Barrett

Barrett, The Honors College at Arizona State University proudly showcases the work of undergraduate honors students by sharing this collection exclusively with the ASU community.

Barrett accepts high performing, academically engaged undergraduate students and works with them in collaboration with all of the other academic units at Arizona State University. All Barrett students complete a thesis or creative project which is an opportunity to explore an intellectual interest and produce an original piece of scholarly research. The thesis or creative project is supervised and defended in front of a faculty committee. Students are able to engage with professors who are nationally recognized in their fields and committed to working with honors students. Completing a Barrett thesis or creative project is an opportunity for undergraduate honors students to contribute to the ASU academic community in a meaningful way.

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Causation as Causal Influence

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This thesis proposes an extension of David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, providing a method to calculate the `degrees of causal influence.' By providing a quantitative approach to causal influence, I find that that the influence approach can assess statements that involve causal redundancies, allowing the assessor to attribute…

This thesis proposes an extension of David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, providing a method to calculate the `degrees of causal influence.' By providing a quantitative approach to causal influence, I find that that the influence approach can assess statements that involve causal redundancies, allowing the assessor to attribute primary causal responsibility to the contending cause with a higher net influence value. The causal influence calculation also addresses criticisms towards Lewis's influence account, namely those involving `inert zones' of influence, the use of the term `might,' trumping versus symmetric overdetermination, and Lewis's clause requiring stepwise influence. This thesis also compares the results of causal influence in multiple toy cases including Two Rocks, both the asymmetric and symmetric variants, demonstrating that causal influence overcomes many of the core issues in Lewis's initial counterfactual account of causation. Using the asymmetric Two Rocks variant, this thesis also provides a detailed example of how to use the calculation and a discussion of the calculation's limitations. The main drawbacks of the quantitative method for causal influence seems to be the effort that it requires and issues in finding measurable qualities to compare the similarity/difference between possible worlds. Using the Two Rocks case, however, the causal influence calculation reaches the same conclusions as what Lewis suggests. A primary remaining issue is applying the calculation to instances of causation by omission, however this seems to only be a problem in using the equations rather than a problem within the idea of causal influence itself. Also, there may still be issues in justifying comparative overall similarity. However, this is an issue that both the counterfactual and influence accounts face.
ContributorsKha, Rachael Thuy-Trang (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / McElhoes, David (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Chemical Engineering Program (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
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A Virtue Ethics Account for Maximizing Enjoyment in Life

Description
Philippa Foot's theory of Natural Goodness provides a theoretical ethical framework that encompasses Aristotelian notions of flourishing and practical rationality. Foot's text provides a clear path to self-fulfillment, and her argument suggests that for a human being to flourish, they must experience happiness, actively enjoy good things, encompass human goodness,…

Philippa Foot's theory of Natural Goodness provides a theoretical ethical framework that encompasses Aristotelian notions of flourishing and practical rationality. Foot's text provides a clear path to self-fulfillment, and her argument suggests that for a human being to flourish, they must experience happiness, actively enjoy good things, encompass human goodness, and exercise practical rationality. This thesis aims to evolve Foot's project of Natural Goodness from a theoretical model into a configuration that may be applied to everyday practical living. This project begins by detailing Philippa Foot's theory, walking through each step of the argument Foot provides in support for her ethical framework. Following, the merits of the theory are compared to other renowned ethical theories, and the intuitive nature of Natural Goodness is highlighted. It is argued that although Foot's ethical framework is praiseworthy, the theory is too open-ended in its discussion of happiness for individuals lacking human goodness to confidently apply the account in a practical setting. Due to this, I explore Foot's notion of happiness, defined as the enjoyment of good things, and I focus on the subjective aspect of enjoyment. By applying research from the field of positive psychology, the definition becomes guided into a more practical form, allowing for Foot's framework of Natural Goodness to become an applicable theory within contemporary society. Once this is achieved, and interrogatories are answered, I delve into ramifications of this new framework, and ways that individuals may increase the quality of their own lives.
ContributorsWoods, Tyler (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Klein, Shawn (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
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Personal Identity as a Story: An Evaluation of Marya Schechtman's Narrative Self-Constitution View

Description
Personal identity stands at the heart of many practical practices such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance…

Personal identity stands at the heart of many practical practices such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman argues that the only accounts of personal identity that can capture this practical importance are those that address the characterization question \u2014 the question of what makes some feature attributable to a person. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels answers the characterization question and is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this paper, I argue that her account ultimately does not serve her purposes as it only focuses on attribution of features and does not, in fact, account for personal identity. Given that her view is exclusively about attribution, I explain, it is not relevant to the conversation on personal identity. Upon making this argument, I describe how the narrative self constitution view may nevertheless be useful as a tool for understanding the phenomenological notion of a sense of self or a self conception. Here I argue against Galen Strawson who holds that a narrative self conception is oftentimes problematic and unnecessary for several practical human functions. I argue that having a narrative sense of self is useful for personal growth insofar as it involves placing emphasis on certain life events, placing those events in context, and seeing one's life as having direction. Ultimately, I argue that a narrative self conception is not as problematic as Strawson thinks and may often be a useful tool for self-improvement.
ContributorsMoga, Radu (Author) / Watson, Jeffrey (Thesis director) / Khoury, Andrew (Committee member) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12