This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of entanglement and the particular problems it poses for some physicists. In addition to looking at the history of entanglement and non-locality, this paper will use the Bell Test as a means for demonstrating how entanglement works, which measures the behavior of electrons whose combined internal angular momentum is zero. This paper will go over Dr. Bell's famous inequality, which shows why the process of entanglement cannot be explained by traditional means of local processes. Entanglement will be viewed initially through the Copenhagen Interpretation, but this paper will also look at two particular models of quantum mechanics, de-Broglie Bohm theory and Everett's Many-Worlds Interpretation, and observe how they explain the behavior of spin and entangled particles compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation.

This paper analyzes the history and impact of the double-slit experiment on the world of physics. The experiment was initially created by Thomas Young in the early nineteenth century to prove that light behaved as a wave, and the experiment’s findings ended up being foundational to the classical wave theory of light. Decades later, the experiment was replicated once more with electrons instead of light and shockingly demonstrated that electrons possessed a dual nature of behavior in that they acted in some instances as particles and in others as waves. Despite numerous modifications and replications, the dual behavior of electrons has never been definitively explained. Numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics all offer their own explanations of the double-slit experiment’s results. Notably, the Copenhagen Interpretation states that an observer measuring a quantum system, such as the double-slit experiment, causes the electrons to behave classically (i.e. as a particle.) The Many Worlds Interpretation offers that multiple branching worlds come into existence to represent the physical occurrence of all probable outcomes of the double-slit experiment. In these and other interpretations, explanations of the double-slit experiment are key to proving their respective dogmas. The double-slit experiment has historically been very important to the worlds of both classical and quantum physics and is still being modified and replicated to this day. It is clear that it will continue to remain relevant even in the future of physics.

The sociological model of mental illness (Weitz, 2020, pp. 146-148) offers a much needed contrast to the disproportionate dominance of the medical model in research, public policy, and popular discourse (Weitz, 2020, pp. 145-146 & 158-160). Unfortunately, the sociological model receives little attention in comparison (Mulvaney, 2001), although there has been a slight revival in recent years. However, the bulk of research on mental illness within the sociological model is predominantly quantitative, relying heavily on statistics and reducing complex systemic processes to various separated variables (Chandler, 2019; Mullaney, 2016; Spates & Slatton, 2021). Both sociological and psychological research on mental illness tend to be dominated by a highly quantitative focus on ‘social factors’, and generally shy away from examining the role of macro-level social structures and institutions. Consequently, even the sociological model of mental illness tends to fall short of implicating the underlying socio-economic system as a potential contributor to psychological harm and distress. This paper offers critiques of the medical model of mental illness and highlights both the strengths and shortcomings of work in the sociological model. I will also attempt to address these issues by providing a sociological and philosophical analysis of how the capitalist socio-economic system, and systems of oppression in general, shapes social constructions of mental illness and inflicts chronic stress and stigma, leading to much of the psychological distress that many people currently experience.