ASU Scholarship Showcase

Experiments have made important contributions to our understanding of human behavior, including behavior relevant for understanding social-ecological systems. When there is a conflict between individual and group interests in social-ecological systems, social dilemmas occur. From the many types of social-dilemma formulations that are used to study collective action, common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas are most relevant for social-ecological systems. Experimental studies of both common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas have shown that many predictions based on the conventional theory of collective action, which assumes rational, self-interested behavior, do not hold. More cooperation occurs than predicted (Ledyard 1995), “cheap talk” increases cooperation (Ostrom 2006), and participants are willing to invest in sanctioning free riders (Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Chaudhuri 2011). Experiments have also demonstrated a diversity of motivations, which affect individual decisions about cooperation and sanctioning (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2002 and Sobel 2005 for reviews, and Bowles 2008 for policy implications).

Butyrate is a common fatty acid produced in important fermentative systems, such as the human/animal gut and other H₂ production systems. Despite its importance, there is little information on the partnerships between butyrate producers and other bacteria. The objective of this work was to uncover butyrate-producing microbial communities and possible metabolic routes in a controlled fermentation system aimed at butyrate production. The butyrogenic reactor was operated at 37°C and pH 5.5 with a hydraulic retention time of 31 h and a low hydrogen partial pressure (PH₂). High-throughput sequencing and metagenome functional prediction from 16S rRNA data showed that butyrate production pathways and microbial communities were different during batch (closed) and continuous-mode operation. Lactobacillaceae, Lachnospiraceae, and Enterococcaceae were the most abundant phylotypes in the closed system without PH₂ control, whereas Prevotellaceae, Ruminococcaceae, and Actinomycetaceae were the most abundant phylotypes under continuous operation at low PH₂. Putative butyrate producers identified in our system were from Prevotellaceae, Clostridiaceae, Ruminococcaceae, and Lactobacillaceae. Metagenome prediction analysis suggests that nonbutyrogenic microorganisms influenced butyrate production by generating butyrate precursors such as acetate, lactate, and succinate. 16S rRNA gene analysis suggested that, in the reactor, a partnership between identified butyrogenic microorganisms and succinate (i.e., Actinomycetaceae), acetate (i.e., Ruminococcaceae and Actinomycetaceae), and lactate producers (i.e., Ruminococcaceae and Lactobacillaceae) took place under continuous-flow operation at low PH₂.

Anode-respiring bacteria (ARB) generate electric current in microbial electrochemical cells (MXCs) by channeling electrons from the oxidation of organic substrates to an electrode. Production of high current densities by monocultures in MXCs has resulted almost exclusively from the activity of Geobacter sulfurreducens, a neutrophilic freshwater Fe(III)-reducing bacterium and the highest-current-producing member documented for the Geobacteraceae family of the Deltaproteobacteria. Here we report high current densities generated by haloalkaliphilic Geoalkalibacter spp., thus broadening the capability for high anode respiration rates by including other genera within the Geobacteraceae. In this study, acetate-fed pure cultures of two related Geoalkalibacter spp. produced current densities of 5.0 to 8.3 and 2.4 to 3.3 A m^-2 under alkaline (pH 9.3) and saline (1.7% NaCl) conditions, respectively. Chronoamperometric studies of halophilic Glk. subterraneus DSM 23483 and alkaliphilic Glk. ferrihydriticus DSM 17813 suggested that cells performed long-range electron transfer through electrode-attached biofilms and not through soluble electron shuttles. Glk. ferrihydriticus also oxidized ethanol directly to produce current, with maximum current densities of 5.7 to 7.1 A m^-2 and coulombic efficiencies of 84 to 95%. Cyclic voltammetry (CV) elicited a sigmoidal response with characteristic onset, midpoint, and saturation potentials, while CV performed in the absence of an electron donor suggested the involvement of redox molecules in the biofilm that were limited by diffusion. These results matched those previously reported for actively respiring Gb. sulfurreducens biofilms producing similar current densities (~5 to 9 A m^-2).

Institutions, the rules of the game that shape repeated human interactions, clearly play a critical role in helping groups avoid the inefficient use of shared resources such as fisheries, freshwater, and the assimilative capacity of the environment. Institutions, however, are intimately intertwined with the human, social, and biophysical context within which they operate. Scholars typically are careful to take this context into account when studying institutions and Ostrom’s Institutional Design Principles are a case in point. Scholars have tested whether Ostrom’s Design Principles, which specify broad relationships between institutional arrangements and context, actually support successful governance of shared resources. This article further contributes to this line of research by leveraging the notion of institutional design to outline a research trajectory focused on coupled infrastructure systems in which institutions are seen as one class of infrastructure among many that dynamically interact to produce outcomes over time.

Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

Large-N comparative studies have helped common pool resource scholars gain general insights into the factors that influence collective action and governance outcomes. However, these studies are often limited by missing data, and suffer from the methodological limitation that important information is lost when we reduce textual information to quantitative data. This study was motivated by nine case studies that appeared to be inconsistent with the expectation that the presence of Ostrom’s Design Principles increases the likelihood of successful common pool resource governance. These cases highlight the limitations of coding and analyzing Large-N case studies.

We examine two issues: 1) the challenge of missing data and 2) potential approaches that rely on context (which is often lost in the coding process) to address inconsistencies between empirical observations theoretical predictions. For the latter, we conduct a post-hoc qualitative analysis of a large-N comparative study to explore 2 types of inconsistencies: 1) cases where evidence for nearly all design principles was found, but available evidence led to the assessment that the CPR system was unsuccessful and 2) cases where the CPR system was deemed successful despite finding limited or no evidence for design principles. We describe inherent challenges to large-N comparative analysis to coding complex and dynamically changing common pool resource systems for the presence or absence of design principles and the determination of “success”. Finally, we illustrate how, in some cases, our qualitative analysis revealed that the identity of absent design principles explained inconsistencies hence de-facto reconciling such apparent inconsistencies with theoretical predictions. This analysis demonstrates the value of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, and using mixed-methods approaches iteratively to build comprehensive methodological and theoretical approaches to understanding common pool resource governance in a dynamically changing context.

The structure and dynamics of ecosystems can affect the information available to resource users on the state of the common resource and the actions of other resource users. We present results from laboratory experiments that showed that the availability of information about the actions of other participants affected the level of cooperation. Since most participants in commons dilemmas can be classified as conditional cooperators, not having full information about the actions of others may affect their decisions. When participants had more information about others, there was a more rapid reduction of the resource in the first round of the experiment. When communication was allowed, limiting the information available made it harder to develop effective institutional arrangements. When communication was not allowed, there was a more rapid decline of performance in groups where information was limited. In sum, the results suggest that making information available to others can have an important impact on the conditional cooperation and the effectiveness of communication.

Social roles are thought to play an important role in determining the capacity for collective action in a community regarding the use of shared resources. Here we report on the results of a study using a behavioral experimental approach regarding the relationship between social roles and the performance of social-ecological systems. The computer-based irrigation experiment that was the basis of this study mimics the decisions faced by farmers in small-scale irrigation systems. In each of 20 rounds, which are analogous to growing seasons, participants face a two-stage commons dilemma. First they must decide how much to invest in the public infrastructure, e.g., canals and water diversion structures. Second, they must decide how much to extract from the water made available by that public infrastructure. Each round begins with a 60-second communication period before the players make their investment and extraction decisions. By analyzing the chat messages exchanged among participants during the communication stage of the experiment, we coded up to three roles per participant using the scheme of seven roles known to be important in the literature: leader, knowledge generator, connector, follower, moralist, enforcer, and observer. Our study supports the importance of certain social roles (e.g., connector) previously highlighted by several case study analyses. However, using qualitative comparative analysis we found that none of the individual roles was sufficient for groups to succeed, i.e., to reach a certain level of group production. Instead, we found that a combination of at least five roles was necessary for success. In addition, in the context of upstream-downstream asymmetry, we observed a pattern in which social roles assumed by participants tended to differ by their positions. Although our work generated some interesting insights, further research is needed to determine how robust our findings are to different action situations, such as biophysical context, social network, and resource uncertainty.

We use an agent-based model to analyze the effects of spatial heterogeneity and agents’ mobility on social-ecological outcomes. Our model is a stylized representation of a dynamic population of agents moving and harvesting a renewable resource. Cooperators (agents who harvest an amount close to the maximum sustainable yield) and selfish agents (those who harvest an amount greater than the sustainable yield) are simulated in the model. Three indicators of the outcomes of the system are analyzed: the number of settlements, the resource level, and the proportion of cooperators in the population. Our paper adds a more realistic approach to previous studies on the evolution of cooperation by considering a social-ecological system in which agents move in a landscape to harvest a renewable resource. Our results conclude that resource dynamics play an important role when studying levels of cooperation and resource use. Our simulations show that the agents’ mobility significantly affects the outcomes of the system. This response is nonlinear and very sensible to the type of spatial distribution of the resource richness. In our simulations, better outcomes of long-term sustainability of the resource are obtained with moderate agent mobility and cooperation is enhanced in harsh environments with low resource level in which cooperative groups have natural boundaries fostered by agents’ low mobility.

Allowing resource users to communicate in behavioural experiments on commons dilemmas increases the level of cooperation. In actual common pool resource dilemmas in the real world, communication is costly, which is an important detail missing from most typical experiments. We conducted experiments where participants must give up harvesting opportunities to communicate. The constrained communication treatment is compared with the effect of limited information about the state of the resource and the actions of the other participants. We find that despite making communication costly, performance of groups improves in all treatments with communication. We also find that constraining communication has a more significant effect than limiting information on the performance of groups.