Matching Items (22)
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What does it mean to speak of governance in the absence of states? This dissertation seeks to answer this question through an empirical examination of the founding of two unique agricultural settlements constructed by the Jewish community of Palestine, also known as the Yishuv: the kibbutz and the moshav. Commonly,

What does it mean to speak of governance in the absence of states? This dissertation seeks to answer this question through an empirical examination of the founding of two unique agricultural settlements constructed by the Jewish community of Palestine, also known as the Yishuv: the kibbutz and the moshav. Commonly, in order to be considered effective, states must, at minimum, provide their population with two critical public goods: the satisfaction of their material needs and their physical protection through a military or police force. Dominant assumptions across multiple subfields of both Comparative Politics and International Relations content that because weak and failed states cannot provide their civilian populations with these critical public goods, that governance in the absence of effective, sovereign, and territorial states is a myth. It is often argued that violence, anarchy, and human suffering inevitably follow in the wake of state collapse and that in order to alleviate these problems, state building practices must focus on creating a fully sovereign state that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its borders. This dissertation questions these assumptions. Through quantitative analysis of an original dataset constructed from Israeli archival sources as well as a qualitative historical examination of declassified Israeli archival material from 1920-1948, this dissertation demonstrates that it is possible for non-state actors to construct institutions of governance within the context of a weak or failing state. The Jewish community, through its organs of governance, utilized the kibbutzim and the moshavim to provide the all important public goods of military defense and economic growth respectively. It is shown in this dissertation how political institutions can be crafted endogenously within weak and failing states and how these institutions may actually serve to increase political stability, staving off anarchy and violence.
ContributorsMuchlinski, David (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Hechter, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Why do religious organizations facilitate secular political activism in some settings and not others? This dissertation uses regional variation in political activism across Mexico to elucidate the relationship between religious organizations and political activism, as measured through associational activity and involvement in political protests. I utilize a quantitative analysis of

Why do religious organizations facilitate secular political activism in some settings and not others? This dissertation uses regional variation in political activism across Mexico to elucidate the relationship between religious organizations and political activism, as measured through associational activity and involvement in political protests. I utilize a quantitative analysis of 13,500 data observations collected from the nationally representative National Survey of Political Culture and Citizenship (ENCUP), supplemented by municipal and diocesan-level data from a variety of governmental and Church statistical databases, to test several theories describing religion's potential impact on political activism. I also utilize a qualitative comparative analysis examining the relationship between the Catholic Church and political mobilization in the Mexican States of Chiapas, Morelos, and Yucatán. I present an agent-based model developed to delineate the micro-level mechanisms linking Church institutional configurations and religion's pro-social effects to individual incentives to politically organize. The predictions of the agent-based model are assessed against my statistical dataset. The study finds where religious institutions devolve decision-making, monitoring, and sanctioning authority to the laity, individuals develop capacities to overcome collective action problems related to political activism. Religious ideology is also found to influence capacities for political activism.
ContributorsHale, Chris (Christopher) (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Hechter, Michael (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Hinojosa, Magda (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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The purpose of this paper is to examine why the Russian government has been taking political, economic, and military actions in Belarus and Ukraine, and the extent to which the Russian people support these actions. Many observers in the West seem to believe that the Russian government is forcing its

The purpose of this paper is to examine why the Russian government has been taking political, economic, and military actions in Belarus and Ukraine, and the extent to which the Russian people support these actions. Many observers in the West seem to believe that the Russian government is forcing its political will onto Russian citizens. However, public opinion research indicates that Russian citizens express a genuine support for the regime's political behavior in neighboring countries. Russian citizens seem to support the decisions to build closer relations with countries they consider culturally significant or culturally similar to themselves. Perhaps the clearest examples of these sentiments occur in relationships with Belarus and Ukraine. This is especially apparent when compared to Russian relations with the Baltic nations. Although these nations are home to a large numbers of Russians, the citizens of Russia do not consider the Baltics as significant as Belarus or Ukraine because of pronounced cultural differences. In this context, it seems as though Russian public opinion drives government action toward international relations with the Near Abroad nations perhaps just as much as the government influences public opinion.
ContributorsFranko, Blake Isaac (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis director) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Benkert, Volker (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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This paper examines the Syrian Civil War using seven different civil war settlement theories in order to assess the likelihood of a negotiated settlement ending the conflict. The costs of war, balance of power, domestic political institutions, ethnic identity, divisibility of stakes, veto player, and credible commitment theories were used

