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Influenza has shown its potential to affect and even kill millions of people within an extremely short time frame, yet studies and surveys show that the general public is not well educated about the facts about influenza, including prevention and treatment. For this reason, public perception of influenza is extremely skewed, with people generally not taking the disease as seriously as they should given its severity. To investigate the inconsistencies between action and awareness of best available knowledge regarding influenza, this study conducted literature review and a survey of university students about their knowledge, perceptions, and action taken in relationship to influenza. Due to their dense living quarters, constant daily interactions, and mindset that they are "immune" to fairly common diseases like influenza, university students are a representative sample of urban populations. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 54% of the world's population lived in cities as of 2014 (Urban population growth). Between 2015 and 2020, the global urban population is expected to grow 1.84% per year, 1.63% between 2020 and 2025, and 1.44% between 2025 and 2030 (Urban population growth). Similar projections estimate that by 2017, an overwhelming majority of the world's population, even in less developed countries, will be living in cities (Urban population growth). Results of this study suggest possible reasons for the large gap between best available knowledge and the perceptions and actions of individuals on the other hand. This may lead to better-oriented influenza education initiatives, more effective prevention and treatment plans, and generally raise excitement and awareness surrounding public health and scientific communication.
ContributorsGur-Arie, Rachel Ellen Haviva (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis director) / Laubichler, Manfred (Committee member) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
Influenza is a viral infection with the potential to infect millions worldwide. In the case of such a pandemic outbreak, direct patient interaction is handled by the medical community, composed of hospitals, medical professionals, and the policies that regulate them. The medical community is responsible not only for treating infected individuals, but preventing the spread of influenza to healthy individuals. Given this responsibility, the medical community has drafted preparedness plans laying down guidelines for action in the case of an influenza pandemic. This project reviewed these preparedness plans for hospitals in Arizona as well as reviewing the literature produced by the Department of Health and Human Services to guide these plans. The review revealed that the medical community is woefully unprepared to handle the number of infected individuals, projected to be close to 90 million. Plans are disorganized, outdated, and nonexistent. The conclusions of this thesis offer suggestions for pandemic policy improvement.
ContributorsAbboud, Alexis J (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis director) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / O'Neil, Erica (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Two tasks have been predominantly used over the past thirty years to measure false belief understanding: the Location Task and the Typical Box task. These tasks have produced robust findings that children fail false belief tasks at age 3 and pass false belief tasks at age 4. Recent theory, however, points out a shared confound in the 2-option Location and Typical Box tasks. This confound would allow children to perform successfully on the standard false belief tasks without understanding belief. Instead, children might be using perceptual access reasoning and reason that ignorant agents will "get it wrong" and be incorrect about reality. Modified 3-option tasks were used to address this confound by introducing a third, irrelevant option to the 2-option tasks. According to PAR, children who pass 2-option tasks should perform worse on the 3-option tasks because there are two "wrong" answers. We argue that subtle differences in salience between the false belief and irrelevant options in combination with one open-ended test question can draw children who use PAR toward one or the other in unpredictable ways. To demonstrate that other procedures will give more salience to the irrelevant options several studies are needed, each with minor variations in procedure that do not alter the basic false belief structure. Thus in five studies we varied superficial characteristics across tasks in order to test for a task effect across studies. We used the "continuously cumulating meta-analysis" (CCMA) approach, combining each replication study into a broader analysis (final N=113) for higher power. Our CCMA analyses provide strong support for the PAR hypothesis because 1) children performed worse on the 3-option tasks than the 2-option tasks, 2) children's proportion of false belief responses out of non-reality responses did not replicate across studies, 3) children's proportion of reality responses replicated across studies, and 4) the Location task was easier than the Box tasks across studies. These findings suggest that there is a lack of construct validity in traditional false belief tasks; thus, new methods of testing for false belief understanding are needed to determine at what point children acquire Theory of Mind.
ContributorsPesch, Annelise Nicole (Author) / Fabricius, William (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Modern computers interact with the external environment in complex ways — for instance, they interact with human users via keyboards, mouses, monitors, etc., and with other computers via networking. Existing models of computation — Turing machines, λ-calculus functions, etc. — cannot model these behaviors completely. Some additional conceptual apparatus is required in order to model processes of interactive computation.
ContributorsThomas, Nicholas Woodlief (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Blackson, Thomas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
The study of literature, which has traditionally been the work of the humanities, has seemingly opened up to biology in recent years through an infusion of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. This essay examines two perspectives on the potential for reader/character identification, one perspective from cognitive/evolutionary studies, and the other from the humanities. Building on both perspectives, I propose my own notion of reader/character identification called immersive identification. I argue that fiction is especially suited to prompt readers to identify with fictional characters in an immersive way. Then, I demonstrate how different cognitive/evolutionary perspectives of fiction can accommodate my notion of immersive identification. Finally, I defend my account of immersive identification against a counterexample.
