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Scientific and Cultural Interpretations of Volcanoes, 1766-1901 analyzes nineteenth-century conceptions of volcanoes through interdisciplinary literature and science studies. The project considers how people in the nineteenth century used science, aesthetics, and other ways of knowing to understand volcanoes and their operations. In the mid-eighteenth century, volcanoes were seen as singular,

Scientific and Cultural Interpretations of Volcanoes, 1766-1901 analyzes nineteenth-century conceptions of volcanoes through interdisciplinary literature and science studies. The project considers how people in the nineteenth century used science, aesthetics, and other ways of knowing to understand volcanoes and their operations. In the mid-eighteenth century, volcanoes were seen as singular, unique features of the planet that lacked temporal and terrestrial reach. By the end of the nineteenth century, volcanoes were seen as networked, environmental phenomena that stretched through geological time and geographic space. Scientific and Cultural Interpretations of Volcanoes, 1766-1901 offers a new historical understanding of volcanoes and their environmental connections, using literature and science to show how perceptions of volcanic time and space changed over 135 years.

The first chapter, using texts by Sir William Hamilton, Hester Piozzi, and Priscilla Wakefield, argues that in the late eighteenth century important aspects of volcanoes, like their impact upon human life and their existence through time, were beginning to be defined in texts ranging from the scientific to the educational. The second chapter focuses on works by Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton and Charles Lyell to demonstrate the ways that volcanoes were stripped of metaphysical or symbolic meaning as the nineteenth century progressed. The third chapter contrasts the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa with Constance Gordon-Cumming’s travels to Kīlauea. The chapter shows how even towards the end of the century, trying to connect human minds with the process of volcanic phenomenon was a substantial challenge, but that volcanoes like Kīlauea allowed for new conceptions of volcanic action. The last chapter, through a post-apocalyptic novel by M. P. Shiel, shows how volcanoes were finally beginning to be categorized as a primary agent within the environment, shaping all life including humanity. Ultimately, I argue that the change in thinking about volcanoes parallels today’s shift in thinking about global climate change. My work provides insight into how we imagine ecological catastrophes like volcanic eruptions or climate change in the past and present and what that means for their impact on people.
ContributorsLinthicum, Kent Robert (Author) / Lussier, Mark (Thesis advisor) / Bivona, Daniel (Committee member) / Looser, Devoney (Committee member) / Tromp, Marlene (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was no universal term to describe a person who practiced science. In 1833, the term “scientist” was proposed to recognize these individuals, but exactly who was represented by this term was still ambiguous. Supported by Bruno Latour’s theory of networks and hybridity,

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was no universal term to describe a person who practiced science. In 1833, the term “scientist” was proposed to recognize these individuals, but exactly who was represented by this term was still ambiguous. Supported by Bruno Latour’s theory of networks and hybridity, The Emerging Scientist takes a historical approach to analyze the different collectives of individuals who influenced the cultural perception of science and therefore aided in defining the role of the emerging scientist during the nineteenth century.

Each chapter focuses on a collective in the science network that influenced the development of the scientist across the changing scientific landscape of the nineteenth century. Through a study of William Small and Herbert Spencer, the first chapter investigates the informal clubs that prove to be highly influential due, in part, to the freedom individuals gain by being outside of formal institutions. Through an investigation of the lives and works of professional astronomer, Caroline Herschel, and physicist and mathematician, James Clerk Maxwell, chapter two analyzes the collective of professional practitioners of science to unveil the way in which scientific advancement actually occurred. Chapter three argues for the role of women in democratizing science and expanding the pool from which future scientists would come through a close analysis of Jane Marcet and Agnes Clerke, members of the collective of female popularizers of science. The final chapter examines how the collective of fictional depictions of science and the scientist ultimately are part of the cultural perception of the scientist through a close reading of Shelley’s Alastor; or, the Spirit of Solitude and Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray. Ultimately, The Emerging Scientist aims to recreate the way science is studied in order to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the influences on developing science and the scientist during the nineteenth century.
ContributorsSoutherly, Kaitlin (Author) / Lussier, Mark (Thesis advisor) / Broglio, Ronald (Committee member) / Bivona, Daniel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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The emergence of machine intelligence, which is superior to the best human talent in some problem-solving tasks, has rendered conventional educational goals obsolete, especially in terms of enhancing human capacity in specific skills and knowledge domains. Hence, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a buzzword, espousing both crisis rhetoric and ambition

