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I will examine the relation between techne and virtue as it appears in Plato‘s dialogues and suggest that in order to adequately confront our greatest political and social challenges our understanding must move beyond mere scientific and technical knowledge and our practices must move beyond the political art taught by

I will examine the relation between techne and virtue as it appears in Plato‘s dialogues and suggest that in order to adequately confront our greatest political and social challenges our understanding must move beyond mere scientific and technical knowledge and our practices must move beyond the political art taught by Gorgias and Protagoras. It is my belief that the Platonic conception of virtue and the political art that aims toward that conception of virtue offer a paradigm that can help remedy today‘s arguably technocratic political condition. I begin this work by exploring the nature of techne as it was understood in ancient Greece, and arguing (contra Irwin) that Plato did not hold a technical conception of justice. Whereas each techne establishes an eidos (idea, form, blueprint) in advance, which can be clearly known and uniformly applied in each particular case, I argue that Plato‘s conception of justice leaves all substantive content to be filled out in each concrete situation, precluding the possibility of the anticipatory disposition that techne affords and demanding a certain degree of deliberation in each situation, with attention paid to the unique aspects of each particular set of circumstances. I argue that this conception of justice informs Plato's notion of a "political art" and suggest that this art requires constant attention to the unique attributes of each particular situation in which we find ourselves, and that the pre-interpretive prejudice of many modern ideologies and political-economic perspectives hinders our ability to see the particularity in each situation and thereby reduces our capacity for achieving justice in the historically-situated, concrete moment within which we always must act.
ContributorsOlsen, Tyler (Author) / Crittenden, Jack (Thesis director) / Ramsey, Ramsey Eric (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05
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People often rely on experts' opinions and knowledge to inform their own decisions. This can be problematic, as expertise does not necessarily protect one from bias, and increased experience does not always increase an experts' accuracy (Cassidy & Buede, 2009; Goldberg, 1968; Molins et al., 2008). The nature of task

People often rely on experts' opinions and knowledge to inform their own decisions. This can be problematic, as expertise does not necessarily protect one from bias, and increased experience does not always increase an experts' accuracy (Cassidy & Buede, 2009; Goldberg, 1968; Molins et al., 2008). The nature of task characteristics of expert domains is associated with experts' performance (Shanteau 1992). The purpose of this thesis is to examine how people perceive experts in different disciplines, and to explore the factors that affect perceptions of expert objectivity. Perceptions of objectivity in 26 expert domains were examined. As hypothesized, higher ratings of clear and immediate feedback available to experts were associated with higher ratings of objectivity. However, other indicators of higher domain validity were not recognized by laypeople, such as higher levels of training and education. Contrary to our hypotheses, higher levels of familiarity with experts in a given domain and more experiences of disagreement with experts in a given domain were not associated with perceptions of objectivity. These results suggest that laypeople can correctly identify some indicators of the validity of different expert domains, but they cannot identify others. These perceptions affect how objectivity is perceived.
ContributorsVelez, Rebecca Ellen (Author) / Neal, Tess (Thesis director) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
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Description
There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the

There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought.
ContributorsHafdahl, Riquel J (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
This study investigates the presence of a dual identity defendant, and how sharing an in-group can create a judgment bias. A sample of 256 participants was used to test whether there was a relationship between judgment punitiveness, perceptions of shared identity, hypocrisy and the social identities (religion and sexual orientation)

This study investigates the presence of a dual identity defendant, and how sharing an in-group can create a judgment bias. A sample of 256 participants was used to test whether there was a relationship between judgment punitiveness, perceptions of shared identity, hypocrisy and the social identities (religion and sexual orientation) of the participants and a defendant charges with a sexual offence. Results suggest that Christian participants selected more punitive outcomes for the defendant compared to non-Christian participants. Further, participants were more punitive when the defendant was gay compared to when the defendant was heterosexual. Also, when the defendant was straight there was a stronger feeling of similarity between the participants and defendant compared to when the defendant was gay, and non-Christian participants had a stronger feeling of closeness to the defendant compared to Christian participants. There was a significant interaction found, suggesting that when the defendant was Christian and gay he was seen as more hypocritical compared to when he was Christian and straight; there was no interaction when the defendant was not Christian. These findings should aid in future research and a better understanding of how dual identity defendants are perceived in the courtroom.
ContributorsAltholz, Rachel Leah (Author) / Salerno, Jessica (Thesis advisor) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Schweitzer, Nick (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
A substantial amount of research has been dedicated to understanding how and why innocent people confess to crimes that they did not commit. Unfortunately, false confessions occur even with the best possible interrogation practices. This study aimed to examine how different types of false confession (voluntary, compliance, and internalization) and

A substantial amount of research has been dedicated to understanding how and why innocent people confess to crimes that they did not commit. Unfortunately, false confessions occur even with the best possible interrogation practices. This study aimed to examine how different types of false confession (voluntary, compliance, and internalization) and the use of jury instructions specific to confessions influences jurors’ verdicts. A sample of 414 participants read a criminal trial case summary that presented one of four reasons why the defendant falsely confessed followed by either the standard jury instruction for confessions or a clarified version. Afterwards, participants completed several items assessing the perceived guilt of the defendant, their attitudes on confessions in general, and their opinions on jury instructions. Although the three confession reasons did not differ among one another, jurors who were given no explanation for the false confession tended to more harshly judge the defendant. Further, the clarified jury instructions did not influence the participants’ judgments. Future research should focus on how expert witness testimonies affect verdicts regarding each type of false confession reason and whether the media may influence a juror’s knowledge of factors that could provoke false confessions.
ContributorsPollack, Andrew Christian (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
In recent years, the use of biologically based (neurological, neuropsychological, genetic) evidence in criminal trials as support for claims of mental impairments among offenders has increased in popularity. However, research on how exposure to those arguments affects jury decision-making remains unclear. Specifically, arguments rooted in biology sometimes mitigate and sometimes

In recent years, the use of biologically based (neurological, neuropsychological, genetic) evidence in criminal trials as support for claims of mental impairments among offenders has increased in popularity. However, research on how exposure to those arguments affects jury decision-making remains unclear. Specifically, arguments rooted in biology sometimes mitigate and sometimes aggravate judgments of criminal responsibility for mentally ill offenders, and this discrepancy seems to stem from the specific conditions by which that disorder was acquired. The following study’s aim was to uncover the precise mechanism(s) behind this elusive effect. Utilizing a 2x2 between subjects experimental design, participants were presented with a hypothetical crime summary involving an offender with either an onset controllable or uncontrollable mental disorder. Ratings of criminal responsibility and other variables hypothesized to function as mediators were obtained after presentation of a prime supporting either a biologically deterministic or free will argument for human behavior in general. Results indicated that when the defendant’s disorder was the result of the his own actions (onset controllable), a biological prime decreased judgments of criminal responsibility; however, when the disorder was caused by factors out of his control (onset uncontrollable), the prime increased judgments of criminal responsibility. An examination of several possible mechanisms finds the effect mediated by the perception of control the defendant could have had over his own actions at the time of the crime. These results suggest that perceptions of behavioral control are an important contributor to jurors’ formation of criminal responsibility judgments when an offender possesses a mental illness; and arguments advocating a biological basis for human behavior reliably affect blame attribution, suggesting that a societal shift in the perception of free will as a result of increased exposure to biology in general may alter the framework of criminal responsibility judgments.
ContributorsHunter, Shelby (Author) / Schweitzer, Nick (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017