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- All Subjects: Civilian Resistance
- All Subjects: redistribution
- Creators: Hechter, Michael
Description
This dissertation develops a theory on the strategic interaction between civilians and combatants in war zones. It builds on the emerging field of research on noncombatant self-protection mechanisms in civil wars and addresses two questions: first, once civilians have decided to organize a resistance campaign, why do they choose armed or unarmed methods of struggle? Second, how do armed groups respond to this challenge? Regarding resistance strategies, I argue norms against the use of violence determine the content of a campaign when a community depends on an external ally to organize the mobilization and such an actor has strong preferences for peaceful activism. Strategic factors (e.g., rebels’ reputation) are determinant when norm entrepreneurs are absent or fail to influence the community. Concerning groups’ reaction to a resistance campaign, the dissertation conducts one of the first comparisons of the effectiveness of these strategies. To do so, it advances a typology that distinguishes between moderate (i.e., protests) and radical strategies (either unarmed or armed self-protection) and proposes two game-theoretic models of the civilian-combatant interaction in war zones. These models predict that rebels are more likely to repress radical rather than moderate strategies. The dissertation tests this theory with statistical methods and a novel dataset on resistance campaigns in Colombia (1985-2005). It explores the Catholic Church's promotion of peaceful activism against the war in this country and tests the theory on the civilian choice of strategy with multilevel multinomial models. This empirical method yields robust evidence to the theory: when encountering a rebel group with a negative reputation, civilians are more likely to organize violent self-protection rather than peaceful activism. In contrast, when there is a powerful third party with the leverage and resolution to promote nonviolent action, civilians are more willing to undertake a peaceful mobilization rather than create a militia. The empirical expectations concerning the warring parties’ reaction to civilian dissent are examined with methods for causal inference with panel data. The dissertation corroborates that protests can compel insurgents to make concessions to the population. In contrast, rebels tend to harshly retaliate against communities that escalate a campaign with violent tactics.
ContributorsOrtega Poveda, Pablo Alberto (Author) / Wood, Reed (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Hechter, Michael (Committee member) / Kaplan, Oliver (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
This dissertation attempts to explain the variation in violence at the time of state secession. Why do some governments respond to secessionist demands with violence and others settle such disputes peacefully? Previous research emphasized the high value of the secessionist region, the state’s fear of a domino effect, and the political fragmentation of the state and secessionist region elites, as the primary explanations for the violent response of the state to secession. I seek to provide a more comprehensive theory for the variation of secessionist violence that integrates individual, regional, state, and international factors. Drawing on a rational choice approach, and recent research on dehumanization, I argue that the state’s response to secessionist claims depends on the degree of economic redistribution in the country, the cultural differential between the dominant group of the state and the secessionist group, and the international security of the state. My theory predicts that the state is less likely to use violence against secessionists when there is a high degree of economic redistribution, a small cultural difference between the dominant and secessionist group, and the state enjoys a high level of external security. A state willing to redistribute in favor of the secessionist region dampens support for secession in the region and reduces the need to use violence by the state. Due to cognitive biases of the human brain, it is easier to marginalize culturally distinct groups than culturally similar groups. As a result, a high cultural differential is often associated with greater probability of secessionist violence. When the international security of the state is under threat, the government of the state can more easily convince its population to use force against the secessionist region, regardless of other considerations. In sum, my theory implies that economic redistribution, cultural differences, and international security shape state responses to secessionist claims. I test these theoretical conjectures using a new dataset on peaceful and violent secessionist campaigns, along with several case studies based on field research and primary source materials and find strong supportive evidence for them.
ContributorsDzutsati, Valery (Author) / Siroky, David S (Thesis advisor) / Hechter, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn M (Committee member) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017