Nature's own voice: reason, nature, and the birth of natural law

In this dissertation, I argue that the original development of Natural Law Theory (NLT) by the Stoics of the second and first centuries B.C. was not merely an outpouring or natural byproduct of an earlier philosophic achievement in Plato and Aristotle, but a reaction to it, specifically, an effort to correct certain problems that had surfaced as a result of discussion within and challenges to the broader eudaimonistic tradition. Prior to Cicero's writings in particular, the term "natural law" appears only occasionally in the philosophic texts, and never as a term signifying a coherent and developed moral theory. A central part of my argument will be to demonstrate the negative thesis that neither Plato nor Aristotle defended a version of NLT - a claim that current scholarship does not universally accept. The primary reason for my claim, I argue, is that neither Plato nor Aristotle accepted a conception of nature (physis) that contained a normative element that could be understood in terms of law (nomos) and its accompanying notions of command and obligation. This negative thesis is important because it clarifies the central modification the Stoics make on the eudaimonistic tradition, namely, the advancement of a distinct theory of nature, one in which they identify physis with "Divine Reason." The "theological conception" of physis, as I shall call it, entails a breakdown of the nomos-physis dichotomy that had been central to Greek thought for centuries prior and thereby makes possible the birth of NLT.