Matching Items (7)
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- All Subjects: Philosophy of Science
- All Subjects: Epistemology
- Creators: Creath, Richard
Description
There is no doubt that inductive logic and inductive arguments are vital to the formation of scientific theories. This thesis questions the use of inductive inferences within the sciences. Specifically, it will examine various perspectives on David Hume's famed "problem of induction". Hume proposes that inductive inferences cannot be logically justified. Here we will explore several assessments of Hume's ideas and inductive logic in general. We will examine the views of philosophers and logicians: Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman, Larry Laudan, and Wesley Salmon. By comparing the radically different views of these philosophers it is possible to gain insight into the complex nature of making inductive inferences. First, Popper agrees with Hume that inductive inferences can never be logically justified. He maintains that the only way around the problem of induction is to rid science of inductive logic altogether. Goodman, on the other hand, believes induction can be justified in much the same way as deduction is justified. Goodman sets up a logical schema in which the rules of induction justify the particular inductive inferences. These general rules are then in turn justified by correct inferences. In this way, Goodman sets up an explication of inductive logic. Laudan and Salmon go on to provide more specific details about how the particular rules of induction should be constructed. Though both Laudan and Salmon are completing the logic schema of Goodman, their approaches are quite different. Laudan takes a more qualitative approach while Salmon uses the quantitative rules of probability to explicate induction. In the end, it can be concluded that it seems quite possible to justify inductive inferences, though there may be more than one possible set of rules of induction.
ContributorsFeddern, James William Edward (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Armendt, Brad (Committee member) / Department of Physics (Contributor) / Department of Military Science (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
Moral status questions, (who and what counts morally) are of central concern to moral philosophers. There is also a rich history of psychological work exploring the topic. The received view in psychology of moral status accounts for it as a function of other mind perception. On this view, entities are morally considerable because they are perceived to have the right sort of minds. This dissertation analyzes and tests this theory, pointing out both empirical and conceptual issues with the received view. The results presented show that important moral intuitions (for example about unjustifiable interpersonal killing) cannot be explained by appealing to other mind perception. Some alternative views of the psychology of moral status are presented, as well as avenues for further research.
ContributorsLaTourelle, Jonathan Jacob (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Van Gelderen, Elly (Thesis advisor) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Ellison, Karin (Committee member) / Becker, D. Vaughn (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
The relationship between science and religion in the modern day is complex to the point that the lines between them are often blurred. We have a need to distinguish the two from each-other for a variety of practical reasons. Various philosophies, theories, and tests have been suggested on the interaction between the two and how they are subdivided. One of the sets of criteria which has been shown to work was originally introduced in the opinion of Judge Overton in the case of McLean v Arkansas. McLean v Arkansas is a pivotal case in that it gave us a useful definition of what science is and isn’t in the context of the law. It used the already established Lemon test to show what counts as the establishment of religion. Given the distinction by Judge Overton, there are questions as to whether or not there is even overlap or tension between science and religion, such as in the theory of Stephen Jay Gould’s Nonoverlapping Magisteria (NOMA). What we find in this thesis is that the NOMA principle is doubtful at best. Through the discussion of McLean v. Arkansas, NOMA, and the commentaries of Professors Larry Laudan and Michael Ruse, this thesis develops a contextualization principle that can be used as a guide to develop further theories, particularly regarding the divisions between science and religion.
ContributorsAmmanamanchi, Amrit (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis director) / Minteer, Ben (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor)
Created2022-05
Description
In this dissertation, I explore the possibility of Latin American Futurism/s because Latin American visions of the future are primarily absent from the global conversation of alternative or counter futures. In three chapters, I expose three interrelated yet methodologically different approaches to understanding the emerging phenomenon of Latin American Futurism/s: A exploration of the connections between notions of visions of technology/futures for El Salvador's Bitcoin and South Cone's robots, the experiences and practices of local future-makers and their communities; and artifacts that characterize expressions of regional futuring. To comprehend the region's technological paradigms, I offer these socio-technical accounts of Future-making and Future-knowledge for/from Latin America as a geo-political region. Each element contributes, with its different interdisciplinary perspective, to characterizing "Latin American Futurism/s" as a form of technological rationality and regional futuring as an expression of shared paradigms about science and technology. These characterizations allow for an appreciation of the paradigms, strategies, and artifacts that configure domestic and professional futurity in Latin America, focusing on its objects and visions as mediators and sense-makers of what ought to come. In this manuscript, I offer a characterization of Latin American futurism/s to facilitate its recognition and understanding and to put in value the production of forward-oriented knowledge produced by people thinking and living in Latin America.
