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This dissertation consist two chapters related with misallocation and economic development.
The first chapter studies the organization of production, as summarized by the number of managers per plant, the number of workers per manager and the mean size of plants in terms of employment. First, I document that in the manufacturing sector, richer countries tend to have (i) more managers per plant, (ii) less workers per manager and (iii) larger plants on average. I then extend a knowledge-based hierarchies model of the organization of production where the communication technology depends on the managerial level in the hierarchy and the abilities of subordinates. I estimate model parameters so that the model jointly produces plant size distribution and number of managers per plant in the United States manufacturing sector. I find that when the largest, more complex, plants face distortions that are twice as large as distortions faced by smaller plants, output declines by 33.4% and the number of managers per plant falls by 30%. Moreover, I find that a 10% increase in communication cost parameters can account for a 35% decrease in the aggregate output without having a significant effect on the number of managers per plant.
The second chapter examines the relationship between bribery, plant size and economic development. Using the Enterprise Survey, I document that small plants spend higher fraction of their output on bribery than big plants do. Then I develop a one sector growth model in which size-dependent distortions, bribery opportunities and different plant sizes coexist. I find that size-dependent distortions become less distortionary in the presence of bribery opportunities and the effect of such distortions on the plant size become reversed since bigger plants are able to avoid from distortions by paying larger bribes. My results indicate that changes in the distortion level do not affect output and size significantly because managers are able to circumvent the distortions by adjusting their bribery expenditures. However, the removal of distortions can have a substantial effect on both the output and the mean size. Output in Turkey can increase by 12.3%, while the mean size can increase by almost double.
The first chapter studies the organization of production, as summarized by the number of managers per plant, the number of workers per manager and the mean size of plants in terms of employment. First, I document that in the manufacturing sector, richer countries tend to have (i) more managers per plant, (ii) less workers per manager and (iii) larger plants on average. I then extend a knowledge-based hierarchies model of the organization of production where the communication technology depends on the managerial level in the hierarchy and the abilities of subordinates. I estimate model parameters so that the model jointly produces plant size distribution and number of managers per plant in the United States manufacturing sector. I find that when the largest, more complex, plants face distortions that are twice as large as distortions faced by smaller plants, output declines by 33.4% and the number of managers per plant falls by 30%. Moreover, I find that a 10% increase in communication cost parameters can account for a 35% decrease in the aggregate output without having a significant effect on the number of managers per plant.
The second chapter examines the relationship between bribery, plant size and economic development. Using the Enterprise Survey, I document that small plants spend higher fraction of their output on bribery than big plants do. Then I develop a one sector growth model in which size-dependent distortions, bribery opportunities and different plant sizes coexist. I find that size-dependent distortions become less distortionary in the presence of bribery opportunities and the effect of such distortions on the plant size become reversed since bigger plants are able to avoid from distortions by paying larger bribes. My results indicate that changes in the distortion level do not affect output and size significantly because managers are able to circumvent the distortions by adjusting their bribery expenditures. However, the removal of distortions can have a substantial effect on both the output and the mean size. Output in Turkey can increase by 12.3%, while the mean size can increase by almost double.
ContributorsTamkoc, Mehmet Nazim (Author) / Ventura, Gustavo (Thesis advisor) / Herrendorf, Berthold (Committee member) / Ferraro, Domenico (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020