Matching Items (4)
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- All Subjects: International relations
- Creators: Thomson, Henry
Description
Our thesis is a cross collaboration between international relations and industrial engineering. We used a combination of database logic, programming, and Microsoft Visual Studio to organize and analyze Middle Eastern politics. Not only does the final product show raw data entry, but it also can answer complex questions about Middle Eastern relations- queries so complex that Google can’t answer them. We organized and analyzed geopolitical data to make it more accessible and easy, hopefully you enjoy!
ContributorsGranillo-Walker, Erin (Co-author) / Gomez, Livingstone (Co-author) / Wu, Teresa (Thesis director) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / School of Public Affairs (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
Our thesis is a cross collaboration between international relations and industrial engineering. We used a combination of database logic, programming, and Microsoft Visual Studio to organize and analyze Middle Eastern politics. Not only does the final product show raw data entry, but it also can answer complex questions about Middle Eastern relations- queries so complex that Google can’t answer them. We organized and analyzed geopolitical data to make it more accessible and easy, hopefully you enjoy!
ContributorsGomez, Livingstone Labaco (Co-author) / Granillo-Walker, Erin (Co-author) / Wu, Teresa (Thesis director) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Industrial, Systems & Operations Engineering Prgm (Contributor) / Industrial, Systems & Operations Engineering Prgm (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.
ContributorsSari, Angguntari Ceria (Author) / Thies, Cameron G. (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Neuner, Fabian (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
When does coercion succeed in international relations? Why do states resist coercion in some cases but concede in others? This dissertation adopts network analysis to investigate the network factors influencing the success and failure of economic and military coercion. The first chapter addresses the coercion target states’ information problem regarding how coercers would react to the targets’ resistances and concessions. By regarding resistances and concessions as network ties that can transmit information, it argues that past coercion outcomes endogenously influence targets’ current responses and coercion outcomes. Specifically, target states are more likely to concede to coercers who have been successful in gaining others’ compliance. Sender states are more likely to succeed in coercion when they had successful coercion in the past. The second chapter adds a condition to the first chapter’s argument. It argues that when being coerced by the same sender, a stronger sanction target’s compliance is likely to prompt a weaker target’s acquiescence, and that a weaker target’s resistance is likely to prompt a stronger target’s resistance. The third chapter explores how states’ positions in international security and economic networks influence the success and failure of military and trade coercion. States that occupy different network positions own different network power. I argue that when the coercion sender has relatively more network power than the target, the more likely coercion will be successful. I use interstate military alliances and arms transfer data to operationalize international security networks. International economic networks are operationalized by bilateral trade and regional trade agreements networks. Using military and trade coercion outcomes in the Military Compellent Threats (MCT) and the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) datasets as outcome variables, the statistical analysis partially supports my argument. Trade coercion is more likely to succeed when the sender has more network power. However, military coercion is less likely to succeed when the sender has more network power than the target.
ContributorsAi, Weining (Author) / Peterson, Timothy (Thesis advisor) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Chyzh, Olga (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023