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- All Subjects: redistribution
- Creators: Bretschneider, Stuart
- Creators: Hechter, Michael
Description
This dissertation examines whether participatory budgeting (PB) processes, as a case of participatory governance and an innovative approach to local governance, promote inclusive and deliberative government decision-making and social justice outcomes. The first chapter introduces the case of the dissertation, PB in the city of Seoul, South Korea. It reviews the history of PB and the literature on PB in South Korea and discusses three issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB. The second chapter explores whether inclusive PB processes redistribute financial resources even without the presence of explicit equity criteria, using the last four years of PB resource allocation data and employing multi-level statistical analysis. The findings show that having a more inclusive process to encourage citizen participation helps poorer districts to win more resources than wealthier ones. The third chapter is a follow-up exploratory study; the possible reasons behind the redistributive effects of PB are discussed using interview data with PB participants. The findings suggest that the PB process could have been redistributive because it provided an opportunity for the people living in the comparatively poorer neighborhoods to participate in the government decision-making process. Additionally, when scoring proposals, participants valued ‘needs’ and ‘urgency’ as the most important criteria. The last chapter examines the 32 PB meetings in order to find the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative participatory process, employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This dissertation contributes to the field of public management, and particularly participatory governance by providing a review of the literature on PB in South Korea, presenting empirical evidence on the redistributive effect of PB without explicit equity criteria, and finding the combinations of meeting conditions that could be used to promote deliberation in the context of PB.
ContributorsNo, Wŏn (Author) / Schugurensky, Daniel, 1958- (Thesis advisor) / Bretschneider, Stuart (Committee member) / Johnston, Erik W., 1977- (Committee member) / Hsueh, Lily (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This dissertation attempts to explain the variation in violence at the time of state secession. Why do some governments respond to secessionist demands with violence and others settle such disputes peacefully? Previous research emphasized the high value of the secessionist region, the state’s fear of a domino effect, and the political fragmentation of the state and secessionist region elites, as the primary explanations for the violent response of the state to secession. I seek to provide a more comprehensive theory for the variation of secessionist violence that integrates individual, regional, state, and international factors. Drawing on a rational choice approach, and recent research on dehumanization, I argue that the state’s response to secessionist claims depends on the degree of economic redistribution in the country, the cultural differential between the dominant group of the state and the secessionist group, and the international security of the state. My theory predicts that the state is less likely to use violence against secessionists when there is a high degree of economic redistribution, a small cultural difference between the dominant and secessionist group, and the state enjoys a high level of external security. A state willing to redistribute in favor of the secessionist region dampens support for secession in the region and reduces the need to use violence by the state. Due to cognitive biases of the human brain, it is easier to marginalize culturally distinct groups than culturally similar groups. As a result, a high cultural differential is often associated with greater probability of secessionist violence. When the international security of the state is under threat, the government of the state can more easily convince its population to use force against the secessionist region, regardless of other considerations. In sum, my theory implies that economic redistribution, cultural differences, and international security shape state responses to secessionist claims. I test these theoretical conjectures using a new dataset on peaceful and violent secessionist campaigns, along with several case studies based on field research and primary source materials and find strong supportive evidence for them.
ContributorsDzutsati, Valery (Author) / Siroky, David S (Thesis advisor) / Hechter, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn M (Committee member) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017