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- All Subjects: Business
- Creators: Chen, Hong
- Creators: Pei, Ker-Wei
- Creators: Hertzel, Michael
- Member of: ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Description
This dissertation analyzes the reliability of reported employee stock option (ESO) expense, the determination of expected life of ESOs, motivations to manipulate ESO expense, and the impact of noise in ESO expense on subsequent stock price returns. Based on unique data, this is the first paper to measure average historical ESO life for all employees of a broad set of firms. I find average life has a mean of 4.12 years. Average life is reduced by 0.38 years per 10 percentage point increase in volatility, and industry effects explain an additional 7% of the variation. Reported expected life increases 0.37 years per year of historical life and an additional 0.16 years per year of age of the outstanding options. Deviations of reported volatility and life from benchmarks have positive correlations with deviations from own reporting history. Using stated assumptions rather than benchmark assumptions drops (increases) ESO expense by 8.3% (17.6%) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. The change in earnings per share decreases (increases) by $0.019 ($0.007) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. Tests for motivations to manipulate stock option expense downward have mixed results. Absolute values of deviations from benchmarks have a positive relationship with subsequent stock price volatility suggesting noise in reported stock option expense results in stock price noise. Deviations from benchmarks and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns have statistically significant results but are difficult to interpret.
ContributorsYoung, Brian (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This study investigates the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, I investigate the effect of the disclosure requirements that take effect when an investment company's assets exceed $100 million; when that occurs, a fund is required by the SEC to submit form 13F disclosing its portfolio holdings. Consistent with the argument that portfolio disclosure reveals "trade secrets" and also raises front running costs thus harms the funds that disclose, I find that there is a drop in fund performance (about 4% annually) after a fund begins filing form 13F, as well as an increase in return correlations with other hedge funds in the same investment style. The drop in performance cannot be explained by a change in the assets under management or a mean reversion in returns. Consistent with the idea that funds with illiquid holdings tend to employ sequential trading strategies, which increase the likelihood of being taken advantage of by free riders and front runners, the drop in performance is more dramatic for funds that have more illiquid holdings. In addition, I find that the incentive fees paid to fund managers are 1% higher when portfolio disclosure is required, which supports the hypothesis that investors' monitoring of portfolio holdings disciplines adverse risk-taking by fund managers and allows for higher convexity in the optimal compensation structure. Finally, there is a drop in flows into funds that file 13F, which suggests that hedge fund investors negatively value 13F disclosure. Overall, this study suggests that the cost of portfolio disclosure is economically large. It contributes to the policy debate over what constitutes optimal disclosure.
ContributorsShi, Zhen (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Aragon, Georges (Thesis advisor) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
The city of Shanghai is set to become an international financial center (IFC) by 2020. To achieve this goal, it is imperative to clearly define the key characteristics of an IFC. In this study I draw from recent research on the ranking of IFCs to develop an index of these key characteristics that can be used to assess a city’s standings as an IFC. Based on a review of prior research, I first put together a comprehensive list of the indicators that have been used to evaluate IFCs, which includes six first-level indicators and 34 second-level indicators. I then collect information on all these indicators from public sources for the following eight cities each year from 2011 to 2013: London, New York, Paris, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, Beijing and Shanghai. Next, I conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) on my data, and obtain four primary factors that contain most information of the original 34 indicators. The first factor covers 18 of the original indicators and reflects a city’s level of development in general business environment. The second factor covers 10 of the original indicators and reflects a city’s level of development in financial markets. The third factor covers three of the original indicators and reflects a city’s level of economic vitality. The fourth factor covers three of the original indicators and reflects a city’s level of the costs of living. I further calculate the composite scores for the above eight cities along these four factors, and find that these eight cities can be classified into three tiers on the basis of their scores. The first tier consists of New York and London; the second tier consists of Singapore, Hong Kong, Paris and Tokyo; and the third tier consists of Shanghai and Beijing. I also find that Shanghai has been making progress in its scores along these four factors over the last three years, especially regarding financial market development, economic vitality, and cost of living. What Shanghai needs to focus on next is to improve its business environment so that it can move up to the second tier in IFC status.
