Matching Items (3)
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Description
The success of Bitcoin has generated significant interest in the financial community to understand whether the technological underpinnings of the cryptocurrency paradigm can be leveraged to improve the efficiency of financial processes in the existing infrastructure. Various alternative proposals, most notably, Ripple and Ethereum, aim to provide solutions to the

The success of Bitcoin has generated significant interest in the financial community to understand whether the technological underpinnings of the cryptocurrency paradigm can be leveraged to improve the efficiency of financial processes in the existing infrastructure. Various alternative proposals, most notably, Ripple and Ethereum, aim to provide solutions to the financial community in different ways. These proposals derive their security guarantees from either the computational hardness of proof-of-work or voting based distributed consensus mechanism, both of which can be computationally expensive. Furthermore, the financial audit requirements for a participating financial institutions have not been suitably addressed.

This thesis presents a novel approach of constructing a non-consensus based decentralized financial transaction processing model with a built-in efficient audit structure. The problem of decentralized inter-bank payment processing is used for the model design. The two key insights used in this work are (1) to utilize a majority signature based replicated storage protocol for transaction authorization, and (2) to construct individual self-verifiable audit trails for each node as opposed to a common Blockchain. Theoretical analysis shows that the model provides cryptographic security for transaction processing and the presented audit structure facilitates financial auditing of individual nodes in time independent of the number of transactions.
ContributorsGupta, Saurabh (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Herlihy, Maurice (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
This study investigates the relation between the line of service (audit, tax, advisory) of Big Four office managing partners (OMPs) and both non-audit service fees and audit quality. Given that audit quality has been shown to vary across offices and because changes in office-level leadership can impact the office culture,

This study investigates the relation between the line of service (audit, tax, advisory) of Big Four office managing partners (OMPs) and both non-audit service fees and audit quality. Given that audit quality has been shown to vary across offices and because changes in office-level leadership can impact the office culture, I examine the impact of the OMP’s line of service on non-audit service fees and audit quality. I find that when an accounting firm office changes leadership to an advisory OMP, non-audit service revenues increase while audit quality suffers. This finding is consistent with advisory partners encouraging an office culture that emphasizes selling non-audit services more than conducting quality audits. Overall, this study provides evidence consistent with regulators’ concerns that the recent trend toward greater advisory services at the largest accounting firms reduces their focus on providing high-quality audits, thereby leading to decreased audit quality.
ContributorsMowchan, Michael (Author) / Kaplan, Steven E (Thesis advisor) / Lamoreaux, Phillip T (Committee member) / Call, Andrew C. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and

Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.
ContributorsHayes, Matthew J (Author) / Reckers, Philip (Thesis advisor) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / Maksymov, Eldar (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016