The first chapter studies the aggregate consequences of misallocation in a firm dynamics model with multi-establishment firms. I calibrate my model to the US firm size distribution with respect to both the number of employees and the number of establishments, and use it to study distortions that are correlated with establishment size, or so-called size-dependent distortions to establishments, which are modeled as implicit output taxes. In contrast to previous studies, I find that size-dependent distortions are not more damaging to aggregate productivity and output than size-independent distortions, while the implicit tax revenue approximately summarizes the effects on aggregate output. I also use the model to compare the effects of size-dependent distortions to establishments and to firms, and find that they have different effects on firm size distribution, but have similar effects on aggregate output.
The second chapter studies the effects of product market frictions on firm size distribution and their implications for industrial pollution in China. Using a unique micro-level manufacturing census, I find that larger firms generate and emit less pollutants per unit of production. I also provide evidence suggesting the existence of size-dependent product market frictions that disproportionately affect larger firms. Using a model with firms heterogeneous in productivity and an endogenous choice of pollution treatment technology, I show that these frictions result in lower adoption rate of clean technology, higher pollution and lower aggregate output. I use the model to evaluate policies that eliminate size-dependent frictions, and those that increase environmental regulation. Quantitative results show that eliminating size-dependent frictions increases output by 30%. Meanwhile, the fraction of firms using clean technology increases by 27% and aggregate pollution decreases by 20%. In contrast, a regulatory policy which increases the clean technology adoption rate by the same 27%, has no effect on aggregate output and leads to only 10% reduction in aggregate pollution.
The first chapter documents that intergenerational occupational persistence is significantly higher in poor countries even after controlling for cross-country differences in occupational structures. Based on this empirical fact, I posit that high occupational persistence in poor countries is symptomatic of underlying talent misallocation. Constraints on education financing force sons to choose fathers' occupations over the occupations of their comparative advantage. A version of Roy (1951) model of occupational choice is developed to quantify the impact of occupational misallocation on aggregate productivity. I find that output per worker reduces to a third of the benchmark US economy for the country with the highest level of occupational persistence.
In the second chapter, I use occupational prestige as a proxy of social status to estimate intergenerational occupational mobility for 50 countries spanning the breadth of world's income distribution for both sons and daughters. I find that although relative mobility varies significantly across countries, the correlation between relative mobility and GDP per capita is only mildly positive for sons and is close to zero for daughters. I also consider two measures of absolute mobility: the propensity to move across quartiles and the propensity to move relative to father's occupational prestige. Similar to relative mobility, the first measure of absolute mobility is uncorrelated with GDP per capita. The second measure, however, is positively correlated with GDP per capita with correlations being significantly higher for sons compared to daughters.
The third chapter analyses to what extent the growth in productivity witnessed by India during 1983--2004 can be explained by a better allocation of workers across occupations. I first document that the propensity to work in high-skilled occupations relative to high-caste men increased manifold for high-caste women, low-caste men and low-caste women during this period. Given that innate talent in these occupations is likely to be independent across groups, the chapter argues that the occupational distribution in the 1980s represented talent misallocation in which workers from many groups faced significant barriers to practice an occupation of their comparative advantage. I find that these barriers can explain 15--21\% of the observed growth in output per worker during the period from 1983--2004.
Abstract The first chapter discusses the policies that may have an impact on the long-run innovation capacity of developing economies. The existing literature emphasizes that the backward linkage of foreign-owned firms is a key to determining whether FDI is beneficial or detrimental to a domestic economy. However, little empirical evidence has shown which aspects of FDI policies lead to a strong backward linkage between foreign-owned and domestic firms. This paper focuses on the foreign ownership structure of these foreign-owned firms. I show that joint ventures (i.e, firms with 1%-99% foreign share) have stronger backward linkages than MNC affiliates (i.e, firms with 100% foreign share) with domestic firms. I also find that the differences in backward linkages are strong enough to translate into a positive correlation between domestic innovation and the density of joint ventures and a negative correlation between domestic innovation and the density of MNC affiliates. Finally, I find that the channel through which foreign ownership structure affects domestic innovation raises innovation TFP in domestic firms. My results suggest that policies that affect the foreign ownership structure of foreign-owned firms could have a persistent effect on domestic innovation because they shift the comparative advantage of an developing economy towards the innovation sector in the long run.
Abstract The second chapter provides a unified theory to study what causes the divergence in economic growth of developing economies and how the innovation sector emerges in the developing countries. I show that open developing economies become trapped at the middle-income level because they tend not to specialize in sectors that generate spillover or factor accumulation (the innovation sector). Using a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, I show that the fast growth of developing economies tends to end before they can fully catch up with the developed world, and the innovation sector will not operate in the developing countries. However, the successful growth stories of Korea and Taiwan challenge this view. In order to explore the economic miracle that happened in Korea and Taiwan, I generalize a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model by introducing technology adoption and explore how it generates spillovers to domestic innovation. I show that countries with policies that encourage technology adoption will benefit most from FDI: in addition to the fact that foreign technology raises productivity in the host country, the demand for skilled labor to adopt these technologies raises the education level in equilibrium, which benefits domestic innovation and leads to catch-up in the long run.
The second essay studies how heterogeneous households respond to the fast rising housing prices through their life-cycle behaviors. Chinese housing market has been undergoing a rapid booming period since 1998, causing the house prices increasing significantly. As a result, households endured severe financial burdens to buy homes at price-to-income ratios of around six. Along with the rising house prices, household savings rate has been increasing consistently since 1998. Can the rising house prices be an important factor to explain the increase in household saving rate? This paper develops a life cycle dynastic model with endogenous choice on housing, coresidence and intergenerational transfer, then quantitatively analyze the effect of housing price on household saving. It shows that housing is an important motive for saving, and it accounts for about 35% of the increase in household savings rate. The housing situation affects households’ saving behavior through three channels. First, households are financially constrained due to the down payment requirement and they choose to limit their consumption in order to buy houses. Second, young adults live in their parents’ houses for a long time and save more intensively, since they get to pay less for the housing expenses under coresidence. Thirdly, older parents make large sum of intergeneration transfer in aid of the children’s housing purchase, indicating the housing affordability issue also has influence on old parents’ saving decisions.
This article develops welfare-consistent measures of the employment effects of environmental regulation. Our analysis is based on a microeconomic model of how households with heterogeneous preferences and skills decide where to live and work. We use the model to examine how job loss and unemployment would affect workers in Northern California. Our stylized simulations produce earnings losses that are consistent with empirical evidence. They also produce two new insights. First, we find that earnings losses are sensitive to business cycle conditions. Second, we find that earnings losses may substantially understate welfare losses once we account for the fact that workers may have to commute further or live in a less desirable community after losing a job.