Matching Items (12)
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- All Subjects: philosophy
- Creators: de Marneffe, Peter
Description
Libertarians affirm the right to liberty, i.e., the right to do what one wants free from interference. Libertarians also affirm the right to private property. One objection to libertarianism is that private property relations restrict liberty. This objection appears to have the consequence that libertarianism is an incoherent position. I examine Jan Narveson's version of the libertarian view and his defense of its coherence. Narveson understands the right to liberty as a prohibition on the initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the enforcement of property rights violates it. I also examine Narveson's attempt to support private property with his distinction between interference with and mere prevention of activity and argue that this distinction does not do the work that he needs it to do. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible because conceptually unsound.
ContributorsSchimke, Christopher (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Blackson, Thomas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
In this discussion I will state fundamental principles of Kelsen's Legal Positivism in International Law and explain four problems with his theory. I will then propose two suggestions in the light of which Kelsen's theory is modified in this discussion and explain how these two suggestions address the four problems and help the theory account for regime change. Finally, I will address possible objections to the view advanced in this discussion.
ContributorsIoannidis, Christoforos (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / French, Peter (Committee member) / Fellmeth, Aaron (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
The Paradox of Fiction can be understood as the acceptance of three plausible but inconsistent claims: Claim 1. We are genuinely moved by fiction Claim 2. We know that what is portrayed by fiction is not actual Claim 3. We are only genuinely moved by what we believe is actual. Taken individually, we intuitively accept each of the claims, however, they form a contradiction when taken together. The issue at hand is although we observe many instances of fiction moving a spectator/reader to tears, we know that the grief we observe does not reference an existent entity. How can we grieve at the death of Mercutio in "Romeo and Juliet" when Mercutio never existed let alone died? How can we fear a monster we know exists only in the world of a film? Many theories have been proposed to dissolve this paradox, and I focus on the ones that approach the puzzle by rejecting one of the above three claims. I examine some of these theories and explain why they fail to solve the paradox, and in doing so I demonstrate that the Make-Believe Theory succeeds where the others failed. Make-Believe Theory rejects Claim 1 and I shall prove that although unintuitive, we are completely justified in claiming that we are not genuinely moved by fiction. Instead, when we are moved by fictions, we are moved in a similar way to how a child is moved in a game of make-believe.
ContributorsGoitia, Brice Edward (Author) / Bolton, Cynthia (Thesis director) / de Marneffe, Peter (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Abstract. The term "sex trafficking" can mean many different things, depending on who uses it. To some, it may be synonymous with prostitution. To others, it may equate to slavery. And some may find that sex trafficking differs from both slavery and prostitution. But I find that the term "sex trafficking" is used improperly when referring to phenomena that may not entail the violation of rights of any individual involved. For this reason, various definitions of "sex trafficking" may inappropriately conflate sex trafficking with prostitution. In this essay, I argue against such a conflation through supporting a rights-based approach of defining "sex trafficking," in which every instance of true sex trafficking necessitates a violation of someone's rights. First, I begin by laying the foundation of my discussion with definitions and various government and non-government uses of the term "sex trafficking." Then, I argue for the rights-based approach. I proceed to explore how the rights-based approach relates to consent, force, coercion, deception, and competence. Then, I compile my findings, synthesize a definition, and elaborate on a few questions regarding my definition. Using the term "sex trafficking" correctly, as I argue, means that we necessarily use the term in a context of a violation of rights.
ContributorsMiller, Isaac Jonathan (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis director) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
In this thesis, I delve into the complex ethical issue of deception and coercion as external factors that can undermine consent. Countless theorists have debated the moral permissibility of different forms of deception and coercion, and in this thesis, I propose my own solution to this challenging problem in the ethics of consent. Narrow in scope, my investigation focuses on the morally transformative power of consent and how deception and coercion hinder consent from performing this morally transformative "magic." I argue that certain features of sex are essential to the act of consent, and that deception about these features fundamentally undermines the validity of consent. Furthermore, I support David Boonin's distinction between threats and offers in the coercion literature as the most compelling distinction thus far. Through rigorous analysis and critical engagement with existing literature, my thesis contributes to the ongoing philosophical discourse on consent, deception, and coercion, shedding light on the intricacies of these issues and advancing our understanding of this complex ethical landscape.
