Matching Items (12)
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- All Subjects: Security
- Creators: Computer Science and Engineering Program
Description
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology allows objects to be identified electronically by way of a small electronic tag. RFID is quickly becoming quite popular, and there are many security hurdles for this technology to overcome. The iCLASS line of RFID, produced by HID Global, is one such technology that is widely used for secure access control and applications where a contactless authentication element is desirable. Unfortunately, iCLASS has been shown to have security issues. Nevertheless customers continue to use it because of the great cost that would be required to completely replace it. This Honors Thesis will address attacks against iCLASS and means for countering them that do not require such an overhaul.
ContributorsMellott, Matthew John (Author) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Thesis director) / Thorstenson, Tina (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Modern computer processors contain an embedded firmware known as microcode that controls decode and execution of x86 instructions. Although proprietary and relatively obscure, this microcode can be modified using updates released by hardware manufacturers to correct processor logic flaws (errata). At the same time, a malicious microcode update could compromise a processor by implementing new malicious instructions or altering the functionality of existing instructions, including processor-accelerated virtualization or cryptographic primitives. Not only is this attack vector capable of subverting all software-enforced security policies and access controls, but it also leaves behind no postmortem forensic evidence since the write-only patch memory is cleared upon system reset. Although supervisor privileges (ring zero) are required to update processor microcode, this attack cannot be easily mitigated due to the implementation of microcode update functionality within processor silicon. In this paper, we reveal the microarchitecture and mechanism of microcode updates, present a security analysis of this attack vector, and provide some mitigation suggestions.
ContributorsChen, Daming Dominic (Author) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Thesis director) / Lee, Joohyung (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
We discuss processes involved in user-centric security design, including the synthesis of goals based on security and usability tasks. We suggest the usage of implicit security and the facilitation of secureuser actions. We propose a process for evaluating usability flaws by treating them as security threats and adapting traditional HCI methods. We discuss how to correct these flaws once they are discovered. Finally, we discuss the Usable Security Development Model for developing usable secure systems.
ContributorsJorgensen, Jan Drake (Author) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Thesis director) / VanLehn, Kurt (Committee member) / Wilkerson, Kelly (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
Apple’s HomeKit framework centralizes control of smart home devices and allows users to create home automations based on predefined rules. For example, a user can add a rule to turn off all the lights in their house whenever they leave. Currently, these rules must be added through a graphical user interface provided by Apple or a third-party app on iOS. This thesis describes how a text-based language provides users with a more expressive means of creating complex home automations and successfully implements such a language. Rules created using this text-based format are parsed and interpreted into rules that can be added directly into HomeKit. This thesis also explores how security features should be implemented with this text-based approach. Since automations are run by the system without user interaction, it is important to consider how the system itself can provide functionality to address the unintended consequences that may result from running an automation. This is especially important for the text-based approach since its increase in expressiveness makes it easier for a user to make a mistake in programming that leads to a security concern. The proposed method for preventing unintended side effects is using a simulation to run every automation prior to actually running the automation on real-world devices. This approach allows users to code some conditions that must be satisfied in order for the automation to run on devices in the home. This thesis describes the creation of such a program that successfully simulates every device in the home. There were limitations, however, with Apple's HomeKit framework, which made it impractical to match the state of simulated devices to real devices in the home. Without being able to match the current state of the home to the current state of the simulation, this method cannot satisfy the goal of ensuring that certain adverse effects will not occur as a result of automations. Other smart home control platforms that provide more extensibility could be used to create this simulation-based security approach. Perhaps as Apple continues to open up their HomeKit platform to developers, this approach may be feasible within Apple's ecosystem at some point in the future.
ContributorsSharp, Trevor Ryan (Co-author) / Sharp, Trevor (Co-author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Department of Management and Entrepreneurship (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
One of the major sources of authentication is through the use of username and password systems. Ideally, each password is a unique identifier known by a single individual. In reality however, exposed passwords from past data breaches reveal vulnerabilities that are traceable to passwords created today. Vulnerabilities include repetitions of characters, words, character sequences, and phrases that are used in a password. This project was observed in English to highlight the vulnerabilities that can come from utilizing the English language. However, the vulnerabilities highlighted in this project can also be applicable in languages across the world. It was observed that through the common types of digital attacks, brute force attack and dictionary attack work effectively against weak passwords. Brute force attack revealed that a user could expose an alphanumeric password of length eight in as little as one and a half days. In addition, dictionary attacks revealed that an alphanumeric password of length eight can be exposed in a shorter amount of time if the password contains a single long word or phrase thought to be secure. During this attack analysis, it found that passwords become significantly more secure in the utilization of alphanumeric passwords of minimal length of eight. In addition, the password must also not be a particular phrase or word with simplistic characteristics for adequate strength against dictionary attack. The solution to using username and password systems is to create a password utilizing as many characters as possible while still retaining memorability. If creating a password of this type is not feasible, there is a need to use technological solutions to keep the current system of username and passwords as secure as possible under daily life. Otherwise, there will be a need to replace the username and password system altogether before it becomes insecure by technology.
