Matching Items (6)
Description
Cochlear implants are electronic medical devices that create hearing capabilities in those with inner ear damage that results in total or partial hearing loss. The decision to get a cochlear implant can be difficult and controversial. Cochlear implants have many physical and social impacts on cochlear implant users. The aim of this study was to evaluate how patient narratives written by people with cochlear implants (or their caregivers) express issues of quality of life and personhood related to the use of this medical device. The methodology used to answer this question was a content analysis of patient narratives. The content analysis was done using grounded theory and the constant comparative method. Two sensitizing concepts, quality of life and personhood, were used and became the large umbrella themes found in the narratives. Under the major theme of quality of life, the sub-themes that emerged were improved hearing, improved communication skills, and assimilation into the hearing world. Under the major theme of personhood, the sub-themes that emerged were confidence, self-image, and technology and the body. Another major theme, importance of education, also emerged. In general, cochlear implant users and their caregivers expressed in their narratives that cochlear implants have positive effects on the quality of life of cochlear implant users. This is because almost all of the narrative writers reported improved hearing, improved communication skills, and better assimilation into the hearing world. In addition, it was found that cochlear implants do not have a significant affect on the actual personal identity of cochlear implant users, though they do make them more confident. The majority of cochlear implant users expressed that they view the cochlear implant device as an assistive tool they use as opposed to a part of themselves. Lastly, there is a need for more awareness of or access to education and therapy for cochlear implant users.
ContributorsResnick, Jessica Helen (Author) / Helms Tillery, Stephen (Thesis director) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Piemonte, Nicole (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
This dissertation examines songs, sticks, and stories pertaining to Tohono O'odham pilgrimages to Magdalena, Sonora, Mexico, the home of their patron saint, Saint Francis. In the sense that Tohono O'odham travel to Magdalena in order to sustain their vital and long-standing relationship with their saint, these journeys may be understood as a Christian pilgrimages. However, insofar as one understands this indigenous practice as a Christian pilgrimage, it must also be noted that Tohono O'odham have made Christianity their own. The findings show that Tohono O'odham have embedded, or emplaced, Christianity within their ancestral landscapes, and that they have done so in a variety of ways through songs, staffs, and stories. This work emphasizes connections between O'odham processes of producing places and persons. Songs associated with the journey to Magdalena, which contain both geographical and historical knowledge, foreground the significance of place and the movements of various persons at the places mentioned within them. The staffs of O'odham walkers, like other sticks, similarly contain both geographical and historical knowledge, evoking memories of past journeys in the present and the presence of Magdalena. Staffs are also spoken of and treated as persons, or at least as an extension of O'odham walkers. O'odham stories of good and bad walkers illustrate contested O'odham ideologies of socially sanctioned movements. Finally, this dissertation concludes by demonstrating some of the ways in which O'odham senses of their own history diverge from academic models of Tohono O'odham history and the history of Christianity in the Americas.
ContributorsSchermerhorn, Seth (Author) / Swanson, Tod D (Thesis advisor) / Brown, Eddie F. (Committee member) / Feldhaus, Anne (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
This Thesis contends that if the designer of a non-biological machine (android) can establish that the machine exhibits certain specified behaviors or characteristics, then there is no principled reason to deny that the machine can be considered a legal person. The thesis also states that given a related but not necessarily identical set of characteristics, there is no principled reason to deny that the non-biological machine can make a claim to a level of moral personhood. It is the purpose of my analysis to delineate some of the specified behaviors required for each of these conditions so as to provide guidance and understanding to designers seeking to establish criteria for creation of such machines. Implicit in the stated thesis are assumptions concerning what is meant by a non-biological machine. I use analytic functionalism as a mechanism to establish a framework within which to operate. In order to develop this framework it is necessary to provide an analysis of what currently constitutes the attributes of a legal person, and to likewise examine what are the roots of the claim to moral personhood. This analysis consists of a treatment of the concept of legal personhood starting with the Greek and Roman views and tracing the line of development through the modern era. This examination then explores at a more abstract level what it means to be a person. Next, I examine law's role as a normative system, placing it within the context of the previous discussions. Then, criteria such as autonomy and intentionality are discussed in detail and are related to the over all analysis of the thesis. Following this, moral personhood is examined using the animal rights movement of the last thirty years as an argument by analogy to the question posed by the thesis. Finally, all of the above concepts are combined in a way that will provide a basis for analyzing and testing future assertions that a non-biological entity has a plausible claim for legal or moral personhood. If such an entity exhibits the type of intentionality and autonomy which humans view as the foundation of practical reason, in combination with other indicia of sentience described by "folk psychology", analytic functionalism suggests that there is no principled reason to deny the android's claim to rights.
ContributorsCalverley, David J (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / Askland, Andrew (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
In Jeter v. Mayo, the Court of Appeals of Arizona in 2005 held that a cryopreserved, three-day-old pre-embryo is not a person for purposes of Arizona's wrongful death statutes, and that the Arizona Legislature was best suited to decide whether to expand the law to include cryopreserved pre-embryos. The Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Maricopa County Superior Court to dismiss a couple's wrongful death claim after the Mayo Clinic (Mayo) allegedly lost or destroyed several of their cryopreserved pre-embryos. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals explored ethical and legal issues relating to cryopreserved pre-embryos, including prior case law, the principles of statutory construction, and the Arizona Legislature's role in balancing the societal interests involved.
ContributorsChapman, Jennifer E. (Author) / Arizona State University. School of Life Sciences. Center for Biology and Society. (Publisher) / Arizona Board of Regents (Publisher)
Created2016-10-22
Description
This thesis poses the argument that abortion is morally impermissible because it causes harm to the embryo/fetus. To defend this, the author argues that the pre-conscious fetus has a level of moral status that warrants protection of its life, even if it is not yet considered a person. She uses the philosophical accounts of personhood and moral status offered by philosophers Bertha Manninen, Don Marquis, and Jack Mulder to situate her own arguments. The author devises a new harm principle to contend that the pre-conscious fetus can be a subject of harm. She then uses this harm principle to argue that the future person can also be a subject of harm and to argue that the pre-conscious fetus necessarily belongs to the future person. The underlying postulation of the thesis is that the pre-conscious fetus and the future person are related such that they cannot be separated in any way that is of moral significance. The person and the body are intrinsically and inextricably tied. The thesis contends that the pre-conscious fetus cannot exist without anticipating the existence of a future person and that it is thus in the fetus’s human nature to become a person. Because the fetus has a valuable future as a person, the thesis concludes that the fetus has a level of moral status equal to that of a person.
ContributorsDelvecchio, Emily Ann (Author) / Ron, Amit (Thesis director) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis director, Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor, Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-12
Description
In this paper, we offer three legal bases for the continued legality of abortion in the U.S. in alternative to the current rationale set by Roe v. Wade. After a brief history of abortion law and rhetoric that shows the abortion debates to center on unanswered assumptions about the value and nature of human life, we first propose, through philosophical analysis, that an embryo does not merit the same legal protections as a born human because the status of being unborn marks it as fundamentally different from one. Secondly, we examine the legal principle of bodily integrity and demonstrate its clear application to the pregnant women, whose right over her own body, we argue, is unjustifiably curtailed by anti-abortion laws. Finally, we proffer that abortion is justified even if we grant the embryo personhood by applying the legal concept of medical power of attorney to the rights that parents have over their children.
ContributorsSalazar, Jakob Andrew (Author) / Huntington, Patricia (Thesis director) / Kim, Linda (Committee member) / School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies (Contributor) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05