Matching Items (12)
Description
With the number of internationally-run clinical drug trials increasing, the double standards between those in developed nations and those in developing nations are being scrutinized under the ethical microscope. Many argue that several pharmaceutical companies and researchers are exploiting developing nation participants. Two issues of concern are the use of a placebo control when an effective alternative treatment exists and the lack of drug availability to the country that hosted the clinical trial should the experimental drug prove effective. Though intuitively this seems like an instance of exploitation, philosophically, exploitation theories cannot adequately account for the wrongdoing in these cases. My project has two parts. First, after explaining why the theories of Alan Wertheimer, John Lawrence Hill, and Ruth Sample fail to explain the exploitation in clinical drug research, I provide an alternative account of exploitation that can explain why the double standard in clinical research is harmful. Rather than craft a single theory encompassing all instances of exploitation, I offer an account of a type, or subset, of exploitation that I refer to as comparative exploitation. The double standards in clinical research fall under the category of comparative exploitation. Furthermore, while many critics maintain that cases of comparative exploitation, including clinical research, are mutually beneficial, they are actually harmful to its victims. I explain the harm of comparative exploitation using Ben Bradley's counterfactual account of harm and Larry May's theory of sharing responsibility. The second part of my project focuses on the "standard of care" argument, which most defenders use to justify the double standard in clinical research. I elaborate on Ruth Macklin's position that advocates of the "standard of care" position make three faulty assumptions: placebo-controlled trials are the gold standard, the only relevant question responsive to the host country's health needs is "Is the experimental product being studied better than the 'nothing' now available to the population?", and the only way of obtaining affordable products is to test cheap alternatives to replace the expensive ones. In the end, I advocate moving towards a universalizing of standards in order to avoid exploitation.
ContributorsFundora, Danielle (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
Many of us regularly make decisions with the intention of living longer, healthier lives. We try to eat right, exercise, take vitamins, get checkups, and keep our bodies in general good shape. Some of the enhancements we make that are meant to increase the length or quality of life go even further: organ or joint replacement surgeries, cosmetic surgeries, cancer treatments, etc. These kinds of enhancements and attempts at increasing one's life, or, in some cases, the feeling or look of youth, are not the focus of this essay. These adjustments are too minor. Here I focus on the potential for significant lifespan extension (SLE), with "significant" being the operative word. For the purposes of this article, I shall define SLE as an extension to the human lifespan that is at least 100 years greater than humans 'current lifespan, which now maxes-out at about 120 years. Lifespan extension of merely a few years, say if people could live to 130 or so, would not likely result in vast personal and social differences. However, SLE promises to have more interesting and impactful potential results.
ContributorsWhitney, Shannon (Author) / Calhoun, Chesire (Thesis director) / Botham, Thad (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2012-05
Description
The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of whether there are objective truths about what is good and bad in a sense that extends beyond merely meeting (or failing to meet) certain pre-determined standards. An answer to this question would provide a basis for answering more specific questions, such as: Are there acts that are universally bad? Are there truths about what kinds of life are the most worth living independent of the aims people choose for themselves? Is it possible for one person to be right in the case of value disagreement in this non-pre-determined sense? If the answer to these questions is Yes, what facts make this true? Lastly, I will reflect on what conclusions this exploration warrants adopting, and their possible implications.
ContributorsMurphy, Henry (Author) / Marneffe, Peter (Thesis director) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Bednarchik, Lori (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor)
Created2012-12
Description
I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns of addiction, Native American revenue streams, and the metaphysics of sport and integrity of the game.
ContributorsBurnell, Colby (Author) / Priest, Maura (Thesis director) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor)
Created2022-12
Description
The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7, according to the World Health Orignaztion, the mortality rate for COVID reached its lowest since March 9, 2020. I will take September 7 as the turning point for the ethics of the pandemic in this work. If we accept utilitarianism, deontology, or moral relativism, then, prior to the turning point, China’s Zero-COVID Policy was morally justified. Although China’s Zero-COVID Policy has remained controversial, I will propose that (1) the policy was justified on utilitarianism because it maximized utility, (2) the policy was justified on deontology because the policy is the Nash Equilibrium, and (3) the policy was justified on moral relativism because the policy was in accordance with the norms of the Chinese people.
ContributorsTao, Junru (Author) / Portmore, Douglas (Thesis director) / Priest, Maura (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Hugh Downs School of Human Communication (Contributor)
Created2023-05
Description
Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then there exist entities called personites. And if personites exist, then many of the ordinary prudential, social, and moral habits we engage in, like present self-sacrifice for future benefit, promising to do something painful in the future, or being held responsible for something the we did in the past, subjects personites to suffering without sufficient compensation, consent, or desert. And this would be immoral according to our common-sense morality. In this paper, I argue that if four-dimensionalism is true, and personites exist, then we are still morally permitted to engage in the above practices. If four-dimensionalism turns out to be true, it has no perverse implications on how we ought to live.
ContributorsRavi, Ashwin (Author) / Portmore, Douglas (Thesis director) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2022-05
Description
This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual’s relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state’s right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund’s theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable.
ContributorsHall, James Michael (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Huemer, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
Description
Principles of climate mitigation in environmental ethics often draw on either considerations of fairness and forward-looking concerns, or on justice and backward-looking concerns. That is, according to some theorists, considerations of the current distribution of climate benefits and burdens are foremost, while others take repairing historic wrongs as paramount. Some theorists integrate considerations of fairness and justice to formulate hybrid climate principles. Such an integrative approach is promising particularly in the context of environmental harm to indigenous subsistence peoples, who are among those suffering the most from climate change. I argue that existing integrative climate principles tend not to sufficiently emphasize considerations of backward-looking justice. This is a problem for indigenous peoples seeking reparations for environmental harm and violations of their human rights. Specifically, indigenous people in the Arctic suffer a cultural harm from climate change as they lose their land, and their way of life, to erosion, cementing their status as climate refugees. I argue that the current climate situation facing Native Arctic people is unfair according to Rawls' second principle of justice. In addition, the situation is unjust as indigenous people suffer from emissions by others and few attempts are made for reparations. Thus, Rawlsian fairness combined with reparative justice provide a befitting theoretical framework. I conclude that an acceptable climate principle will adequately integrate considerations of both fairness and justice, both forward-looking and backward-looking considerations.
ContributorsSweetland, Lauren (Author) / Brake, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained away by the moderate deontologist.
ContributorsCook, Tyler Blake (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.
ContributorsZhang, Alexander (Author) / Brake, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018