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Description
I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In

I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to

evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.

In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue

from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
ContributorsHernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Created1925-19-39 (uncertain)
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