ContributorsDhein, Kelle James (Author) / Eder, James (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Cassell, Paul (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Human Evolution and Social Change (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
This thesis provides jurors in criminal cases with a body of advice to guide and enrich their understanding of legal proof, knowledge, and justification, in order to ensure that the American legal system is carrying out justice. According to Michael Pardo’s (2010) article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,’ there are five different possible accounts of the relationship between knowledge and legal proof, which vary based on the way they handle different perspectives on legal proof, epistemic concepts, and the extent to which justification is part of the goal or the goal of legal proof. I will argue that jurors in serious criminal cases should adhere to the knowledge account when evaluating evidence in trial. On this account the aim of a criminal trial is for the jurors to gain knowledge, ensuring that their verdict aims at something beyond a merely justified true belief.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
ContributorsSmith, Jenna (Contributor) / Botham, Thad (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
There is no doubt that inductive logic and inductive arguments are vital to the formation of scientific theories. This thesis questions the use of inductive inferences within the sciences. Specifically, it will examine various perspectives on David Hume's famed "problem of induction". Hume proposes that inductive inferences cannot be logically justified. Here we will explore several assessments of Hume's ideas and inductive logic in general. We will examine the views of philosophers and logicians: Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman, Larry Laudan, and Wesley Salmon. By comparing the radically different views of these philosophers it is possible to gain insight into the complex nature of making inductive inferences. First, Popper agrees with Hume that inductive inferences can never be logically justified. He maintains that the only way around the problem of induction is to rid science of inductive logic altogether. Goodman, on the other hand, believes induction can be justified in much the same way as deduction is justified. Goodman sets up a logical schema in which the rules of induction justify the particular inductive inferences. These general rules are then in turn justified by correct inferences. In this way, Goodman sets up an explication of inductive logic. Laudan and Salmon go on to provide more specific details about how the particular rules of induction should be constructed. Though both Laudan and Salmon are completing the logic schema of Goodman, their approaches are quite different. Laudan takes a more qualitative approach while Salmon uses the quantitative rules of probability to explicate induction. In the end, it can be concluded that it seems quite possible to justify inductive inferences, though there may be more than one possible set of rules of induction.
ContributorsFeddern, James William Edward (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / Department of Physics (Contributor) / Department of Military Science (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
The purpose of this research is to discuss and analyze the arguments found in animal-dependent research debates that are formed from the use of speciesism and liberationism. Speciesism is often used to draw distinctions between humans and nonhuman animals in an attempt to lessen or eliminate nonhuman animals from their inclusion in the human moral scope. On the other hand, liberationism is commonly used to argue that nonhuman animals should be included in the human moral scope by claiming that certain characteristics of nonhuman animals are morally important. Although it is not possible to include every viewpoint and style of argument created through the use of these two ideologies, I believe that the two chosen texts accurately represent the arguments made by the majority of those that endorse either one. With that said, both ideologies seek to either justify or condemn certain types of human action that affect nonhuman animals. Through the analysis of the speciesist and liberationist arguments, it has become evident that both speciesism and liberationism are ultimately lacking in their ability to justify or condemn human action that affects nonhuman animals. This discovery led to the creation of a speciesist/liberationist hybrid ideology that seeks to combine the most convincing features of each while avoiding most of the issues associated with either one. The result is a new theory that is able to produce more convincing justifications in regards to how humans ought to treat nonhuman animals.
ContributorsFuller, Stephen (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Minteer, Ben (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Dean, W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
The first chapter of this essay will focus primarily on the history of graffiti from what is generally understood as its origin with the first writers who used spray paint as their tools of creation up until modern times. This chapter will look at how the history has formed the general perception of this art form and how it has changed over the years. The second chapter will discuss three archetypes of graffiti seen today. These archetypes are: city funded art murals, city or privately funded freewalls, and artistic mitigations of vandalism. Each of these archetypes will be explored via multiple real world examples and we will consider how each of these examples do or do not succeed in displaying graffiti as a well regarded public art form. The third chapter will propose another archetype for creating graffiti that has not been widely realized or put into practice. The third chapter will then speculate using the knowledge from the previous existing archetypes to discuss whether or not it could be utilized in the real world effectively and a conclusion will be drawn about the methods of graffiti that are practical and effective means to create well regarded art.
ContributorsMiller, Quinn David (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Chew, Matthew (Committee member) / Minteer, Ben (Committee member) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
One of the central ideas in Rudolf Carnap's philosophy is that of convention. For Carnap, conventionality holds as long as there is some latitude of choice for which theoretical reasoning (correctness vs. incorrectness with regard to the facts) is insufficient and practical reasoning is needed to decide between the alternatives. Carnap uses this understanding of convention to show how one can circumvent the problem of justification for areas such as physical geometry and logic, and he also uses it to propose a new paradigm for philosophy, namely his proposal of the Principle of Tolerance. I maintain that such an understanding of conventionality is helpful and that it ought to be more widely adopted. I also believe that it would be difficult to apply this understanding of conventionality to the realm of religion, but it can be easily and helpfully applied to the realm of politics.
ContributorsBlair, Jarrod (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05