotic War are fixated on topics that Stalin’s war narrative favored, assigning significance to events according to Stalinist preferences rather than objective analysis. My study of the war’s historiography shows how contentious its memory became at every level, making it difficult to clearly discern who represented and opposed the party line throughout Soviet society.

The author argues that the collective memory of the war, as propagated by the state, became so all-encompassing that it was often the preferred version, infiltrating individual memories and displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual documentation. Because the war touched the entire population of the Soviet Union, its story became the foundational myth of the USSR, replacing the October Revolution, and was used as a legitimizing tool by Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. Most recently, it has experienced a revival in the post-Soviet period by Vladimir Putin as a way to unify Russia and build popular support for his administration. Viewing how the public interacted with representatives of the state over the creation of the official history of the war suggests that like no other event, war compels any state, even a totalitarian state, to reexamine its foundations, historical memory, foreign and domestic policies and views on censorship.
ContributorsMann, Yan (Author) / Von Hagen, Mark (Thesis advisor) / Manchester, Laurie (Thesis advisor) / Holian, Anna (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016