This paper examines the Syrian Civil War using seven different civil war settlement theories in order to assess the likelihood of a negotiated settlement ending the conflict. The costs of war, balance of power, domestic political institutions, ethnic identity, divisibility of stakes, veto player, and credible commitment theories were used in a multi-perspective analysis of the Syrian Civil War and the possibility of a peace settlement. It was found that all of the theories except for costs of war and balance of power predict that a negotiated settlement is unlikely to resolve the conflict. Although the Syrian government and the Syrian National Coalition are currently engaged in diplomatic negotiations through the Geneva II conference, both sides are unwilling to compromise on the underlying grievances driving the conflict. This paper ultimately highlights some of the problems inhibiting a negotiated settlement in the Syrian Civil War. These obstacles include: rival ethno-religious identities of combatants, lack of democratic institutions in Syria, indivisibility of stakes in which combatants are fighting for, number of veto player combatant groups active in Syria, and the lack of a credible third party to monitor and enforce a peace settlement.
ContributorsRidout, Scott Jeffries (Author) / Grossman, Gary (Thesis director) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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The purpose of this thesis is to study the happiest countries in the world and see what factors, laws, and values they have in common. I will be focusing on the Scandinavian countries, as they rank highest according to the World Happiness Report. First, I will research these countries to

The purpose of this thesis is to study the happiest countries in the world and see what factors, laws, and values they have in common. I will be focusing on the Scandinavian countries, as they rank highest according to the World Happiness Report. First, I will research these countries to learn more about their political, economic, educational, legal, and social landscapes. Then I will interview individuals from these countries on their views as well as values and thoughts on their country. Finally, I will compare and analyze this information to come to a conclusion to see if there are similar factors that allow these countries to be ranked so highly in the department of happiness. After reading this the reader can take away ideas of how to improve their happiness as well as new perspectives on other countries.
ContributorsFrasure, Laura S. (Author) / Moore, James (Thesis director) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Management and Entrepreneurship (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
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DescriptionThis thesis will exam the history of intra-Islamic conflict as well as its modern incarnations, and illustrate how minority regimes gained power over religious majorities in the Middle East, and used military power, social programs, and foreign aid in order to maintain that power.
ContributorsRamalho Rocha, Anita (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis director) / Pout, Daniel (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
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This thesis paper discusses the interplay between the intelligence community and the United Nations (UN) governing body, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the detection and dismantlement of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. With the intelligence community uncovering almost all of the clandestine nuclear programs that

This thesis paper discusses the interplay between the intelligence community and the United Nations (UN) governing body, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the detection and dismantlement of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. With the intelligence community uncovering almost all of the clandestine nuclear programs that have occurred in the world, it is important to ask if the intelligence community has an inappropriate amount of power over an objective UN structure. The cases of Iraq and Libya are used to highlight the relationship between major intelligence agencies and the IAEA as well as the existence of intermediary agencies created by the UN in special cases. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were both created to ensure Iraq's compliance with international weapons regulations. These appeared to be entirely autonomous and objective, which may have clashed with the intelligence community. However, research has proven that UNSCOM faced criticism for its connection to US intelligence agencies which UNMOVIC attempted to correct. Yet, the US was still able to utilize false intelligence that allowed them to internally justify a preemptive strike on Iraq. This disproven intelligence eventually ostracized the US intelligence community. The clear disregard for the expertise of the IAEA and the disapproval of the UN delegitimized both institutions. When Libya decided to dismantle its weapons programs, it answered to President Bush in the US and Prime Minister Blair in the UK. These communities kept the Libyan cooperation from the UN and IAEA until it could benefit their own nations. This type of power delegitimizes the UN regime and destabilizes an objective system. The ensuing struggle for jurisdiction and mandate confusion exemplified the confusion between a strong intelligence community and an unbiased international regime.
ContributorsHopkins, Audrey (Author) / Niebuhr, Robert (Thesis director) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state

