Matching Items (2)
Description
This qualitative study examined one perennial research question: What lessons from the works of Machiavelli can be taken into consideration to improve U.S. civil-military relations? A case for looking at Machiavelli’s works for solutions to improve military relations off the battlefield is established. This research found two primary themes within the realm of civil-military relations: civilian control of the military and the military doctrine and practices. The researcher examined and analyzed multiple forms of data, including the writings of Machiavelli, military policies, articles, reports from the department of defense, video recordings of interviews, legislation, and historical documents. The researcher analyzed Machiavelli’s The Prince, Discourses on Livy, Art of War, and secondary resources for La Cagione dell’Ordinanza to make conclusions. This research identified lessons from the works of Machiavelli to improve U.S. civil-military relations. The Machiavellian lessons included finding a balance of objective and subjective control of the military, ensuring the president is knowledgeable on military matters, placing an emphasis on conditioning our youth, funding weapons systems and equipment, and continuing to invest in the standing army. Limitations and Future research topics were suggested in the conclusion.Keywords: Machiavelli, civil-military relations, civilian control, military doctrine, task-organization
ContributorsWright, Danny (Author) / Zuckert, Catherine (Thesis advisor) / Seagrave, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Stantchev, Stefan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.
ContributorsZerba, Shaio Hui (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019