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This dissertation investigates how ideas of the right relationships among science, the public, and collective decision-making about science and technology come to be envisioned in constructions of public engagement. In particular, it explores how public engagement has come to be constructed in discourse around gene editing to better understand how

This dissertation investigates how ideas of the right relationships among science, the public, and collective decision-making about science and technology come to be envisioned in constructions of public engagement. In particular, it explores how public engagement has come to be constructed in discourse around gene editing to better understand how it holds together with visions for good, democratic governance of those technologies and with what effects. Using a conceptual idiom of the co-production of science and the social order, I investigate the mutual formation of scientific expertise, responsibility, and democracy through constructions of public engagement. I begin by tracing dominant historical narratives of contemporary public engagement as a continuation of public understanding of science’s projects of social ordering for democratic society. I then analyze collections of prominent expert meetings, publications, discussions, and interventions about development, governance, and societal implications human heritable germline gene editing and gene drives that developed in tandem with commitments to public engagement around those technologies. Synthesizing the evidence from across gene editing discourse, I offer a constructive critique of constructions of public engagement as expressions and evidence of scientific responsibility as ultimately reasserting and reinforcing of scientific experts' authority in gene editing decision-making, despite intentions for public engagement to extend decision-making participation and power to publics. Such constructions of public engagement go unrecognized in gene editing discourse and thereby subtly reinforce broader visions of scientific expertise as essential to good governance by underwriting the legitimacy and authority of scientific experts to act on behalf of public interests. I further argue that the reinforcement of scientific expert authority in gene editing discourse through public engagement also centers scientific experts in a sociotechnical imaginary that I call “not for science alone.” This sociotechnical imaginary envisions scientific experts as guardians and guarantors of good, democratic governance. I then propose a possible alternatives to public engagement alone to improve gene editing governance by orienting discourse around notions of public accountability for potential shared benefits and collective harms of gene editing.
ContributorsRoss, Christian (Author) / Hurlbut, James B. (Thesis advisor) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Collins, James P. (Committee member) / Crow, Michael M. (Committee member) / Sarewitz, Daniel R. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
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This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy,

This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.
ContributorsZhang, Alexander (Author) / Brake, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018