In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state military they face significantly impact the scale of use and targeting selection of their suicide attacks. Older groups are predicted to carry out a decreased number of suicide attacks in comparison with younger groups, but increase their focus on attacking hard targets and decrease their focus on attacking soft targets, due to older groups being more likely to possess skilled terror operatives and to follow traditional guerrilla warfare practices. Groups that began using suicide terror later in their existence are predicted to carry out less suicide attacks than groups that adopt the tactic earlier in their histories, due to organizations having increased reliance on established practices and procedures. Groups fighting strong state militaries are predicted to carry out more suicide attacks, a higher proportion of attacks on soft targets, and be more reliant on suicide terror than are groups fighting weak militaries, as increased military pressure on groups decreases the effectiveness of their individual attacks, reduces their ability to train skilled operatives, and increases their desperation and incentive to use unconventional tactics. I conduct a quantitative analysis of 140 groups from 1998-2012 and find that older groups and groups that adopt suicide terror later in their existence carry out less suicide attacks than younger groups and groups that adopt suicide terror earlier in their histories. I also find that groups respond to increases in state military personnel by carrying out more suicide attacks overall, a higher proportion of suicide attacks against soft targets, a lower proportion against hard targets, and by becoming more reliant on suicide terror. These dynamics are also illustrated in depth through case study analysis of suicide terror campaigns by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which represent two distinct models of suicide terror.
ContributorsGoldenberg, Samuel Klapper (Author) / Wood, Reed (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Peterson, Timothy (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
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Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics, especially, discontented citizens. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, praising protesters, and sympathizing with them- or imposing economic sanctions because

Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics, especially, discontented citizens. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, praising protesters, and sympathizing with them- or imposing economic sanctions because of the host government's repressive behavior is now a significant component of diplomacy. Despite the growing importance of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements, little systematic research has been conducted on its causes and consequence. This study includes three interrelated papers to address this gap in the literature. The first paper addresses the question of why countries provide diplomatic support for protest movements. Focusing on Western diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, I argue that there are two reasons why Western democracies take diplomatic actions in support of protest campaigns. First, when the host government uses extreme violence against protesters; and second when the host government has an oppositional stance toward the U.S.-led liberal international order. I use original data of 523 diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2019 to test these theoretical expectations. The second paper asks whether and under what conditions diplomatic support is effective. I argue that diplomatic support is likely to reduce popular support or protest movements when it occurs alongside protesters' call for international help because it makes governments' common claim on the alleged coordination between opposition figures and foreign countries credible. I conduct a survey experiment among Iranian intelligentsia to test this argument. The results support the theoretical model. The third chapter asks whether the identity of supporter could make a difference in the public's attitudes toward protest movements. The central argument is that support from strategic allies is likely to weaken public support for protest campaigns. However, when diplomatic support comes from allies, it is likely to increase support for protesters. I test this theory by conducting a survey experiment of 1800 American citizens on the Black Lives Matter Movement. The findings show that the identity of supporters plays a crucial role in shaping public attitudes toward protest movements.
ContributorsAsadzadehmamaghani, Peyman (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Peterson, Timothy (Thesis advisor) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Hanson, Margaret (Committee member) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
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This dissertation grapples with the dynamics of intractable conflicts, especially those fought on religious grounds. Intractable conflicts are conceptualized as those which are particularly resistant to resolution. They tend to widen in scope, grow in destructive intensity, and even lengthen in duration. Traditional conflict resolution techniques such as negotiation and

This dissertation grapples with the dynamics of intractable conflicts, especially those fought on religious grounds. Intractable conflicts are conceptualized as those which are particularly resistant to resolution. They tend to widen in scope, grow in destructive intensity, and even lengthen in duration. Traditional conflict resolution techniques such as negotiation and mediation fail to manage or resolve such conflicts. Tangible issues with intangible salience are difficult to be resolved peacefully. Disagreements over religion have intangible significance, meaning they are difficult or impossible to define, understand and divide. They result in indivisible bargains, which subsequently lead to intense, persistent and hence, intractable conflicts. Existing literature mostly compares religious and non-religious conflicts and overlook the variations within religious conflicts, especially among different religious causes and their effects on conflict intractability. Operationalizing intractable conflicts in terms of their intensity and duration, I concentrate on conflicts between two world religions – Hinduism and Islam in India. Using the Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India (1950-1995) and Mitra and Ray’s (2014) extension of the same dataset (1996-2000), I classify religious conflicts into four types – (1) Conflicts over Sacred Sites, (2) Animal Slaughter, (3) Religious Festivities and (4) Mixed. I hypothesize that compared to the latter three conflicts, any conflict that involves Sacred Sites results in greater intensity and duration and hence, will be the most intractable. Moreover, in comparison to non-religious conflicts, the same holds true. My findings confirm these hypotheses and additionally demonstrate the varied effects that each of these types have on conflict intensity and duration.
ContributorsMukherjee, Chirasree (Author) / Thomas, George (Thesis advisor) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Fox, Jonathan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022