ContributorsDevaraj, Sunil (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis director) / de Marneffe, Peter (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor)
Created2023-05
Description
It is my position that Kendrick Lamar takes a journey over the course of his album “To Pimp a Butterfly” (TPAB) that is similar to the journey taken by the prisoner up and out of the cave described by Socrates in the Republic. Using the structure and ideas of the Republic, I will provide a novel interpretation of the album that highlights Lamar’s transformation and development. The general lesson that I have learned by connecting these two works is that becoming a better person is a difficult and continuous process but also a fulfilling one.
First, I will provide some points of context from the Republic and TPAB that are relevant to my argument. Second, I will identify the three stages of the cave prisoner’s ascent out of the cave and Lamar’s escape from Compton together. Third, I will split up the three stages into their own three chapters and show how Lamar’s three-staged journey is similar to the cave prisoner’s. To do this, I will propose shadows, statues, and forms present in TPAB. In each chapter, I will demonstrate using Plato’s tripartite model of the soul how each stage corresponds to one of the three stages of Lamar’s metaphorical metamorphosis on TPAB: caterpillar, cocoon, and butterfly. In the third chapter, I will bring everything together to show how a Platonic understanding of TPAB allows us to better understand the process of Lamar’s self-realization. In my conclusion, I will end with summary of what I have accomplished and the personal thoughts and lessons I have learned from assembling all of this.
ContributorsDonovan, Jaxon (Author) / Klein, Shawn (Thesis director) / de Marneffe, Peter (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2024-05
Description
Over thirty years after the passage of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the meaning of disability accessibility and justification for accessibility measures remains unclear. Connecting work in social and political philosophy to scholarship in disability studies and disability law, this project offers an account of what access is and why access is often owed to disabled people. This project argues that disability access is necessary both for the same reasons access is considered necessary for the non-disabled, and for counteracting harmful narratives about disability and disabled people. These narratives and stereotypes originate from a particular ideology, termed “the ideology of abledness.” This ideology informs the way policies are formed and the ways they are received; it also explains why considerations of disability are often absent in general policies, and why unique provisions for disability accessibility are necessary. In its effort to clarify disability access, the project tackles difficult questions such as the nature of accessibility, issues of cost and who is obligated to pay for accessibility measures, how all people with disabilities can be included in a social contract theory, and how disability accessibility relates to and can even expand the way non-discrimination is understood.
ContributorsLevit Ades, Rachel (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / de Marneffe, Peter (Committee member) / Francis, Leslie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual’s relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state’s right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund’s theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable.
ContributorsHall, James Michael (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Huemer, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
Description
In their criticism of various approaches to upbringing and related American family law jurisprudence, liberal theorists tend to underweight the interests of parents in directing the development of children’s values. Considered through the lens of T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism, providing a good upbringing is not a matter of identifying children’s “best interests” or acting in accordance with overriding end-state principles. Rather, children should be raised in accordance with principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. The process of ascertaining such principles requires an understanding of relevant values; a good upbringing is what children receive when parents properly value their children, enabling them to appropriately recognize what it is that they have reason to do given the roles that they play. By developing the account of upbringing hinted at in Scanlon’s contractualist monograph, What We Owe to Each Other, this project identifies and responds to some common mistakes in contemporary liberal theorizing on childhood, suggests that contractualism yields a more plausible account of upbringing than alternative approaches, and along the way identifies some implications of contractualism for public policy where individuals properly value the children of others in their community.
ContributorsPike, Kenneth (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Studies suggest that graduate students experience higher rates of anxiety and depression than their peers outside of academia. Studies also show exercise is correlated with lower levels of anxiety and depression among graduate students. However, despite this evidence, nearly half of graduate students do not exercise regularly. Accordingly, I suggest universities consider adding an exercise requirement to promote graduate student well-being. One potential objection to this recommendation is that an exercise requirement is objectionably paternalistic. I answer this objection with two possible replies. First, there are reasons why the exercise requirement might not be paternalistic, and there may be sufficient non-paternalistic reasons to justify the policy. Second, there are reasons why even if the policy is paternalistic, it is not objectionably paternalistic, and may still be justified. I will offer reasons to consider paternalism in a positive light and why the exercise requirement may be an example of a good paternalistic policy. Because the exercise requirement might be justified on paternalistic grounds, there are reasons to consider other paternalistic policies to promote graduate student well-being.
ContributorsArthur, Philip (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Doug (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020