ContributorsPérez Comisso, Martín Andrés (Author) / Smith, Lindsay A (Thesis advisor) / Keeler, Lauren W (Thesis advisor) / Bennett, Michael G (Committee member) / Wetmore, Jameson (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
I examined the slogan, “Mental illnesses are illnesses like any other,” widespread in psychiatry and medicine, and in society more generally, to determine if it accurately and usefully characterizes mental illnesses, given current neurological and neurophysiological knowledge. Rather than focus on disease entities for comparison, I scrutinized the symptoms of somatic illnesses and mental illnesses and compared them in three areas: their production, their relationship to social and cultural context, and their potential use as indicators of underlying disease or dysfunction. In all three areas, I found that, contrary to the claim of the slogan, the symptoms of mental illness are not like the symptoms of somatic illness and therefore, by extension, mental illness is not “illness like any other.” I briefly surveyed the implications of this difference between mental illnesses and somatic illnesses, and provided some broad suggestions regarding how this finding might help to inform the characterization of mental illnesses, as well as help direct research and treatment of these conditions.
ContributorsDennert, James (Author) / Robert, Jason (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Phillips, Ben (Committee member) / Neisewander, Janet (Committee member) / Maienschein, Jane (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2024
Description
The study of wasp societies (family Vespidae) has played a central role in advancing our knowledge of why social life evolves and how it functions. This dissertation asks: How have scientists generated and evaluated new concepts and theories about social life and its evolution by investigating wasp societies? It addresses this question both from a narrative/historical and from a reflective/epistemological perspective. The historical narratives reconstruct the investigative pathways of the Italian entomologist Leo Pardi (1915-1990) and the British evolutionary biologist William D. Hamilton (1936-2000). The works of these two scientists represent respectively the beginning of our current understanding of immediate and evolutionary causes of social life. Chapter 1 shows how Pardi, in the 1940s, generated a conceptual framework to explain how wasp colonies function in terms of social and reproductive dominance. Chapter 2 shows how Hamilton, in the 1960s, attempted to evaluate his own theory of inclusive fitness by investigating social wasps. The epistemological reflections revolve around the idea of investigative framework for theory evaluation. Chapter 3 draws on the analysis of important studies on social wasps from the 1960s and 1970s and provides an account of theory evaluation in the form of an investigative framework. The framework shows how inferences from empirical data (bottom-up) and inferences from the theory (top-down) inform one another in the generation of hypotheses, predictions and statements about phenomena of social evolution. It provides an alternative to existing philosophical accounts of scientific inquiry and theory evaluation, which keep a strong, hierarchical distinction between inferences from the theory and inferences from the data. The historical narratives in this dissertation show that important scientists have advanced our knowledge of complex biological phenomena by constantly interweaving empirical, conceptual, and theoretical work. The epistemological reflections argue that we need holistic frameworks that account for how multiple scientific practices synergistically contribute to advance our knowledge of complex phenomena. Both narratives and reflections aim to inspire and inform future work in social evolution capitalizing on lessons learnt from the past.
ContributorsCaniglia, Guido (Author) / Laubichler, Manfred (Thesis advisor) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Mitchell, Sandra (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence. In order for intuitions to play a viable role in research they must be subject to certain constraints, regardless of whether they allow individual researchers to know that their theories are true. Metaphysicians are not permitted to use intuitions as arbitrarily having different evidential status in different circumstances, nor should they continue to use intuitions as evidence in certain disputes when there is disagreement amongst disputants about whether intuitions should have this evidential status.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies.
ContributorsMusgrave, Shea (Author) / Creath, Richard (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor A. (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014