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The need for a critical education in a democracy, its difficulties, and how to reform this field requires urgent attention. This project begins with the premise that education is necessary for a vibrant democracy. While examining differing voices that advocate for educational reform, mainly that of Critical Pedagogy, it is shown how conflicting forms are advocating similar ideals. Henry Giroux and David Horowitz, both reformers that are on opposite sides of the political spectrum appear to have similar goals. Yet, the question becomes how to solve these differences between these parties? By examining the philosophical origins of these projects and explicating differences rooted in human nature and the good, the basic differences can begin to be shown. In showing these differences it requires going back to the work of Kant. Kant shows the necessity of beginning with philosophy and examining basic assumptions in order to begin to critique and build an education that would guarantee equality.
ContributorsNolen, Matthew (Author) / Wise, Greg (Thesis advisor) / Anderson, Owen (Committee member) / Ramsey, Ramsey (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Given the success of science, weak forms of mind-brain dependence are commonly treated as uncontroversial within contemporary philosophies of mind. More controversial are the different metaphysical claims inferred from this dependence, many ascribing ontological priority to the brain. Consider the following three propositions: (i) neurological events are essentially identified by their role in material systems, laws, and causes that are constitutively non-rational; (ii) at least some mental events are essentially identified in virtue of their role in the use of reason; (iii) all mental events are realized by, identical to, or composed out of, neurological events. (i) is uncontroversial. However, (iii) is strictly materialistic. (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together appear incoherent. A fruitful task for philosophy is to resolve this apparent incoherence. In his 1997 book The Last Word Thomas Nagel offers an explication of reason that conceptually transcends the nature of material substrate. In his 2010 article "Modest Dualism" Tyler Burge offers reasons to think of propositional thought as irreducible to the concepts of the material sciences. Both focus on rationality as a unique form of intentionality. Both philosophers also reject materialism (iii). On their accounts it's reasonable to take 'rational intentionality' as exhibiting a logical priority of the mind with respect to the brain in inquiries into the nature of mind. Granting this, the diminished conception of mind presupposed by prevailing contemporary theories is seen to be the result of a more general failure to recognize the logical priority and intricate nature of rationality. The robust views of rationality expressed by Nagel and Burge constitute grounds for argument against even the weakest form of materialism. I develop such an argument in this thesis, showing that the propositional attitudes exhibited in thought and speech preclude all materialistic notions of mind. Furthermore, I take the nature of propositional attitudes to suggest a perspective for exploring the fundamental nature of mind, one that focuses not on composition but on rational powers.
ContributorsGoodrich, Gregory (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W (Thesis advisor) / White, Michael J. (Committee member) / Anderson, Owen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011