ContributorsWang, Weiren, Ph.D (Author) / Yao, David (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Using historical data from the third-party payment acquiring industry, I develop a statistical model to predict the probability of fraudulent transactions by the merchants. The model consists of two levels of analysis – the first focuses on fraud detection at the store level, and the second focuses on fraud detection at the merchant level by aggregating store level data to the merchant level for merchants with multiple stores. My purpose is to put the model into business operations, helping to identify fraudulent merchants at the time of transactions and thus mitigate the risk exposure of the payment acquiring businesses. The model developed in this study is distinct from existing fraud detection models in three important aspects. First, it predicts the probability of fraud at the merchant level, as opposed to at the transaction level or by the cardholders. Second, it is developed by applying machine learning algorithms and logistical regressions to all the transaction level and merchant level variables collected from real business operations, rather than relying on the experiences and analytical abilities of business experts as in the development of traditional expert systems. Third, instead of using a small sample, I develop and test the model using a huge sample that consists of over 600,000 merchants and 10 million transactions per month. I conclude this study with a discussion of the model’s possible applications in practice as well as its implications for future research.
ContributorsZhou, Ye (Author) / Chen, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Chao, Xiuli (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
This thesis starts with an analysis of the current situation of the pharmaceutical industry in China, and discusses the strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the pharmaceutical industry in China. It elaborates on the rationale for the development of the mergers and acquisitions of the pharmaceutical SMEs. Then a literature review is provided on the causes of corporate mergers and acquisitions such as the economies of scale, synergistic effect, transaction costs, market power, and strategic diversification.Next,the thesis analyzes the underlying rationale for the M&A transactions in the pharmaceutical industry in China, and explores the likely path of successful value creation for pharmaceutical SMEs in China. Specifically, with five in-depth case studies of M&A transactions of pharmaceutical firms, this thesis reveals the critical success factors leading to value creation and growth in the practice of mergers and acquisitions of the pharmaceutical SMEs in China.
ContributorsZhou, Yan (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Although China’s economy has experienced fast growth over the years, it is also characterized by a lack of innovative products and slow development of advanced production technologies. A main reason for this problem is insufficient investments in research and development (R&D) activities by Chinese firms. Because of the potential externality and free-rider effects, the economics literature has long suggested that the private sector tends to underinvest in R&D without governmental interventions. The weak protection of intellectual property rights in China makes the problem of underinvestment in R&D even worse. In this situation, it becomes increasingly important for the government to provide incentives such as subsidies on R&D investments, given that R&D investments are critical to the development of new technologies and the sustainable growth of the economy.
In this study I investigate how governmental subsidies on R&D influence Chinese firms’ R&D investments and performance. Specifically, I want to find out (1) whether governmental subsidies promote or hinder firms’ R&D investments, and (2) whether governmental subsidies have differential effects on financial performance across different types of firms. My goal is to better understand the effects of governmental subsidies on Chinese firms. To achieve this goal, I first conduct an extensive review of the relevant literature and then develop a conceptual model about the determinants of governmental subsidies on R&D in China. Next, I conduct empirical analysis using data collected from all the firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Changes and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period of 2009 to 2012. Overall, my findings show that governmental subsidies on R&D have a positive impact on R&D investments by the listed firms. Meanwhile, I find that this positive impact varies significantly across different types of firms, particularly among firms that are still largely owned by the state. I conclude this study with a discussion of its implications for governmental policies on R&D investments.
In this study I investigate how governmental subsidies on R&D influence Chinese firms’ R&D investments and performance. Specifically, I want to find out (1) whether governmental subsidies promote or hinder firms’ R&D investments, and (2) whether governmental subsidies have differential effects on financial performance across different types of firms. My goal is to better understand the effects of governmental subsidies on Chinese firms. To achieve this goal, I first conduct an extensive review of the relevant literature and then develop a conceptual model about the determinants of governmental subsidies on R&D in China. Next, I conduct empirical analysis using data collected from all the firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Changes and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period of 2009 to 2012. Overall, my findings show that governmental subsidies on R&D have a positive impact on R&D investments by the listed firms. Meanwhile, I find that this positive impact varies significantly across different types of firms, particularly among firms that are still largely owned by the state. I conclude this study with a discussion of its implications for governmental policies on R&D investments.
ContributorsYang, Guisheng (Author) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Thesis advisor) / Wang, Tan (Committee member) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Financing lease has bloomed as a new financing tool in China for the last several years. In this thesis I investigate the factors that influence China’s automobile financial leasing decisions by both lessors and lessees through market surveys. Based on Probit regression analysis of the data collected from 250 companies and 300 individuals, I find that a firm is more likely to use automobile financial leasing when its corporate tax rate is lower, growth potential is more stabilized, and profit is higher. It is also more likely to happen when a firm's long-term debt ratio and its degree of internationalization are higher. At the individual level, I find that the likelihood of individuals’ leasing decision is influenced by their risk preference, income level, and car price. Individuals’ gender, age and education level show no effect.
Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis, I further find that financing costs, service value-added, and products diversity are the three most important competitive factors for the auto financial leasing service providers. This is the case for both the corporate and individual customers in the sample. By contrast, the factors of sales channel and government relationship are found to be much less important. Finally, through an in-depth case study of the leasing company Shanghai Auto Financial Leasing, I find that the key factors determining the customers’ credit default risk are interest rate and automobile type. I also investigate factors that influence business risk during the automobile procurement stage, at the selling stage, and toward the disposition stage. The managerial implications of the above results are discussed throughout the thesis.
Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis, I further find that financing costs, service value-added, and products diversity are the three most important competitive factors for the auto financial leasing service providers. This is the case for both the corporate and individual customers in the sample. By contrast, the factors of sales channel and government relationship are found to be much less important. Finally, through an in-depth case study of the leasing company Shanghai Auto Financial Leasing, I find that the key factors determining the customers’ credit default risk are interest rate and automobile type. I also investigate factors that influence business risk during the automobile procurement stage, at the selling stage, and toward the disposition stage. The managerial implications of the above results are discussed throughout the thesis.
ContributorsLin, Zhen, Ph.D (Author) / Zhang, Anming (Thesis advisor) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a family-owned controlling interest, and a Sino-foreign joint venture firm. By using a case study approach, I focus on two dimensions of ownership structure characteristics – ownership diversification and differences in property rights so as to document whether there are systematic differences in governance participation and executive compensation design. Specifically, I focused on whether such differences are reflected in management selection (which is linked to adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and in compensation design (the choices of performance measurements, performance pay, and in stock option or restricted stock). The results are consistent with my expectation – the nature of ownership structure does affect senior management compensation design. Policy implications are discussed accordingly.
ContributorsGao, Shenghua (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
This study investigates three issues that are relevant for the development of multinational investment banks in China. The first is about the domestic market conditions that are necessary for a country to develop multinational investment banks. The second issue is about the degree to which China has met these conditions. The last issue focuses on the potential strategies Chinese investment banks can undertake to become multinational corporations.
To address the first issue, I draw an important distinction between international investment banks and multinational investment banks. For an international investment bank to be regarded as a multinational, I propose that it must have a strong presence (i.e., holding at least one percent of the market share) in at least two of the seven major capital markets in the world. Using this criterion, I identify 25 multinational investment banks. I then analyze their home countries’ domestic market conditions and propose that the following six factors are important to the development of multinational investment banks: the size of the home country’s gross domestic product (GDP), the total capitalization of its domestic security market, the number of its Global 500 firms, the volume of its foreign direct investment (FDI), the internationalization of its currency, and the openness of its capital market to foreign investors.
By comparisons, I find that China’s domestic market conditions are comparable to the home countries of multinational investment banks with respect to the size of GDP, total market capitalization, the number of Global 500 firms, and the volume of FDI. What China lags behind are the internationalization of currency and the openness of capital market to foreign investors. Given the current trends of development, it is very likely that China will be able to catch up on the latter within ten years, thus meeting all the conditions necessary for the development of multinational investment banks.
Based on the above findings, I suggest that Chinese investment banks seize this historical opportunity, speed up the internationalization of their businesses, and learn from the experiences of global industry leaders to become truly multinational corporations.
To address the first issue, I draw an important distinction between international investment banks and multinational investment banks. For an international investment bank to be regarded as a multinational, I propose that it must have a strong presence (i.e., holding at least one percent of the market share) in at least two of the seven major capital markets in the world. Using this criterion, I identify 25 multinational investment banks. I then analyze their home countries’ domestic market conditions and propose that the following six factors are important to the development of multinational investment banks: the size of the home country’s gross domestic product (GDP), the total capitalization of its domestic security market, the number of its Global 500 firms, the volume of its foreign direct investment (FDI), the internationalization of its currency, and the openness of its capital market to foreign investors.
By comparisons, I find that China’s domestic market conditions are comparable to the home countries of multinational investment banks with respect to the size of GDP, total market capitalization, the number of Global 500 firms, and the volume of FDI. What China lags behind are the internationalization of currency and the openness of capital market to foreign investors. Given the current trends of development, it is very likely that China will be able to catch up on the latter within ten years, thus meeting all the conditions necessary for the development of multinational investment banks.
Based on the above findings, I suggest that Chinese investment banks seize this historical opportunity, speed up the internationalization of their businesses, and learn from the experiences of global industry leaders to become truly multinational corporations.
ContributorsLiu, Xin (Author) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015