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Description
The electric power system is monitored via an extensive network of sensors in tandem with data processing algorithms, i.e., an intelligent cyber layer, that enables continual observation and control of the physical system to ensure reliable operations. This data collection and processing system is vulnerable to cyber-attacks that impact the system operation status and lead to serious physical consequences, including systematic problems and failures.
This dissertation studies the physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks wherein the attacker maliciously changes supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) or phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements, on the electric power system. In this context, the dissertation is divided into three parts, in which the first two parts focus on FDI attacks on SCADA and the last part focuses on FDI attacks on PMUs.
The first part studies the physical consequences of FDI attacks on SCADA measurements designed with limited system information. The attacker is assumed to have perfect knowledge inside a sub-network of the entire system. Two classes of attacks with different assumptions on the attacker's knowledge outside of the sub-network are introduced. In particular, for the second class of attacks, the attacker is assumed to have no information outside of the attack sub-network, but can perform multiple linear regression to learn the relationship between the external network and the attack sub-network with historical data. To determine the worst possible consequences of both classes of attacks, a bi-level optimization problem wherein the first level models the attacker's goal and the second level models the system response is introduced.
The second part of the dissertation concentrates on analyzing the vulnerability of systems to FDI attacks from the perspective of the system. To this end, an off-line vulnerability analysis framework is proposed to identify the subsets of the test system that are more prone to FDI attacks.
The third part studies the vulnerability of PMUs to FDI attacks. Two classes of more sophisticated FDI attacks that capture the temporal correlation of PMU data are introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass both the bad data detector and the low-rank decomposition (LD) detector.
This dissertation studies the physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks wherein the attacker maliciously changes supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) or phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements, on the electric power system. In this context, the dissertation is divided into three parts, in which the first two parts focus on FDI attacks on SCADA and the last part focuses on FDI attacks on PMUs.
The first part studies the physical consequences of FDI attacks on SCADA measurements designed with limited system information. The attacker is assumed to have perfect knowledge inside a sub-network of the entire system. Two classes of attacks with different assumptions on the attacker's knowledge outside of the sub-network are introduced. In particular, for the second class of attacks, the attacker is assumed to have no information outside of the attack sub-network, but can perform multiple linear regression to learn the relationship between the external network and the attack sub-network with historical data. To determine the worst possible consequences of both classes of attacks, a bi-level optimization problem wherein the first level models the attacker's goal and the second level models the system response is introduced.
The second part of the dissertation concentrates on analyzing the vulnerability of systems to FDI attacks from the perspective of the system. To this end, an off-line vulnerability analysis framework is proposed to identify the subsets of the test system that are more prone to FDI attacks.
The third part studies the vulnerability of PMUs to FDI attacks. Two classes of more sophisticated FDI attacks that capture the temporal correlation of PMU data are introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass both the bad data detector and the low-rank decomposition (LD) detector.
ContributorsZhang, Jiazi (Author) / Sankar, Lalitha (Thesis advisor) / Kosut, Oliver (Committee member) / Hedman, Kory (Committee member) / Vittal, Vijay (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
An optimal energy scheduling procedure is essential in an isolated environment such as naval submarines. Conventional naval submarines include diesel-electric propulsion systems, which utilize diesel generators along with batteries and fuel cells. Submarines can charge the batteries by running diesel-electric generators only at the surface or at snorkeling depth. This is the most dangerous time for submarines to be detectable by acoustic and non-acoustic sensors of enemy assets. Optimizing the energy resources while reducing the need for snorkeling is the main factor to enhance underwater endurance. This thesis introduces an energy management system (EMS) as a supervisory tool for the officers onboard to plan energy schedules in order to complete various missions. The EMS for a 4,000-ton class conventional submarine is developed to minimize snorkeling and satisfy various conditions of practically designed missions by optimizing the energy resources, such as Lithium-ion batteries, Proton-exchange membrane fuel cells, and diesel-electric generators. Eventually, the optimized energy schedules with the minimum snorkeling hours are produced for five mission scenarios. More importantly, this EMS performs deterministic and stochastic operational scheduling processes to provide secured optimal schedules which contains outages in the power generation and storage systems.
ContributorsJeon, Byeongdoo (Author) / Hedman, Mojdeh Khorsand (Thesis advisor) / Holbert, Keith E. (Committee member) / Wu, Meng (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020