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- All Subjects: Epistemology
- Creators: Creath, Richard
Description
This thesis provides jurors in criminal cases with a body of advice to guide and enrich their understanding of legal proof, knowledge, and justification, in order to ensure that the American legal system is carrying out justice. According to Michael Pardo’s (2010) article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,’ there are five different possible accounts of the relationship between knowledge and legal proof, which vary based on the way they handle different perspectives on legal proof, epistemic concepts, and the extent to which justification is part of the goal or the goal of legal proof. I will argue that jurors in serious criminal cases should adhere to the knowledge account when evaluating evidence in trial. On this account the aim of a criminal trial is for the jurors to gain knowledge, ensuring that their verdict aims at something beyond a merely justified true belief.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
Under the knowledge account the existence of any probatory errors or material errors sufficient to undermine knowledge in a trial are grounds for an acquittal. The definitions that I use for the material perspective and the probatory perspective differ from the standard notions of these terms. The term probatory more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. Evidence and/or propositions that are not probative do not prove or help prove a proposition at issue for the purposes of deciding on a legal verdict. The term material more commonly refers to evidence and/or propositions that are relevant to a legal case and establish or help establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. Evidence and/or propositions that are immaterial are irrelevant to a legal case and do not establish the truth or falsity of a point at issue in a legal case. I will use the following idiosyncratic definitions of the terms probatory and material as used in Pardo’s article ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’. The probatory perspective holds that truth is not essential to the goal of legal proof; instead, a proof standard is formulated that regulates whether the evidence meets the epistemic level set by the proof standard. A probatory error occurs when the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven. The material perspective includes truth as an essential part of the goal of legal proof, and on this perspective when probatory errors or material errors are made, the juror, the legal system, and the verdict have failed to achieve justice. A material error has occurred when either (a) the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that a proposition has met the requisite epistemic level set by the proof standard, yet a juror concludes that the proposition is proven and/or (b) the proposition did not actually occur and a juror concludes that the proposition did occur. The case of Troy Anthony Davis provides an example of a trial that was arguably free from probatory errors, because the conviction of Davis was supported by sufficient evidence for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Davis argued that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice, because material errors occurred in his trial viz., that he’s innocent and so the jury failed to find the truth.
According to Justice Scalia (2009), defendants do not have the constitutional right to challenge their convictions through the writ of habeas corpus multiple times on the federal level when the state court and district court have already ruled that their trial is free of procedural errors. Under Justice Scalia’s perspective, defendants like Davis have exhausted all avenues of post conviction relief, if the state and federal courts have not unreasonably applied federal law, even if the convicted defendants claim that material
errors occurred in his/her trial, i.e., the defendant actually did not commit the crime, yet the jury convicted the defendant. Justice Scalia argues that the district court would be in violation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it granted Davis the opportunity for a new trial, even if the district court was persuaded by the new evidence Davis provided to demonstrate that material errors occurred during his trial. Justice Stevens disagrees with Justice Scalia’s argument and upholds the constitutional significance of material errors. Justice Stevens argues that federal law, which bars death row inmates, who are actually able to prove their innocence, from receiving habeas corpus relief, may be unconstitutional even if their trials lack procedural errors.
Davis exhausted the maximal amount of recourse the American legal system could provide him. The state court, appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court all denied Davis post conviction relief. Troy Anthony Davis was executed by lethal injection on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m. For all the jury knew, however, Davis may very well have been innocent, even though he had a fair trial from a probatory perspective alone. If Davis were (and, he very well may have been) innocent, then a grave injustice has occurred. For the purposes of my thesis, I will use the Davis case as a case study and assume that Davis was innocent. I contest Justice Scalia’s ruling, arguing that a jury legally (and morally) should acquit a defendant if either probatory or material errors occur during his/her trial. The existence of these errors entails that the legal proof presented for the purposes of issuing a verdict failed to satisfy the knowledge account.
ContributorsSmith, Jenna (Contributor) / Botham, Thad (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
The study of wasp societies (family Vespidae) has played a central role in advancing our knowledge of why social life evolves and how it functions. This dissertation asks: How have scientists generated and evaluated new concepts and theories about social life and its evolution by investigating wasp societies? It addresses this question both from a narrative/historical and from a reflective/epistemological perspective. The historical narratives reconstruct the investigative pathways of the Italian entomologist Leo Pardi (1915-1990) and the British evolutionary biologist William D. Hamilton (1936-2000). The works of these two scientists represent respectively the beginning of our current understanding of immediate and evolutionary causes of social life. Chapter 1 shows how Pardi, in the 1940s, generated a conceptual framework to explain how wasp colonies function in terms of social and reproductive dominance. Chapter 2 shows how Hamilton, in the 1960s, attempted to evaluate his own theory of inclusive fitness by investigating social wasps. The epistemological reflections revolve around the idea of investigative framework for theory evaluation. Chapter 3 draws on the analysis of important studies on social wasps from the 1960s and 1970s and provides an account of theory evaluation in the form of an investigative framework. The framework shows how inferences from empirical data (bottom-up) and inferences from the theory (top-down) inform one another in the generation of hypotheses, predictions and statements about phenomena of social evolution. It provides an alternative to existing philosophical accounts of scientific inquiry and theory evaluation, which keep a strong, hierarchical distinction between inferences from the theory and inferences from the data. The historical narratives in this dissertation show that important scientists have advanced our knowledge of complex biological phenomena by constantly interweaving empirical, conceptual, and theoretical work. The epistemological reflections argue that we need holistic frameworks that account for how multiple scientific practices synergistically contribute to advance our knowledge of complex phenomena. Both narratives and reflections aim to inspire and inform future work in social evolution capitalizing on lessons learnt from the past.
ContributorsCaniglia, Guido (Author) / Laubichler, Manfred (Thesis advisor) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Mitchell, Sandra (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence. In order for intuitions to play a viable role in research they must be subject to certain constraints, regardless of whether they allow individual researchers to know that their theories are true. Metaphysicians are not permitted to use intuitions as arbitrarily having different evidential status in different circumstances, nor should they continue to use intuitions as evidence in certain disputes when there is disagreement amongst disputants about whether intuitions should have this evidential status.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
ContributorsMusgrave, Shea (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor A. (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014