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I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns of addiction, Native American revenue streams, and the metaphysics of

I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns of addiction, Native American revenue streams, and the metaphysics of sport and integrity of the game.

ContributorsBurnell, Colby (Author) / Priest, Maura (Thesis director) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor)
Created2022-12
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The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7, according to the World Health Orignaztion, the mortality rate for

The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7, according to the World Health Orignaztion, the mortality rate for COVID reached its lowest since March 9, 2020. I will take September 7 as the turning point for the ethics of the pandemic in this work. If we accept utilitarianism, deontology, or moral relativism, then, prior to the turning point, China’s Zero-COVID Policy was morally justified. Although China’s Zero-COVID Policy has remained controversial, I will propose that (1) the policy was justified on utilitarianism because it maximized utility, (2) the policy was justified on deontology because the policy is the Nash Equilibrium, and (3) the policy was justified on moral relativism because the policy was in accordance with the norms of the Chinese people.

ContributorsTao, Junru (Author) / Portmore, Douglas (Thesis director) / Priest, Maura (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Hugh Downs School of Human Communication (Contributor)
Created2023-05
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Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then there exist entities called personites. And if personites exist, then

Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then there exist entities called personites. And if personites exist, then many of the ordinary prudential, social, and moral habits we engage in, like present self-sacrifice for future benefit, promising to do something painful in the future, or being held responsible for something the we did in the past, subjects personites to suffering without sufficient compensation, consent, or desert. And this would be immoral according to our common-sense morality. In this paper, I argue that if four-dimensionalism is true, and personites exist, then we are still morally permitted to engage in the above practices. If four-dimensionalism turns out to be true, it has no perverse implications on how we ought to live.

ContributorsRavi, Ashwin (Author) / Portmore, Douglas (Thesis director) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2022-05
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Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their

Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained away by the moderate deontologist.
ContributorsCook, Tyler Blake (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy,

This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.
ContributorsZhang, Alexander (Author) / Brake, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018