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In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the

following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market

over time, each agent is restricted by a

In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the

following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market

over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A

form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can

manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In

such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one

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  • 2020
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    • Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2020

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