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In the first chapter, I study the two-sided, dynamic matching problem that occurs in the United States (US) foster care system. In this market, foster parents and foster children can

In the first chapter, I study the two-sided, dynamic matching problem that occurs in the United States (US) foster care system. In this market, foster parents and foster children can form reversible foster matches, which may disrupt, continue in a reversible state, or transition into permanency via adoption. I first present an empirical analysis that yields four new stylized facts related to match transitions of children in foster care and their exit through adoption.

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Date Created
  • 2019
Resource Type
  • Text
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    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2019
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Economic theory

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    by Diana Elizabeth MacDonald

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