The emergence of machine intelligence, which is superior to the best human talent in some problem-solving tasks, has rendered conventional educational goals obsolete, especially in terms of enhancing human capacity in specific skills and knowledge domains. Hence, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a buzzword, espousing both crisis rhetoric and ambition to enact policy reforms in the educational policy arena. However, these policy measures are mostly based on an assumption of binary human-machine relations, focusing on exploitation, resistance, negation, or competition between humans and AI due to the limited knowledge and imagination about human-machine relationality. Setting new relations with AI and negotiating human agency with the advanced intelligent machines is a non-trivial issue; it is urgent and necessary for human survival and co-existence in the machine era. This is a new educational mandate. In this context, this research examined how the notion of human and machine intelligence has been defined in relation to one another in the intellectual history of educational psychology and AI studies, representing human and machine intelligence studies respectively. This study explored a common paradigmatic space, so-called ‘cyborg space,’ connecting the two disciplines through cross-referencing in the citation network and cross-modeling in the metaphorical semantic space. The citation network analysis confirmed the existence of cross-referencing between human and machine intelligence studies, and interdisciplinary journals conceiving human-machine interchangeability. The metaphor analysis found that the notion of human and machine intelligence has been seamlessly interwoven to be part of a theoretical continuum in the most commonly cited references. This research concluded that the educational research and policy paradigm needs to be reframed based on the fact that the underlying knowledge of human and machine intelligence is not strictly differentiated, and human intelligence is relatively provincialized within the human-machine integrated system.
ContributorsGong, Byoung-gyu (Author) / McGurty, Iveta (Thesis advisor) / Wylie, Ruth (Committee member) / Dorn, Sherman (Committee member) / Zheng, Yi (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
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Getting clear about what behavioral scientists mean when they invoke content presupposing concepts, like information, is necessary for understanding how humanity’s own behavioral capacities do or do not relate to those of non-human animals. Yet, producing a general naturalistic definition for representational content has proven notoriously difficult. Some have argued

Getting clear about what behavioral scientists mean when they invoke content presupposing concepts, like information, is necessary for understanding how humanity’s own behavioral capacities do or do not relate to those of non-human animals. Yet, producing a general naturalistic definition for representational content has proven notoriously difficult. Some have argued that Claude Shannon’s formal, mathematically defined notion of information is the proper starting point for building a biological theory of content. Others have sought to define content presupposing concepts in terms of the historical selection processes that drive evolution. However, neither approach has produced definitions that capture the way successful researchers in the behavioral sciences use content-presupposing concepts. In this dissertation, I examine an ethological tradition of insect navigation research that has consistently ascribed content to insects. To clarify the meaning of such ascriptions, I analyze the practices scientists use to justify new attributions of content and the way new attributions of content guide scientists’ future research activities. In chapter 1, I examine a series of insect navigation experiments performed in 2006–2007 that led to a novel ascription of content. I argue that researchers ascribe content to insects’ navigation behaviors when those behaviors reliably accomplish a difficult goal-directed function. I also argue that ascriptions of content help researchers achieve their epistemic aims by guiding hypothesis formation and aiding comparative theorizing. In chapter 2, I trace the history of the experimental strategy analyzed above back to the work of Karl von Frisch in the early 20th century. I argue that von Frisch has a complicated and understudied relationship to the discipline of ethology. I support that argument by highlighting features of von Frisch’s research that both comported with and differed from the program of classical ethology. In chapter 3, I examine the cognitive map debate in insects. I argue that the debate stems from competing research groups’ endorsement of different norms for justifying claims about the dynamics of representational contents. I then situate these different norms historically to show how the cognitive map debate is a continuation of longstanding divisions within the history of animal behavior research.
ContributorsDhein, Kelle (Author) / Sterner, Beckett (Thesis advisor) / Maienschein, Jane (Committee member) / Allen, Colin (Committee member) / Pratt, Stephen (Committee member) / Laubichler, Manfred (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021