ContributorsTipton, Tony T (Co-author) / Tipton, Tony (Co-author) / Meuth, Ryan (Thesis director) / Tirupalavanam, Ganesh (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Despite the more tightly controlled permissions and Java framework used by most programs in the Android operating system, an attacker can use the same classic vulnerabilities that exist for traditional Linux binaries on the programs in the Android operating system. Some classic vulnerabilities include stack overows, string formats, and heap meta-information corruption. Through the exploitation of these vulnerabilities an attacker can hijack the execution ow of an application. After hijacking the execution ow, an attacker can then violate the con_dentiality, integrity, or availability of the operating system. Over the years, the operating systems and compliers have implemented a number of protections to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable programs. The most widely implemented protections include Non-eXecutable stack (NX Stack), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Stack Canaries (Canaries). NX Stack protections prevent the injection and execution of arbitrary code through the use of a permissions framework within a program. Whereas, ASLR and Canaries rely on obfuscation techniques to protect control ow, which requires su_cient entropy between each execution. Early in the implementation of these protections in Linux, researchers discovered that without su_cient entropy between executions, ASLR and Canaries were easily bypassed. For example, the obfuscation techniques were useless in programs that ran continuously because the programs did not change the canaries or re-randomize the address space. Similarly, aws in the implementation of ASLR and Canaries in Android only re-randomizes the values after rebooting, which means the address space locations and canary values remain constant across the executions of an Android program. As a result, an attacker can hijack the control ow Android binaries that contain control ow vulnerabilities. The purpose of this paper is to expose these aws and the methodology used to verify their existence in Android versions 4.1 (Jelly Bean) through 8.0 (Oreo).
ContributorsGibbs, Wil (Author) / Doupe, Adam (Thesis director) / Shoshitaishvili, Yan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Third-party mixers are used to heighten the anonymity of Bitcoin users. The mixing techniques implemented by these tools are often untraceable on the blockchain, making them appealing to money launderers. This research aims to analyze mixers currently available on the deep web. In addition, an in-depth case study is done on an open-source bitcoin mixer known as Penguin Mixer. A local version of Penguin Mixer was used to visualize mixer behavior under specific scenarios. This study could lead to the identification of vulnerabilities in mixing tools and detection of these tools on the blockchain.
ContributorsPakki, Jaswant (Author) / Doupe, Adam (Thesis director) / Shoshitaishvili, Yan (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Ethereum smart contracts are susceptible not only to those vulnerabilities common to all software development domains, but also to those arising from the peculiar execution model of the Ethereum Virtual Machine. One of these vulnerabilities, a susceptibility to re-entrancy attacks, has been at the center of several high-profile contract exploits. Currently, there exist many tools to detect these vulnerabilties, as well as languages which preempt the creation of contracts exhibiting these issues, but no mechanism to address them in an automated fashion. One possible approach to filling this gap is direct patching of source files. The process of applying these patches to contracts written in Solidity, the primary Ethereum contract language, is discussed. Toward this end, a survey of deployed contracts is conducted, focusing on prevalence of language features and compiler versions. A heuristic approach to mitigating a particular class of re-entrancy vulnerability is developed, implemented as the SolPatch tool, and examined with respect to its limitations. As a proof of concept and illustrative example, a simplified version of the contract featured in a high-profile exploit is patched in this manner.
ContributorsLehman, Maxfield Chance Christian (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Node.js is an extremely popular development framework for web applications. The appeal of its event-driven, asynchronous flow and the convenience of JavaScript as its programming language have driven its rapid growth, and it is currently deployed by leading companies in retail, finance, and other important sectors. However, the tools currently available for Node.js developers to secure their applications against malicious attackers are notably scarce. While there has been a substantial amount of security tools created for web applications in many other languages such as PHP and Java, very little exists for Node.js applications. This could compromise private information belonging to companies such as PayPal and WalMart. We propose a tool to statically analyze Node.js web applications for five popular vulnerabilites: cross-site scripting, SQL injection, server-side request forgery, command injection, and code injection. We base our tool off of JSAI, a platform created to parse client-side JavaScript for security risks. JSAI is novel because of its configuration capabilities, which allow a user to choose between various analysis options at runtime in order to select the most thorough analysis with the least amount of processing time. We contribute to the development of our tool by rigorously analyzing and documenting vulnerable functions and objects in Node.js that are relevant to the vulnerabilities we have selected. We intend to use this documentation to build a robust Node.js static analysis tool and we hope that other developers will also incorporate this analysis into their Node.js security projects.
ContributorsWasserman, Jonathan Kanter (Author) / Doupe, Adam (Thesis director) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Zhao, Ziming (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
Description
IoT Media broadcast devices, such as the Roku stick, Amazon Fire, and Chromecast have been emerging onto the market recently as a portable and inexpensive alternative to cable and disk players, allowing easy integration between home and business Wi-Fi networks and television systems capable of supporting HDMI inputs without the additional overhead of setting up a heavy or complicated player or computer. The rapid expansion of these products as a mechanism to provide for TV Everywhere services for entertainment as well as cheap office appliances brings yet another node in the rapidly expanding network of IoT that surrounds us today. However, the security implications of these devices are nearly unexplored, despite their prevalence. In this thesis, I will go over the structure and mechanisms of Chromecast, and explore some of the potential exploits and consequences of the device. The thesis contains an overview of the inner workings of Chromecast, goes over the segregation and limited control and fundamental design choices of the Android based OS. It then identifies the objectives of security, four different potential methods of exploit to compromise those objectives on a Chromecast and/or its attached network, including rogue applications, traffic sniffing, evil access points and the most effective one: deauthentication attack. Tests or relevant analysis were carried out for each of these methods, and conclusions were drawn on their effectiveness. There is then a conclusion revolving around the consequences, mitigation and the future implications of security issues on Chromecast and the larger IoT landscape.
ContributorsHuang, Kaiyi (Author) / Zhao, Ziming (Thesis director) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12